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Abstract 
Mortgage loans are the major assets securitised by South African banks. Arguments from 
the literature indicate that the use of securitisation as an instrument for regulatory 
arbitrage weakened banks’ soundness and caused, at least partially, the 2007-2008 Global 
Financial Crisis. In this regard, financial institutions continually took advantage of the 
loopholes in the Basel regulation, principally that of Basel I.  
 
Undertaken from both the empirical and theoretical angles, this thesis investigated 
whether regulatory capital arbitrage under Basel II and III regulations, was a driver of 
mortgage loans securitisation by South African banks. Additionally, the effect of mortgage 
loans securitisation on the South African banks’ stability was analysed. Furthermore, the 
project built upon the case of mortgage loans securitisation to deepen the insight on banks’ 
behaviour towards risk, by considering a rare contractual relationship where banks are 
regarded as agents acting on behalf of regulators. The theoretical examination was carried 
out by means of perspectives from Agency and Institutional Theories.  
 
The South African banking system is essentially monopolistic with five banks holding more 
than 90% of total assets, out of which four, with 70% of the assets, consistently report 
outstanding volume of mortgage loans securitised. Based on the data collected from these 
four major banks, this research project is the first in many regards. It involves an emerging 
economy, considers the influence of both Basel II and III regulations, covers the period 
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2008 to 2015, and focuses on well-capitalised banks exclusively. Moreover, it extends 
regulatory capital arbitrage analysis to the evidence of loans expansion, includes CAMELS 
as bank stability proxy and brings in Agency Theory and Institutional Theory to explain 
banks’ behaviour with regards to risk in this particular context. In contrast, other studies 
were concentrated on Europe and America, mostly under Basel I, limited to one or two 
baseline models for regulatory capital arbitrage and often only the Z-score measure was 
used for bank stability.  
  
In three major steps, this study first employed the Ordinary Least Squares statistical 
methodology to test the capital arbitrage theory of securitisation and other of its features 
whereby it causes the decrease of capital with little or no reduction of risk. The estimation 
results indicated that securitisation of mortgage loans lessened South African banks’ 
regulatory capital, increased their overall risk level and moreover, suggested that the 
proceeds from securitisation were used to expand their loans portfolios. These outcomes 
tentatively imply that South African banks securitise mortgage loans for regulatory capital 
arbitrage.  
  
The second step explored the impact of securitisation of mortgage loans on South African 
banks’ stability.  Two different measures of bank stability were involved: the CAMELS and 
the Z-score. CAMELS stands for C: capital (leverage ratio and not the regulatory capital); 
A: assets quality; M: management efficiency; E: earning; L: liquidity; and S: sensitivity to 
 iii 
 
market risk (interest risk). The Two Stage Least Squares and the Ordinary Least Squares 
statistical methods were used respectively for the analysis of the relationship between the 
two bank stability indicators and the outstanding volume of mortgage securitised. The 
empirical results from CAMELS showed that mortgage loans securitised negatively 
affected the level of capital proxied by the leverage ratio, eroded assets quality and 
increased South African banks’ overall costs. However, they had a positive effect on South 
African banks’ profit, they seemed to be an additional source of liquidity and represented 
a useful tool to curtail market risk sensitivity, especially the interest risk as they increased 
net interest income. With regards to the analysis with the Z-score, the results indicated a 
negative impact of mortgage securitised on South African banks’ stability. The outcome 
remained unchanged when retained interests in the form of subordinated loans were 
included in the analysis, but retained interest had a positive influence on the Z-score. 
 
The last step of this study pertained to the theoretical analysis based on the concepts of 
Agency Theory and Institutional Theory. Acting as regulators’ agents in an agency 
relationship, the simple model of Agency Theory in its extended form explained that South 
African banks were first and foremost risk-taking players. They were more interested in 
the risk/reward trade-off in their decision-making attitude towards risk than pursuing the 
regulators’ goal of the stability of the banking system. In that sense, it was not a surprise 
that they engaged in regulatory capital arbitrage despite knowing that it was risky but could 
provide gains in liquidity and profit. In addition to goals conflict, Agency Theory indicated 
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asymmetry of information between banks and regulators as the indirect origin of 
regulatory capital arbitrage, where the opacity of banks’ activities, such as securitisation, 
rendered regulations ineffective and thus easy to shirk.  Furthermore, it was found that the 
essentials of the behaviour-oriented contract suggested by the theory as the optimal 
contract, were already included in the formulation of the latest Basel Accords. However, 
the researcher believes that one key element, which is the reward or compensation that 
should benefit the banks (the agent) when they abide by the terms of the contract, is 
missing. Regulators should therefore include incentives in the regulations and combine 
the behaviour and outcome-oriented contracts to optimize their relationship with banks 
even though, as explained by the theory, the outcome of bank stability will remain partially 
uncertain due to uncontrollable factors such as the economic conditions.   The concept of 
legitimacy, from Institutional Theory, explicated that banks’ legitimacy came from their 
ability to comply with the regulations. From this stance, the results suggested that 
regulatory capital arbitrage seemed instead to undermine the legitimacy of South Africa 
banks well-capitalised position. 
 
Key words: Securitisation; Regulatory capital arbitrage; Bank stability; Basel Accords; 
CAMELS; Z-score; Agency theory; Institutional theory 
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Chapter 1 
                                         Introduction of the Study 
“The deep cause of the financial crisis, on the financial side, is to be found in the flawed institutions and practices of 
the current financial regime” (J. Crotty, 2009) 
 
Section 1.1. Background 
 
The 2007-2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) revealed the devastating effect of regulatory 
arbitrage (RA). RA is defined as “the manipulation of the structure of a deal to take 
advantage of a gap between the economic substance of a transaction and its regulatory 
treatment”(Fleischer, 2010. 4). Specifically, regarding regulatory capital arbitrage (RCA), 
Mingo (2000) explained that securitisation, as well as credit derivatives, are the 
instruments big banks use to strategically align their assets and liabilities with the small 
risk-weights. Moreover, they shift their activities to transactions that require more 
economic capital than regulatory capital Similarly, Arnold (2015) views RCA as financial 
institutions’ effort to compress the regulatory capital that would otherwise be required for 
a set of assets, by rearranging its configuration.  
 
Regulatory Capital is the minimum level of capital required by the Basel Accords I, II, III. 
It is interpreted by some banks as a type of regulatory taxation (Gerding, 2013). This is 
justified by the view that the cost of capital is higher than the cost of debt because of the 
opportunity costs, added to the fact that the interests charged on debt are tax deductible. 
Also, the minimum capital requirement reduces the ability of banks to create liquidity as 
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they normally do through the collection of deposits (Van den Heuvel, 2008). Arbitrage is 
then involved when banks may be willing to comply with the requirement but will first 
proceed to the optimization of their risk-weighted assets (RWA). In other words, if the 
cost of capital as required by the regulator increases (the numerator of the ratio) and the 
managers foresee growth opportunities for the bank, they will then consider ways to 
minimize risk weights (the denominator of the ratio) thus giving preference to 
performance over stability (Beltratti & Paladino, 2013).  
 
Even though it would be legitimate for a bank to reduce its cost at all times in order to 
maximize the shareholder value (Mingo, 2000), it can, however, be harmful to take 
excessive risk in the pursuit of higher return ignoring the potential future backlash. For 
example, it is hazardous to cherry pick to preserve securitising banks’ reputation by not 
transferring lemon problems1 to investors (Ambrose, Lacour-Little, & Sanders, 2005; 
Affinito & Tagliaferri, 2010). Equally, using RA to hedge against systemic risk in the case 
of regulatory error (Romano, 2010), or even seeing regulation adjusted to optimize the 
benefits of contractual business relationships due to RA (Gerding, 2013) is perilous.  
Gerding (2013) further pointed out some costs of RA such as deregulation to reduce 
competitive disadvantage between market participants, the erosion of effective 
regulations, competition alteration, risk covering, which all lead to more complex laws and 
                                                          
1 Lemon problems refer to the inability of a buyer to know whether the goods he or she is buying are good or bad 
(lemon) due to asymmetry of information (Akerlof, 1970).  
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thus more RA opportunities, not to mention the fact that it creates a waste of legal and 
public resources.   
 
In the aftermath of the 2007-2008 USA subprime mortgage crisis, RA via securitisation 
was pointed out as a partial cause because of what Petersen, Senosi  Mukuddem-Petersen 
(2010) called the IDIOM hypothesis2. Originators accumulated massive risk within the 
banking system without holding enough capital to absorb unexpected losses (Ashcraft & 
Schuermann, 2008; Dell’Ariccia, Igan, & Laeven, 2012;  Mian & Sufi 2009).  
 
Securitisation is pooling loans into packages and selling the pooled assets by issuing 
securities collateralized by the pooled assets (MacDonald & Koch, 2006). Securitisation 
can be driven by the transfer of credit and interest rate risks, provision of liquidity, 
diversification, specialization in lending, an increase of fee income or the improvement of 
capital ratios (MacDonald & Koch, 2006; Ambrose et al., 2005). It can also be motivated 
by the reduction of asymmetries information (Uzun & Webb, 2007).  
 
The 2007-2008 GFC has proven that RCA via securitisation carries risks that can 
jeopardize the stability of a financial Institution (South African Reserve Bank - Bank 
Supervision Department, 2007). The shift by banks from their traditional Originate-and-
                                                          
2 (Petersen et al., (2010) postulate that the subprime mortgage crisis was largely caused by the intricacy and design of 
subprime mortgage origination and securitisation that led to information (asymmetry, contagion, inefficiency and loss) 
problems, valuation opaqueness and ineffective risk mitigation.    
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hold or loans model to the Originate-to-distribute or securitisation model3 led to the 
decline of the lending standard causing unprecedented credit expansion (Brunnermeier, 
2009). As an example of RCA preceding the 2007-2008 GFC, Acharya, Schnabl and 
Suarez, (2013) showed evidence that from 2003 to 2007, banks in the USA alleviated their 
level of regulatory capital through such structures as Assets-Backed Commercial Paper 
(ABCP) conduits or other Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs)4. They created these 
structures in the shadow banking that was not regulated, where they relocated part of their 
assets, specifically the securitised mortgages. Furthermore, they provided these structures 
with credit and liquidity enhancements, which represented a binding commitment to 
collect back the assets from investors should they default (Acharya, et al., 2013).  
 
Other ways identified by Acharya et al., (2013) and other authors was the massive 
investment in Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO)5 and in Collateralized Loan 
Obligation (CLO)6 as means through which banks relieved their minimum of regulatory 
capital required. From the regulatory perspective, the AAA-rated tranches of these 
products made of securitised mortgages were qualified to hold less capital. The problem is 
that the rating was flawed, resulting from pernicious incentives on the one hand and their 
                                                          
3  A business model of financial intermediation, under which financial institutions originate loans such as mortgages, 
repackage them into securitised products, and then sell them to investors (IMF, 2008). 
4  A legal entity whose assets consist of asset-backed securities and various (SIV) types of loans and receivables. An 
SIV’s funding liabilities are usually trenched and include short- and medium-term debt; the solvency of the SIV is put 
at risk if the value of the assets of the SIV falls below the value of the maturing liabilities (IMF, 2008). 
5 CDOs are asset backed securities of which the underlying collateral is constituted of corporate or sovereign bonds, or 
bank loans (Duffie & Gârleanu, 2001).   
6 CLOs are CDOs backed by whole commercial loans, revolving credits facilities or letters of credit (IMF, 2008).   
 5 
  
opaqueness and complexity that render their pricing difficult on the other hand. The 
underlying mortgages were in fact of bad quality. Furthermore, the freed capital in the 
process also opened opportunities to grant more risky loans (Acharya & Richardson, 2009; 
Crotty, 2009). In both cases, when the crisis started triggered by the house prices bubble 
in the United States, banks that engaged in such RCA were unable to face the volume of 
mortgage defaults due to lack of sufficient capital and they eventually became insolvent. 
 
The third RCA engineering known took a more insidious form. Basel II offered to choose 
between the Standardised (SDA) and the Internal Rating Based (IRB) approaches to 
calculate the minimum level of capital. It set the risk weights for mortgages at 35% 
(reduced from 50% in Basel I) and 15% to 20%, respectively. It happened that some banks 
such as Citi or Northern Rock anticipated their option for the IRB and started 
accumulating an unreasonable volume of mortgages because of its comparative advantage 
in terms of capital charge and return on capital. The latter reached a level of 75% of assets 
made up of mortgages before Basel II was even enforced. In 2007, their risk-weighted 
assets (RWA) dropped from 30% of assets under Basel I to 16.7% under Basel II, with a 
Tier 1 capital of only 2% of total assets. Consequently, at the onset of the crisis, this bank 
experienced a liquidity run and later on collapsed (Blundell-wignall, Atkinson, & Lee, 
2008).   
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Other analyses revealed that in order to free up some capital, low franchise value Bank 
Holding Companies in the USA utilized assets-backed securities (Boyson, Fahlenbrach, & 
Stulz, 2014). Some also used Credit Default Swap (CDS) (Yorulmazer, 2013). Many 
financial institutions went further by providing liquidity and credit enhancement to 
securitisation conduits or switched from loans to investments in AAA-rated tranches of 
CDOs (collateralized debt obligations) and CLOs (collateralized loan obligations). All this 
‘financial engineering’ concentrated huge risk within the banking system (Acharya et al., 
2013).  More empirical studies are attached in Appendix 1.    
The next section on the context and the problem statement explains in details why this 
study is focused on South Africa. In a nutshell, the GFC has lift the veil on the hidden-
risks that accompany securitisation transactions and to the best of my knowledge, little 
empirical research has been conducted on securitisation of mortgages in South Africa, 
especially the risky side.  
 
Existing studies include: 
 
Tensfeldt, Firer and  Bendixen (1993) researched South African (SA) banks executives’ 
views on whether the securitisation process will experience a momentum in South Africa, 
using a survey. As results, savings on capital, increase in non-interest income, 
improvement of return on capital and return on equity ratios, and the source of 
diversification for investors were identified as the benefits of assets securitisation. They 
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also found that these benefits are likely to stimulate the process in South Africa. However, 
the participants were sceptical on: whether it reduces bank funding costs or credit risk; 
whether it results in cheaper bank credit; or whether it makes bank funding more available. 
They were also concerned about the complexity of the process, the fact that it is time 
consuming with high transactions cost and high initial set-up costs. Additionally, they 
found the acceptance by investors to be a slow process and the new credit rating agency 
lacked credibility (Tensfeldt, et al., 1993). 
  
Fleishman (1999) discussed the problems inherent in the different approaches to 
securitisation used in South Africa from the taxation point of view. This author used the 
case of securitisation of a debtor’s book of a retailer selling goods on credit to its customers. 
She suggested possible solutions to any adverse tax consequences and their likely taxation 
treatment.  
 
Saayman and Styger (2000) focused on how SA banks can benefit from securitisation to 
improve their liquidity ratios and access to liquidity. In 2003, these same authors 
investigated the reason why securitisation lacked growth in South Africa between 1980s 
and 1990s. They found that the regulation was not favouring this type of transactions. 
Also, there was no strong demand for and supply of assets and Mortgage Backed Securities 
(MBS).  
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Moodley (2003) explored the possibility of replicating the USA subprime mortgage-
backed securitisation model in South Africa for low-to-moderate income. His 
recommendations included a sharing risk between the government (i.e. provision of 
guarantee) and the private sector. 
 
Cumming and Nel (2005) found that under Basel I (1988), SA banks raised additional 
capital to comply with the capital requirements and shifted toward low-risk assets. 
However, the private sector loans and mortgage loans suffered.    
  
Karoly (2006) studied all aspects of the four Commercial Mortgage Backed Securitisation 
(CMBS) programmes launched at that time in SA. Through interviews, she found that 
they triggered more competition between banks and reduced their interest rate on debts. 
 
Smith (2007) examined the future impact of Basel II on securitisation transactions of 
banks before its implementation. He found that among others, it will align regulatory 
capital more closely to actual economic risk of banks’ book assets and will therefore reduce 
RCA opportunities. 
 
Moyo and Firer (2008) looked at the development of securitisation in SA between 2000 
and 2007. They noticed the exponential growth but predicted a slowdown given the crisis, 
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the narrow investor base and concluded that the future of securitisation will depend on the 
demand of asset-backed paper.  
 
Locke (2008) researched the aspects of traditional securitisation in the South African Law. 
She aimed to recommend the best practices in the structuring of the traditional 
securitisation scheme for better benefits from the legal point of view. Among her 
recommendations are the need of a certification of particular rating agencies for greater 
investors’ confidence, and security regulated only by the Trust Property Control Act and 
not the Company Act. Furthermore, she recommended the transfer of assets by way of 
cession only and SPV so that the auditors ensure that the originator is solvent and will be 
left solvent after the securitisation transaction.  
 
Gerdes (2008) studied the emergence of low-income home loan securitisation in the South 
African residential mortgage market. He looked specifically at the 2007 Standard Bank 
RMBS transactions (R 2.4 billion) named the “Siyakha Fund”, the first in this subprime 
category in South Africa. From an interview with the expert involved in the process, he 
discovered that the motivation behind this project was to provide the investors co-
signatories of the Financial Services Charter, namely Investec, Liberty Life and Old 
Mutual, with the charter points they needed. 
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Mgwabi (2009) assessed the securitisation activity post-financial crisis in South Africa. 
She concluded the volume issued has declined but not the volume traded, indicating that 
securitisation went through a crisis. Also, investor confidence was found to be affected by 
liquidity, the reliability of ratings and consumer credit demand concerns.  
 
(Kasse-Kengne & Mukuddem-Petersen, 2015) looked at the regulators’ responses post-
financial crisis regarding securitisation in South Africa. They found that traditional and 
synthetic securitisation are clearly excluded from the business of banks. Special Purpose 
Vehicles (SPV) must provide audited and certified information to the Reserve Bank 
quarterly and the capital for securitisation exposure must be based on their economic 
substance. 
 
To the best of my knowledge, no study has shown whether RCA is a determinant of 
mortgage loans securitisation transactions by SA banks. Furthermore, no study has 
examined the impact of mortgage loans securitisation on SA banks’ financial stability. 
 
Section 1.2.  Context and Problem Statement 
As a brief history of securitisation, the first Mortgage-Backed-Securities were issued in the 
United States in the 1970s by the Government National Mortgage Association, also called 
Ginnie Mae (White, 2011).  In South Africa, the first was launched in 1989 by the former 
United Building Society for 250 million of mortgage backed securities. The development 
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of this market was slowed by regulatory constraints and it is only in 2001 that the market 
was revived with SA Home Loans, a non-bank, issuing a 1.25bn deal (Van Vuuren, 2004). 
Since then, there was a continuous remarkable growth up until the GFC hit.    
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its 2015 assessment recognised that the SA 
banking system is highly compliant with the Basel Accords and other audit/accounting 
international standards. Moreover, it is large and sophisticated with a level of tier 1 capital 
(2013: 13.4%) that make SA banks comparable to their developed countries peers 
(International Monetary Fund, 2015). The country is equally part of the BRICS7, the 
leading emerging economies.  
Likewise, at the national level, South Africa is viewed as benefiting from a financial system 
commonly agreed to be robust, primarily due to its sound financial regulatory framework 
(Nene & Treasury, 2012). This system is also efficient as a liquidity distribution 
mechanism in good time (Nene & Treasury, 2012; Georg & Brink, 2011) as well as its 
major banks before and even during the GFC (Erasmus & Makina, 2014). According to 
the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), SA banks were preserved from the GFC because 
they did not expose themselves directly to the USA subprime mortgage market (SARB, 
2007). In line with the robustness of its regulatory framework, South Africa is already 
compliant with Basel III Accord’s requirements (BIS, 2010), issued after Basel I (BIS, 
1998) and Basel II (BIS, 2004). The country started implementing Basel III since January 
2013 and it will be phased in until January 2019 (Groepe, 2015). More specifically, 
                                                          
7 Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa 
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regarding securitisation, the Securitisation Notice of 2008 provides guidance for 
securitisation transactions by SA banks. Since the end of the GFC, the spill-over effects of 
the crisis and the cyclical downturn in South Africa have a negative impact on the banking 
sector. Mortgage lending is slow and the real estate market is in the doldrums (SARB, 
2013). The motives behind securitisation by SA banks seem mainly to be for liquidity and 
capital management strategies (SARB, 2007).   
Unlike other American and European securitisation transactions, securitisation schemes 
in SA are characterised as in the simplest form and their assessment follows similar 
processes as the normal credit (BSD, 2008).  Syndicate One described the securitisation 
process in SA as one whereby the originator (financial institution) pools mortgage loans, 
a special purpose vehicle (SPV) obtains the ratings of the loans from credit rating agencies 
and look for potential investors. These investors are provided with sufficient information 
on the mortgages to make informed investment decision. Offers are then made via the 
special purpose vehicle (SPV) by auction. The offer with the lowest cost will be accepted. 
In the next step, the originator receives the payment from the SPV while remaining the 
servicer of the loans. The duration of the notes in SA is 5 years in average during which 
the investors are paid the interests according to the rate and repayment conditions agreed 
upon prior to the sale (Mamaregane, Mothibi, Moon, Govan, & Makotoko, 2009).      
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The securitisation market is essentially shared among 5 banks accounting for 91%8 of total 
SA banks assets, and dominated by one type of assets, the mortgage loans. As illustrated 
in Table 1.1 following, mortgage loans alone account for 40.5% in average of total loans 
and advances to banks’ customers. 
Table 1.1: Volume mortgage to total loans and advances by the big five banks in South Africa 
(Big 5) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
% Mortgage 
    to  
loans and  
advances 
 
36.5 
 
 
38.6 
 
39.2 
 
40 
 
42 
 
44.6 
 
45.1 
 
42.3 
 
39.4 
 
37.3 
 
- 
 
- 
Source: SARB (retrieved by the author from SARB annual reports). Information for 2014 and 2015 are not available 
      
Furthermore, as exhibited in Table 1.2, under previous Basel I and II regulations, the 
major players held a regulatory capital ranging from 13.6% to 15.4% in 2015 (13.7% to 
15.7% in 2014). This level is far above the minimum of 8% required by the Basel Accords, 
adjusted at 9.5% minimum for 2013 and 10% for 2014/2015 by the SARB. Such a ‘well-
capitalized’ status granted by the SARB means ‘safe and sound' and subsequently improve 
SA banks’ market demand as a counterpart in a variety of financial contracts (Mingo, 
2000).  
 
 
 
                                                          
8 Standard Bank 26% - ABSA Bank 20% - First Rand Bank 20% - NedBank 17% - Investec 7% - Other 10% 
(International Monetary Fund, 2015) 
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Table 1.2: Regulatory capital big 4 banks compared to minimum regulatory capital 
requirements 
 Standard Bank Ltd Absa Bank Ltd Investec Ltd Nedbank Ltd 
Capital level (%) 2013   2014    2015 
16.5     15.7     15.3 
2013   2014    2015 
15.6     13.7    13.6 
2013   2014   2015 
16.2     15.3    15.4 
2013   2014     2015 
14.5     14.7     14.1 
SARB minimum  
Requirement (%) 
2013    2014   2015 
   9.5        10       10 
2013   2014   2015 
9.5        10        10 
2013   2014   2015 
9.5      10        10 
2013   2014    2015 
   9.5     10          10 
 
Basel III minimum 
Requirement (%) 
 
     8% 
 
     8% 
 
     8% 
 
     8% 
Source: Banks’ Financial Statements and SARB reports (retrieved by the author) 
 
However, as posited by Alan Greenspan (1998), former Chairman of the USA Federal 
Reserve, a well-capitalized bank can still mask its true level of insolvency probability when 
securitisation is inappropriately carried out for RA purpose. As an example, he said a bank 
with 12% capital might be well-capitalized from the regulatory point of view, but its overall 
internal risks require an economic capital of 15%. Also, as through securitisation the best 
assets are transferred and the riskiest are kept on the bank’s balance sheet, Greenspan said 
this ‘cherry picking’ raises two concerns. The first one is with regards to the assessment 
by the originators of the appropriate capital required for these ‘riskiest’ assets and the 
second one, the level of capital hold for the residual risk from the assets securitised 
(Greenspan, 1998). His view was later supported by Mingo (2000); Jones (2000); and  
Dionne and Harchaoui (2008). As for South Africa, in 2014, Daniel Mminele (2014), the 
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Deputy Governor of the SARB, echoed a concern that “fragmentation and arbitrage” are 
“having a big impact on the efficiency and financial stability”, “ increasing the business 
costs for both the providers and the users of financial services” (Mminele, 2014. 10). 
Considering these comments and given the contribution of arbitrage through 
securitisation in the latest financial crisis, this research project addresses part of the 
concerns by measuring the impact of the utilization of this instrument on SA banks’ 
stability to adjust the regulatory framework accordingly and subsequently, reduce 
systematic and systemic risks.  
 
Section 1.3. Purpose  
 
Based on the period 2008–2015, this thesis will quantitatively: 
i)  investigate whether RCA under Basel II and III is the driver of residential mortgage 
loans securitisation by SA banks. Alternatively, the researcher will test the funding 
hypothesis as theoretically supported by the literature on securitisation in South Africa if 
the RCA hypothesis is rejected; 
 
ii) examine the impact of residential mortgage loans securitisation, whether for RCA or 
funding reason, on SA Banks’ stability;  
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iii) use Agency theory (AT) and Institutional theory (IT) to explain banks’ behaviour 
towards risk.  
 
Section 1.4. Research Aims and Objectives 
 
1.4.1. Aims 
 
1.4.1.1: To evaluate the consequences of mortgage loans securitisation driven by RCA on 
securitising banks. 
 
1.4.1.2: To identify various banks stability proxies currently used such as CAMELS, Z-
score, Expected Default Frequency, Leverage ratio, Non-Performing Loan ratio. 
 
1.4.1.3: To estimate a model of mortgage loans securitisation impact on Total Regulatory 
Capital ratio, Risk ratio, Loan ratio and Bank Stability measured by CAMELS/Z-score for 
SA Banks. Additionally, to analyse the relationships between these variables. 
 
1.4.1.4: To use key concepts of AT and IT to explain SA banks’ approach to risk in the 
context of regulatory restrictions.  
 
1.4.1.5: To formulate structured recommendations related to the findings.    
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1.4.2.  Objectives  
 
1.4.2.1: To draw a critical analysis from the related studies of the consequences of RCA 
(reduced Regulatory Capital Ratio accompanied with increased Loan ratio) via mortgage 
loans securitisation (Volume securitised) on banks’ stability (CAMELS/Z-score). 
 
1.4.2.2: To assess bank stability indicators used in the related empirical literature and in 
general (CAMELS, Z-score, Expected Default Frequency, Leverage ratio, Non-
Performing Loan ratio) to choose and justify the best fit for SA Banks.  
 
1.4.2.3: To determine the direction of the relationship between Securitisation, Total 
Regulatory Capital ratio, Risk ratio and Loan ratio, CAMELS/Z-score and Control 
variables (Size, Concentration, House Price, GDP) using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
and Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS) methods.  
  
1.4.2.4: To interpret the results with AT and IT 
 
1.4.2.5: To build an illustrative framework of the findings with the associated 
recommendations.  
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Section 1.5. Research Questions 
 
1.5.1 What are the contributing factors, theoretically, that affect banks’ 
decisions to securitise mortgage loans in South Africa? How do these 
factors theoretically influence banks’ soundness? 
 
1.5.2 Why do SA banks, empirically, securitise residential mortgage loans? Do 
they securitise mortgage loans for RCA or Funding purposes? In other 
words, what is the relationship between residential mortgage loans 
securitised and SA banks’ capital?  
     
1.5.3 If securitisation of residential mortgage loans is RCA driven, what is the 
empirical impact on SA banks’ risk? In other words, what is the 
relationship between residential mortgage loans securitised and SA 
banks’ risk?  
 
1.5.4 In a highly-regulated environment, how can SA banks’ behaviour towards 
risk, from the AT and IT perspectives, be explained? 
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1.5.5 What are the adequate policies prone to mitigate SA banks’ risk taking 
behaviour, if any? 
Section 1.6. Hypotheses 
 
Quantitative methodology is used in this study. The hypotheses are formulated based on 
the AT and IT perspectives – presented in Chapter 2- as follows:  
 
1.6.1. From Agency Theory  
 
Null hypothesis H0 (1):  If SA banks are risk-averse agents (AT), then they do not 
securitise mortgage loans for RCA purpose. Consequently, mortgage loans securitisation 
does not negatively affect total risk-based capital ratio of securitising SA banks, nor 
positively affect their risk and loan ratios. 
    
Alternatively, Hypothesis H1(1): If SA banks are risk-averse agents (AT), then they 
securitise mortgage loans for funding purposes. Consequently, mortgage loans 
securitisation positively affect SA banks’ liquidity ratios.    
 
Null Hypothesis H0(2): From AT, outcome uncertainty is due to random effects. Because 
banks are assumed risk-averse, if random effects are favourable, then mortgage loans 
securitisation do not negatively affect banks’ stability.  
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Alternatively, Hypothesis H1 (2): if random effects are unfavourable, then mortgage loans 
securitisation negatively affect banks’ stability.  
 
1.6.2. From Institutional Theory:  
 
From IT, legitimacy derives from complying with the legal or quasi-legal requirements. 
The following hypothesis will be tested in accordance with this definition and thus do not 
need statistical analysis. Funding motive will be interpreted as conforming to legal 
requirements and RCA as non-conformity.   
Hypothesis formulation:  If complying with legal requirement is a source of legitimacy, 
then RCA is negatively related to legitimacy and funding positively related to legitimacy.       
 
Section 1.7.  Contribution  
 
1.7.1. The study expands the discussion on the principal-agent problem of Agency Theory, 
specifically in the rare cases where the principal is the regulator and the agent the bank, 
acting for the regulator. Additionally, the decision-making process to securitise is better 
understood through the AT concepts.   
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1.7.2. The study contributes to the discussion on the concept of legitimacy as in 
Institutional Theory, in an organizational field, in this case, banking. Legitimacy is so 
crucial in the banking field where confidence underpins legitimacy. The lack of confidence 
may well jeopardize a bank’s stability or the whole system as it creates runs of deposits that 
result in liquidity dried up (Gorton & Metrick, 2010).  
   
1.7.3. Additionally, as far as we know, this is the first study of its kind in South Africa, over 
the period 2008-2015, covering RCA under Basel II and Basel III.  
  
1.7.4. Furthermore, related empirical studies are concentrated on the American continent 
and Europe. This study thus provides new insights on the link between securitisation, RA 
and bank stability from well-capitalized banks in an emerging economy context.  
 
1.7.5 The two most common measures of bank stability are used in parallel in this study 
and the findings compared and discussed. This represents another novelty in comparison 
to other studies, and for South Africa.   
 
Section 1.8. Limitations and Delimitations 
1.8.1 Limitations 
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1.8.1.1. The researcher was willing to start the analysis from 2005 with all the banks. But, 
data collected showed that only 4 banks consistently hold outstanding balance of RMBS 
from 2008. 
1.8.1.2. This study is based on information available mostly on the public domain. Details 
of securitisation transactions were provided by the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, banks, 
SPVs reports and other financial statements.  Data such as the different ratios, were 
retrieved by the researcher from the annual reports published on the banks’ websites. This 
means these data where not independently verified.  
  
1.8.2. Delimitations 
1.8.2.1. The purpose of the study is limited to looking at RCA and funding as determinants 
of securitisation. It does not include other determinants such as credit risk transfer, 
reputation, performance and specialisation. 
 
1.8.2.2. This study is focused on the securitisation of one type of asset, the residential 
mortgage loans. It does not cover other assets such credit cards receivables, vehicles, 
commercial mortgages and so on. Mortgage loans are the assets securitised by all the big 
five banks in South Africa. Other Assets Backed Commercial Papers, Commercial 
Mortgage-Backed securitisations are excluded from the study because they are issued by 
one or two banks only and sporadically.   
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1.8.2.3. The hypotheses are articulated and the results further interpreted within the AT 
and the IT frameworks.  
 
1.8.2.4. The population under investigation is made of banks exclusively. This excludes 
other special purpose conduits and shadow banking involved in the securitisations of 
mortgages in South Africa.  
 
1.8.2.5. The banks selected for the study are those that have consistently been engaged in 
securitisations transactions in South Africa at least before Basel II was implemented in 
2008.  
 
1.8.2.6. These banks are also those with total assets greater than 300 billion Rand because 
studies showed that the size of a bank influences its decision to securitise.  
 
Section 1.9 Data and methodology 
 
This section summarises the data and the methods of analysis used in this study. Chapter 
3 describes these points in more detail.  
 
1.9.1 Data 
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The sample consists of the four big banks in South Africa. The data are annual time series 
covering the period 2008-2015. From the literature, the researcher has identified the 
following variables: securitisation, namely the outstanding volume of residential 
mortgage-backed securities issued to total assets; RCA and risk retention hypothesis would 
be materialised by the reduction of capital as a result of the increase in risky assets in 
proportion to total assets (Uzun & Webb, 2007). So, the dependent variables are: Total 
Bank capital to Risk-Weighted Assets, Risk-Weighted Asset to Total Assets and Total 
Loans to Total Assets; bank stability is measured by two different proxies: Capital – Assets 
Quality – Management Efficiency - Earnings – Liquidity- Sensitivity to Market Risk 
(CAMELS) and Z-score; funding hypothesis is captured in the liquidity ratios.  
 
1.9.2 Methodology 
 
This study uses the OLS method and the TSLS method to analyse the data. The detailed 
steps are exhibited in Figure 1 below. The results are then interpreted and discussed in 
light of the two theoretical perspectives – AT and IT - presented extensively in Chapter 2.    
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Figure 1: Diagrammatic Overview of the Statistical Methodology implemented in this 
Study 
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Section 1.10. Thesis Chapters Outlines  
 
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
This chapter presents the background of the study, the context and the problem statement. 
In particular, the role of securitisation and RCA in the 2007-2008 Global Financial Crisis 
is explained. The chapter ends with the purpose of the study, the research aims and 
objectives, the research questions, the hypotheses, the contributions of the study, the 
summary of data and methodology, the limitation and delimitation, and the thesis 
chapters’ outline.     
 
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework and Literature Review 
This chapter opens with the introduction of the Basel Accords: Basel I (1988), II (2004) 
and III (2010) and discusses its contribution in the prevalence of RCA via securitisation. 
The following sections present the theoretical lenses selected for the study. The RCA 
theory of securitisation is first considered from the principal-agent problem framework 
view (Agency Theory). Specifically, the concepts of asymmetry of information constituted 
of moral hazard and adverse selection, and outcome uncertainty are used to explain the 
origin, prevalence and consequences of the phenomenon of RCA via securitisation. The 
key conversant with regard to this first aspect of the theoretical framework is Eisenhardt 
(1989). Secondly, the concept of legitimacy from Institution Theory further brings some 
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insight on banks’ behaviour towards risk. The main conversant is Scott (2001). This 
chapter ends with the survey of the related empirical studies. 
 
Chapter 3: Research Design, Data and Statistical Techniques 
This chapter discusses the methodology selected for the study, presents the data and the 
data sources.  
 
Chapter 4: Empirical Results  
This chapter presents, analyses and discusses the research findings. 
 
Chapter 5:  Conclusion 
This chapter summarises the research results, provides their theoretical interpretation, 
suggests some recommendations and indicates the direction for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature review 
“What we see and judge to be important and accept as adequate depends not only on the evidence but also on the 
“conceptual lenses” through which we look at the evidence” Graham. T Alisson  
 
This chapter encapsulates three parts. First, it introduces the Basel Accords, Basel I 
(1988), II (2004) and III (2010), specifically its provisions on banks’ capital adequacy for 
credit risk on mortgages, and discusses how each version fuels or has fuelled the prevalence 
of regulatory capital arbitrage (RCA) via securitisation. The second section presents the 
theoretical lenses selected for the study i.e. Agency Theory (AT) and Institutional Theory 
(IT). In the third section, thesis-related empirical studies are surveyed. 
 
Section 2.1. The Basel Accords 
 
In 1974, the Herstatt Bank in Germany and the Franklin National Bank of New York 
collapsed following the meltdown of the foreign exchange trade market. These failures 
impacted negatively on other banks with whom they had business relationships around the 
world. Subsequent to these events, Central Bank governors of the G-109, gathered in Basel 
(a city of Switzerland), and formed a committee that is known as the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS). The ultimate purpose of the BCBS was and still is to 
improve international financial stability through banking regulations and supervision 
                                                          
9 G-10 is composed of the 11 top most industrialised countries. Today, the members of the BCBS are 28  
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(BIS, 2015b). Basel I was the first of the series, later followed by Basel II and now Basel 
III.  
 
2.1.1 Basel I (1988) 
Basel I, also called The Basel Capital Accord, is the first of the series. The idea 
underpinning this Accord was to harmonise national capital requirements10 while 
strengthening international banking system against systemic risk (Bank for International 
Settlements [BIS], 2015b). It focused on the credit risk faced by banks by establishing the 
minimum regulatory capital requirements (MRCR) for banks at 8%11 of their Risk-
Weighted Assets (RWA)(BIS, 1998). This regulatory capital is the minimum level of 
capital required, which aims to equip banks with a lifebelt that will absorb their unexpected 
losses should they occur during downturns. For banks to be able to determine the RWA, 
the Accord categorised banks’ assets into roughly four risks buckets. This method was 
labelled the standardised approach (SDA). Assets such as cash were assigned 0% risk 
weight, claims on other banks, 20%, and claims on the private sector, 100%. Loans totally 
secured by a mortgage on residential property attracted 50% risk weight.  This means, if 
for example, a bank had a portfolio of residential mortgage loans of R 100 million, the total 
MRCR would be calculated as follows: 100 X 50% X 8% = R 4 million.  
 
                                                          
10 Meaning levelling the international playing field 
11 Including a core capital of at least 4%. 
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2.1.1.1 How Basel I fuelled RCA   
Where objections were raised to this first Accord was its lack of sensitivity in terms of risks, 
specifically the way the Risk-Weighted Assets (RWA - denominator of the MRCR) were 
calculated. The SDA fixed risk-weighted regardless of the specific risk of each asset 
(Agostino & Mazzuca, 2011; BIS, 2014). Its one-size-fit-all format made it easy to cherry 
pick within a category and perform ‘cosmetic adjustments’ to reach the targeted ratio while 
concealing the exact risk the regulation intended to address (Jones, 2000). Grouping the 
assets into only 4 categories opened the doors of the phenomenon called Regulatory 
Capital Arbitrage12 (RCA). In practice, RCA manifest by the fact that when two assets with 
different risk profiles were subjected to identical capital requirements, the bank would 
raise  its overall level of risk without facing a parallel increase in its regulatory capital 
requirements by selling the assets with lower risk and retaining the riskier ones (BIS, 
2011). In other words, securitisation became a major instrument for RCA. The reason is 
that regulatory capital is perceived as too high (Calem & LaCour-Little, 2004; Dionne & 
Harchaoui, 2008). (Jackson, 1999) posited that banks that engage in RCA try to do so to 
minimise their cost of funding. This author identified cherry-picking, securitisation with 
partial recourse, remote origination and indirect credit enhancements as the predominant 
forms of RCA.  
 
                                                          
12  (Awrey, 2012) defined regulatory arbitrages as the transactions or strategies designed to exploit gaps or differences 
within or between regulatory regimes, ultimately with the intention of either reducing costs or capturing profits. 
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The gap created by the utilization of different measures of risks by both the regulators and 
banks is at the root of RCA due to information asymmetry between banks and regulators. 
The information asymmetry is reflected in the difference between banks’ economic capital 
and the regulatory capital requirements as defined in the first Basel Accords regulation 
(Jones, 2000). Regulatory capital is different from the economic capital known as the 
intrinsic amount of capital kept by banks to cover their risk exposures. Through moral 
hazard13 and adverse selection14 (Mishkin, 2001), asymmetry information creates 
regulatory arbitrage opportunities. The fact is that the regulators barely know the banks’ 
real internal risk exposures. Thus, the MRCR was inappropriately calibrated, specifically 
the RWA. That is why some banks intentionally misused securitisations to reduce their 
capital requirements or take more risk, for example, in the presence of a deposit insurance 
scheme15 (moral hazard) (Acharya & Richardson, 2009). 
 
2.1.2 Basel II (2004) 
Basel II, also called the Revised Capital Framework, is the second Accord. It aimed to 
rectify the weaknesses of the first Accord, mainly by making capital requirements more 
risk sensitive to reduce RCA and encouraging more robust risk management practices 
                                                          
13 Moral hazard is defined as “actions of economic agents to maximize their own utility to the detriment of others in 
situations where they do not bear the full cost or consequences of their actions”(Alexander, 2006) 
14 Adverse selection: doubts about the quality of the assets (Tirole, 2011). Jean Tirole is also the 2014 Nobel prize winner 
in Economics.  
15 Moral hazard:  because of the deposit insurance scheme, banks managers may now behave differently from the way 
they would have if they were fully exposed to the risk (Naciri, 2009).  
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(BIS, 2004). This new framework was issued with three pillars: the MRCR, the supervisory 
review (SR) of banks’ capital adequacy and market discipline (MD). Regarding the 
MRCR, the BCBS maintained the minimum level at 8% of RWA and improved the SDA 
to credit risk initiated in Basel I. However, it added a new approach termed the Internal 
Ratings Based approach (IRB).  
 
Under the SDA for credit risk, risk weight buckets increased from four in Basel I to six 
(0%, 20%, 50%, 100%, 150% and 100%). Risk weights were now attributed to assets 
according to the rating allocated by external credit rating agencies recognised by national 
supervisors (NS). Out of the standard buckets, risk weight for loans secured by mortgages 
on residential properties was reduced from 50% to 35%16, which means the MRCR for R 
100 mortgage loans, for example, would now be 100 X 35% X 8% = R 2.8 million.  
 
Under the IRB for credit risk, the main idea was giving banks the opportunity to determine 
their capital requirements internally to close the breach between regulatory capital and 
economic capital. However, the methods of risk assessment had to be approved by the 
national supervisor (NS). The Basel Committee provided some guidance though. The 
methods had to include the probability of default (PD), the loss given default (LGD), the 
exposure at default (EAD) and the maturity (M). The Committee also subdivided the IRB 
into Foundation (FA) and Advanced Approaches (ADA). With FA, banks could estimate 
                                                          
16 However, supervisors in different countries had latitude to increase the risk weight depending on the risk involved.  
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PD and the national supervisor appraise LGD, EAD and M. With ADA, banks estimated 
all the components (BIS, 2004). 
 
Regarding residential mortgage loans, the second Accord classified them as retail 
exposures. Risk on retail exposures, in turn, were to be assessed entirely by banks 
themselves, meaning PD, LGD (but not below 10%) and EAD could be determined 
internally. FA and/or ADA did not matter here. So, the formula for the calculation of 
capital requirements for residential mortgage loans looked like this: 
Capital requirements (K) = LGD × N [(1 – R)^-0.5 × G(PD) + (R / (1 – R))^0.5 (0.999)] – PD x 
LGD, where correlation (R) = 0.15 and RWA = K x 12.5 x EAD. 
The new Accord was also enriched with a credit risk securitisation framework.  In a 
nutshell, this framework indicated that securitisation exposures included Asset Backed 
Securities (ABS), Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS), credit enhancement, liquidity 
facilities, credit derivatives, and interest or currency swaps. Banks that opted for the SD 
approach were subjected to RWA for long-term rating categories as follows:  
 
External Credit 
Assessment 
AAA to AA- A+ to A- BBB+ to BBB- BB+ to BB- B+ and below 
or unrated 
Risk weight 20% 50% 100% 350% Deduction 
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This means that, for example, R 100 Ms residential mortgage loans securitised (RMBS) 
and rated between AAA to AA- would have a RWA of 100 x 20% = R 20 Million. 
 
Banks using the IRB approach (approved beforehand by the NS) for the securitised 
exposures, were subjected to the following categories as in the table below: 
External rating 
(Illustrative) 
Risk weights for senior 
positions and eligible senior 
IAA exposures (*) 
Base risk weights (**) Risk weights for tranches 
backed by non-granular pools 
(***) 
AAA 7% 12% 20% 
AA 8% 15% 25% 
A+ 10% 18% 35% 
A 12% 20% 35% 
A- 20% 35% 35% 
BBB+ 35% 50% 50% 
BBB 60% 75% 75% 
BBB- 100% 100% 100% 
BB+ 250% 250% 250% 
BB 425% 425% 425% 
BB- 650% 650% 650% 
Below BB- and unrated Deduction Deduction Deduction 
N: number of underlying exposures – (*) For N>=6; (**) For all others; (***) For N<6 
Source: (BIS, 2004) 
 
From this table, an RMBS of for example R 100 Ms, classified ‘others’ and rated AAA, 
would have a RWA of 100 x 12% = 12 Ms.  
 35 
  
2.1.2.1. RCA opportunities remained in Basel II 
 
Basel II was published in 2004 but was to be implemented only by end 2006. This means, 
in many countries quantitative impact studies were still being conducted (specifically for 
the IRB approach) when the GFC started. For example, both the USA and South Africa 
implemented Basel II in 2008. This also means that most of the banking institutions were 
still under Basel I (Caruana & Narain, 2008), hence the extent of RCA via securitisation. 
Introducing the IRB in Basel II was a way of mitigating RCA incentives. However, 
maintaining the SDA kept perverse incentives ongoing. Also, with the IRB, even though 
securitised assets were no more transferred, it sufficed to get an advantageous rating from 
credit rating agencies (CRAs) to see the capital requirements for securitised assets 
substantially reduced. As López-Andión, Iglesias-Casal, López-Penabad & Maside-Sanfiz, 
(2015) explained, capital freed up here was able to compensate the higher level required 
from riskier tranches. It therefore, preserved dynamic RCA. Also, the use of IRBs approved 
by regulators that do not fully understand banks’ risk exposures was an additional source. 
Furthermore, some banks such as Northern Rock and Citi anticipated the exploitation of 
the loopholes in Basel II before it was even implemented17. 
 
In general, loopholes were the first comparative advantage between originating and 
holding, and originating and securitising mortgage loans. Assuming a bank was faced with 
                                                          
17 See details in Chapter 1: Introduction, Background Section. 
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assets rated equally, in the first case the mortgage loans would have a risk weight (RW) of 
35% when the same mortgage in the case of securitisation would be subjected to only 12% 
of RW. Other authors (Moosa, 2010; da Veiga, Chan & Mcaleer, 2012) argued that the 
Value-at-Risk (VaR) suggested in the IRB approach for market risk provided banks with 
the opportunity to use their own models. Unfortunately, concerned with saving some 
capital (RCA) and safeguarding their return on equity, banks’ models were far too 
optimistic regarding the valuation of risk exposures. Furthermore, a study on the 
relationship between Basel II/III AIRB and portfolio risk proxied by loan performance, 
showed that the risk-weights determine with A-IRB are more risk sensitive than the fixed 
one with Basel I, because it is based on the portfolio risk (Barakova & Palvia, 2014). 
Fullenkamp & Rochon, (2014) pointed out the fact that the IRB made the regulation more 
complex and thus prompted the game. In the same vein, in a study by Mariathasan & 
Merrouche (2014) on ‘the manipulation of Basel Risk-Weights’ evidenced that soon after 
certain banks received the approval for using the IRB, they set up modelling strategies 
intended to reduce their risk weights. In this same study, it is reproached to Basel II a lack 
of correlations18, its reliance on short time series as well as the ignorance of endogeneity 
resulting in a disproportionate level of indebtedness and maturity transformation.  From 
a different perspective, a study on the quality of bank rating by Hau, Langfield & Marques-
ibanez (2012) demonstrated the fact that during the period preceding the GFC, credit 
                                                          
18 The authors referred to the Probability of Default (PD) parameter that is determined internally by banks but used 
in the calculation of capital charge defined instead by the Basel Committee.  
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rating agencies attributed a favourable rating to large banks on a complete arbitrary basis 
as long as the latter provided them with substantial volume of securitisation business. 
 
In summary, just like in Basel I but to a lesser extent, holding assets in the balance sheets 
required more capital than securitising.  Secondly, a comparative advantage also appeared 
between the SD approach and the IRB approach. The same mortgage was assigned a 35% 
RW under the SDA and only 12% to 35% under the IRB. The RWA could continue being 
subjected to gaming through the IRB approach on the one hand and with the help of credit 
rating agencies on the other hand. The BCBS recognised that RWAs were inadequately 
calibrated because some securitisation exposures were over-rated and others under-rated. 
The Committee also denounced the mechanic utilisation of credit rating agencies and the 
limited risk insensitivity of the framework (BIS, 2014). In conclusion, Basel II still failed 
to address the problem of RCA.  
 
2.1.3 Basel III (2010) 
Basel III, the latest Accord, is the response of the BCBS to the 2008 GFC. The BSBC’s 
assessment of the risk factors that amplified the crisis is the fact that banks were highly 
leveraged with inadequate liquidity buffers, they engaged in poor governance and risk 
management, and some set up inappropriate incentives structures (BIS, 2015b). The 
purpose of Basel III was to adjust banks’ capital requirements at a level that would absorb 
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unexpected shocks. The phase-in implementation started in January 2013 and full 
implementation is expected in January 2019. 
 
In summary, Basel III renewed the MRCR but more specifically defined the regulatory 
capital in insisting on a higher quality of Tier 1 capital and repealing Tier 3.  It also 
introduced a conservation buffer ratio, a countercyclical buffer ratio, a leverage ratio, a 
liquidity coverage ratio and net stable funding ratio as follows: 
 
- Total Capital Ratio = Regulatory Capital / Risk-weighted Assets = 8% 
- Conservation buffer = 2.5% of Risk-weighted assets (from 2016) 
- Countercyclical capital buffer = 0 to 2.5% of Risk-weighted assets 
- Leverage Ratio (LR) = Capital measure19 / Exposure measure20 
>=3% 
- Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) = Unencumbered stock of high quality 
liquid assets21 / Total net cash outflows22 over 30 days of significant stress 
period >= 100% 
                                                          
19 Capital measure is the Tier 1 capital of the risk-based capital framework 
20 A bank’s total exposure measure is the sum of the following exposures: (a) on-balance sheet exposures; (b) 
derivative exposures; (c) securities financing transaction (SFT) exposures; and (d) off-balance sheet (OBS) items.  
21 At least 60% level 1 assets (cash, central bank reserve, sovereign debt qualifying for a 0% risk weight under the Basel 
II SDA for credit risk) and no more than 40% level 2 assets (sovereign debt qualifying for a 20% risk weight under the 
Basel II SDA for credit risk and corporate bonds and covered bonds of at least AA- rating  
22 Net cash outflows is Total expected cash outflows minus Total expected cash inflows during the 30 days of stress 
period.  
Basel III 
Capital 
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- Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) = Available amount of stable funding23 / 
Required amount of stable funding >= 100% 
 
Under the SD approach, revised and published in July 2016 (BIS, 2016b), general RWAs 
are 0%, 20%, 50%, 100% and 150%. For residential mortgage loans, the BCBS reduced 
the dependency on rating agencies and distributed the risk weights as follows: 
1- Cases where repayment are not materially dependent on cash flows generated by the 
property 
 LTV≤40% 40%<LTV≤60
% 
60%<LTV≤80
% 
80%<LTV≤90
% 
90%<LTV≤100% LTV>100% 
Risk 
Weights 
25% 30% 35% 45% 55% 75% for 
individuals 
85% for SMEs 
LTV (loan-to-value ratio) = Amount loan24 / Value of the property25 
Source: (BIS, 2016b) 
 
2- Cases where repayment are materially dependent on cash flows generated by the property 
 
 LTV≤60% 60%<LTV≤80% LTV>90% 
Risk Weights 70% 90% 120% 
Source: (BIS, 2016b) 
                                                          
23 Portion of capital and liabilities expected to be reliable over one year 
24 Outstanding loan amount + undrawn committed amount of the mortgage loan 
25 Appraised independently 
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3- Cases that do not meet the requirements of the framework have a 150% risk weight. 
 
With regards to IRB approach, a consultative document was issued in March 2016 on 
“Reducing variations in the credit risk-weighted assets – constraints on the use of internal 
model approaches”. The revised version has not yet been published.   
 
The BCBS also revised the Basel III securitisation framework but the new version is 
scheduled to come into effect only in 2018. For this reason, it is not in the scope of this 
study and will not be presented further. However, it is worth noticing the Basel III design 
distinguishes the internal ratings-based approach, the external ratings-based approach 
and the standardised approach. The choice now depends on the information 
available/analysis/estimations of banks and no more on the bank’s role in the 
securitisation process or the credit risk approach used for the underlying exposures (BIS, 
2016a).    
 
2.1.3.1. RCA persists in Basel III, at least for now 
 
Basel III (2010), published following the GFC, has unfortunately not addressed the Basel 
II risk-weighted assets calculations problems (Petersen & Mukuddem-Petersen, 2014). 
RCA may continue to occur. Among the reasons pointed out, the fact that banks still have 
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the latitude to use a combination of approaches in the calculation of their RWA maintains 
the state of flux (Le Leslé & Avramova, 2012).    Berg, Gehra, & Kunisch (2011) pointed 
out the discrepancies between the RWAs in banks’ credit risk (loans book) and market risk 
(trading book, ex: bonds). They demonstrated that, given a similar risk profile, under Basel 
I and Basel II, the asset correlation parameter (the degree of systematic risk given by the 
regulator), lead to 30% to 50% more capital requirements for corporate loans exposures 
than in the trading business. They believe this RCA opportunity will be repeated under 
Basel III in view of the fact that asset correlation is provided by the regulators for loans 
exposures and determined by banks for the trading business (Berg, Gehra, & Kunisch, 
2011).  
 
Blundell-Wignall & Atkinson (2010)   described a case where bank A lends some money 
to a company through a bond acquisition. To this type of loan, the Accord allocates 100% 
risk weight. Bank A can then buy a Credit Default Swap from bank B on the bond. Because 
of the move of the promise from bank A to bank B, there is a shift of risk weight of the 
loans from 100% to 20%. In definitive, bank A will now determine its regulatory capital 
based on 20% risk weight instead of 100%. 
 In conclusion, as noticed by Haldane (2012), the granularity of the Basel risk weights 
opens doors for ‘near-limitless’ arbitrage.  
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Section 2.2. Theoretical perspective 
Financial regulation and supervision are meant for i) microeconomic stability, ii) 
consumers or investors’ protection and proper behaviour, and iii) efficiency and 
competition (Giorgio & Noia, 2001). Regulation is justified by banks’ balance sheet 
opaqueness. However, regulations have become more and more complex. Subsequently, 
opaqueness and complexity cause asymmetry of information. This is an appropriate canal 
for regulatory arbitrage.  Regulatory arbitrage is for the banking sector what inefficiencies 
are for the financial market (Fleischer, 2010). An efficient market is a market in which 
prices always fully reflect all available information (Fama, 1969). Fama (1969) also 
reported from Niederhoffer & Osborne (1966) and Scholes' (1969) works that two groups 
of actors actually have monopolistic access to information: the specialists on major security 
exchanges and the corporation insiders. This lack of information homogeneity among 
participants of the financial market is commonly termed asymmetry of information or 
principal-agent problem26. Similarly, in the banking sector, information asymmetry is for 
example reflected in the difference between the economic capital and the regulatory 
capital defined in the Basel Accords regulation.  
 
                                                          
26  The principal agent problem is a situation where for example a person (the agent) acts in the interest of another (the 
principal).  The problem is, they both hold different information and different incentives. It is thus difficult for the 
principal to have control over the agent’s action. This is where moral hazard (hidden action) and adverse selection 
(hidden information) occur (Alexander, 2006). 
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Looking at banks’ behaviour under regulatory pressure (capital requirements) and the 
impact on their stability, AT and IT perspectives provide complementary interesting 
insights to assist the researcher in examining the relationship between the regulator and 
banks at the micro and macro levels. Because these theories focus on the pivotal concepts 
of asymmetry information (with sub-concepts of moral hazard27 and adverse selection28), 
principal-agent problem and outcome uncertainty from the former and legitimacy from 
the latter, it is believed that they override the usefulness of other theories as they are 
perfectly aligned with the subject of this research. 
   
2.2.1 Presenting Agency Theory (AT) 
AT is credited to several authors, but the most cited are Jensen and Meckling (1976), and 
Fama and Jensen (1983).  AT derives from of the New Institutional Economics. It is viewed 
as a theory of human behaviour and performance outcome and  further analyses 
organizations from the contractual and efficiency standpoints (Nilakant & Rao, 1994). It 
deals with incentives and control, which are the essence of organizational analysis (Moe, 
1984). AT is  thus viewed as valid even though it is criticised for ignoring the complexity 
of organizations, lacking rigor and being tautological (Eisenhardt, 1989). That is why 
Eisenhardt (1989) and Hirsch, Michaels & Friedman (1987) suggested complementing 
the use of AT with other theoretical perspectives.  
                                                          
27 hidden information (Alexander, 2006) or agent falsified ability (Eisenhardt, 1989) 
28 hidden action (Alexander, 2006)  or  agent lack of effort (Eisenhardt, 1989)   
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Examples of studies that combined AT and IT perspectives include: compensation 
(Eisenhardt, 1988); monitoring and tradition (Conlon & Parks, 1990); performance 
evaluation (Young, Stedham, & Beekun, 2000); and franchise relationship (Doherty, 
Chen, & Alexander, 2014). Examples of studies using AT in South Africa comprise 
corporate strategy (Wright & Ferris, 1997) and corruption (Rispel, Jager, & Fonn, 2015). 
Examples of studies using IT in South Africa encompass state capacity in housing system 
(Jenkins & Smith, 2001), and entry strategies of foreign investors (Meyer, Estrin, 
Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009).  
 
Eisenhardt (1989) explained that AT examines the problems arising from the contractual 
relationships between the agent and the principal (the so-called principal-agent problem) 
and proposes an optimal contract. This would take the form of behaviour-oriented contract 
or outcome-oriented contract to minimise agency costs from monitoring and incentives 
schemes. In the contractual relationship between the principal and the agent, the principal 
delegates the decision making to the agent. The latter therefore acts for the principal. 
However, as assumptions, [1] the relationship is tainted by partial conflicting goals, [2] 
due to asymmetry of information (categorised into adverse selection and moral hazard) 
between the principal and the agent. [3] Efficiency is accounted as the effectiveness 
criterion for information organisation and risk bearing costs (Eisenhardt, 1989). In effect, 
the agent is suspected of holding private information and pursuing self-interests that are 
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contrary to the principal’s without the possibility for the latter to verify the agent’s 
behaviour. Thus, the principal is obliged to provide some incentives to the agent to make 
sure the latter aligns its goals to the principal’s or is obliged to introduce a control system 
that allows him or her to collect the information needed. [4] That is why information is 
also assumed to be a purchasable commodity. The risk bearing costs emanate from the risk 
sharing problem. AT assumes that the principal and agent’s risk preferences are antagonist 
and discordant actions are consequently taken because [5] the principal is risk neutral 
while the agent is risk averse. For example, the outcome-based contract aligns the 
preferences of both participants but transfers the risk from the principal to the agent.  
However, the outcome is said to remain uncertain no matter the agent’s behaviour because 
of exogenous random factors such as economic climate, competition and so forth.  
There are two trends in the literature on AT: the positivist and the principal-agent. The 
former relates to ex post contracts, the separation between ownership and control, 
incentives schemes, external labour and capital markets; the latter is more centred on ex 
ante contracts and information systems (Nilakant & Rao, 1994). Figure 1. below depicts a 
summary of Agency Theory. 
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(*) if agent’s behaviour is known to the principal – (**) if agent’s action is not known to the principal 
Source: Diagram created by the author inspired by (Eisenhardt, 1988) and (Eisenhardt, 1989) 
Figure 2.1: Diagrammatic Summary of Agency Theory 
 
Agency Theory 
Agent (B) Principal (A) 
Risk sharing problem Agency problem 
 
Principal-agent contractual relationship 
(B acts for A) 
Partly Conflicting 
goals 
Behaviour-oriented contract (*) 
 
Outcome-oriented contract (at least partially) (**) 
(via  
 
Monitoring costs 
Partly Conflicting risk 
preferences 
Solutions 
(most efficient contracts) 
 
Assumptions 
People: self-interest/bounded rationality/risk aversion 
Organisation: goal conflict among 
members/asymmetry information between A and 
B/efficiency is the effectiveness criterion. 
Information is a purchasable commodity 
But, Outcome uncertainty But, Transfer of risk to the agent 
Information systems (**) 
Unobservable behaviour 
(due to moral hazard/adverse selection) 
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2.2.1.1 Establishing a principal-agent relationship between regulator and banks 
According to Eisenhardt (1989), AT is suitable for regulatory policy issues, goal conflict 
with possible agent opportunities, outcome uncertainty together with risk. The literature 
commonly refers to an agency relation between shareholders (principal) and managerial 
teams (agent) (Berger & Patti, 2006),  taxpayers (Mishkin, 2001) or other stakeholders in 
the economy (principals)(Alexander, 2006) and regulator (agent), and finally depositors 
(principal) and banks (agent)(Murphy, 2015). However, an agency relationship between 
a regulator and the regulated firm where the regulator is the principal and the regulated 
firm is the agent acting for the regulator is scarce in the literature. This level of agency was 
first pictured by (Loeb & Magat, 1979), followed by (Besanko & Sappington, 1986), then 
by (Caillaud, Guesnerie, Rey, & Tirole, 1988),  and Baron (1988).  
Baron designed a model where he assumed that:  
(i)the regulator is facing incomplete information from the regulatee and limited 
observability of its behaviour;  
(ii) Regulator and regulatee have consequently adopted strategic behaviours; 
(iii) the regulator’s policies are endogenous reactions to the preceding problems; 
(iv) The regulatee, described as profit-maximizer, optimally pursues its goal within the 
regulatory framework. This goal, from the normative viewpoint, conflicts with the 
regulators’ objectives of maximizing total surplus of consumers; 
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(v)Lastly, the regulator controls aspects such as the price or has authority over certain 
aspects of the regulatee’s operations. In the model, the regulator expects the regulatee to 
conform to its requirements, such as satisfying all demands at the specified price, in order 
for the regulatory mechanism to remain efficient. The regulator first formulates a 
regulation in the take-it-or-leave-it form. Because of asymmetry of information such as 
hidden action and hidden information from the part of the the regulatee, the regulation 
has some flaws. The regulator then offers a menu of policies, designed efficiently, from 
which each regulatee can choose according to the nature of its activities.    
From the delegation view, Baron posited that because the regulatee is given the choice of 
policy, the regulator has thus delegated the decision making to the regulatee, who is now 
its agent and can for instance choose the price. In terms of incentives, the regulatee will 
then naturally pick the option that increases its profit. That is, for instance in the price 
example, choosing the too high price from the menu or increase its cost to benefit from a 
higher price).  
From this agency relationship where the regulatee acts on behalf of the regulator, all the 
implications pertaining to the AT ensue, for example control, performance measurement, 
and incentives schemes among others, as described above.  
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2.2.1.2 Applying Agency Theory to the study 
In applying AT to this study, a parallel, anchored by Baron’s case, can be made.  The Basel 
Accords requirements are enforced in South Africa by the South African Reserve Bank 
(SARB) and are being implemented by South African (SA) banks. The relationship 
between these banks and their regulator can be regarded as a contractual relationship, 
specifically an implicit administered contract, because of its ongoing relationship and 
agency features (Goldberg, 1976). It is in effect, a long-term relationship because the first 
Basel Accords was issued in 1988, implemented in South Africa since 2001, and has only 
undergone changes over time with no indication of a future expiry date.  In terms of 
agency, SARB’s goal is to safeguard the stability and the soundness of the SA banking 
system. In a certain sense, SARB relies upon SA banks to see this aim fulfilled by complying 
with the Basel Accords’ provisions.  Here, I see an analogy with Baron’s case and explain 
the possible choice of SA banks for regulatory capital arbitrage as the result of partial 
delegation by the SARB, (the regulator whom for Baron is the “total surplus of 
consumer’s” maximizer), of risk-weighted assets determination to banks.  Basel I, for 
example, grouped assets into only four categories, ignoring the risk sensitivity pertaining 
to different kinds of assets. It offers only one performance metric (a single ratio) for capital 
requirements instead of a holistic approach (Acharya & Schnabl, 2009). This facilitated 
moral hazard and adverse selection from banks’ part. As ‘profit-maximizers’, banks thus 
were given the opportunity to exploit the gap between the regulatory capital required and 
their economic capital due to the lack of sufficient information available to regulators 
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(asymmetry of information) regarding the level of risk of their assets, as well as the risks 
and uses of such financial innovations as securitisation. Banks exploited the opaqueness 
of the securitisation transactions to carry out self-interested goals such as regulatory 
capital arbitrage29. The agent’s goals thus conflict with the principal’s goals. For many, it 
has resulted in unintended consequences (outcome uncertainty), such as a negative 
impact on banks’ stability. Examples are banks in Spain before 2007(López-Andión, 
Iglesias-Casal, López-Penabad, & Maside-Sanfiz, 2015); banks in EU and Switzerland 
before 2007 (Michalak & Uhde, 2011). Banks’ goals in these cases conflicted with the 
regulators’ goal of safety and soundness of the whole banking system via an upholding of 
an adequate level of capital for unexpected losses. Basel II, meant to improve Basel I in 
this regard, reinforces my view of decision-making delegation. It offered a ‘menu of 
policies’ (Baron, 1989) from where banks could choose between the standardised 
approach and the internal rating based approach to calculate their risk-weighted assets. 
The consequences are now known: the 2008 global financial crisis. Despite some 
adjustments, the same option remains in the latest formulation of the Basel Accords III 
with uncertain outcome. More locally, the delegation is materialised by the fact that South 
African banks are given the opportunity to use the risk weight splitting method. With this 
method, when a single residential property loan is totally covered by mortgage, SA banks 
split the loan into several proportions and attribute different risk weight to each portion, 
depending on their own assessment of risk for each these portions. That can be below or 
                                                          
29 See process of RCA described in the context of the study. 
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greater than the 35% risk weight for the whole loan as prescribed by the Basel Accords 
(BIS, 2015a).  
To further the parallel with the simple model of AT, with regards to the optimality of the 
contractual relationship between SA banks and their regulators, the researcher assumes 
that Basel I was an implicit outcome-based contract where the regulator expected banks 
to comply with its provisions, such as to preserve their stability. Because of the flaws of the 
initial contracts (Basel I and II) as explained earlier, the regulator added a monitoring 
system (for example, in Basel III) which consist of a set of required information that must 
be reported monthly by SA banks that are active in the securitisation transactions. In 2012 
for example, under the Banks Act, 1990 (Act No 94 of 1990), the Minister of Finance 
issued regulations where the SARB requires a monthly reporting from banks that indicates 
the amount of assets securitised, the amount of capital and reserve funds in respect of 
securitisation exposures, the role the reporting bank played in the securitisation scheme 
and so forth (Gazette, 2012). Because of the inclusion of the monitoring system and the 
fact that the outcome (bank stability) is measurable, the researcher now believes that the 
contractual relationship between regulators and banks has evolved into a combination of 
behaviour-based and outcome-based contracts as it has elements of both types of 
contracts. When one looks at the propositions formulated by Eisenhardt (1989), both the 
outcome-based contract and the behaviour-based contract would be efficient in aligning 
the agent’s interest to the principal’s, if the principal has enough information on the 
agent’s behaviour. She noted that information systems and outcome uncertainty are 
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positively related to the behaviour-based contract. She further mentioned that conflicting 
goals between the principal and the agent and outcome measurability are positively related 
to the outcome-based contract. 
However, from the AT, banks are supposed to receive a compensation or a reward of some 
sort from the regulator should the expected outcome realized. In this regard, the 2012 
Regulations under the 1990 Banks Act only indicates that if a bank fails or is unable to 
comply, that bank must provide the reasons for the failure otherwise an action will be taken 
or that bank will be given the opportunity to comply within a certain period (Gazette, 
2012). The vacuum with regards to compensation or reward will serve as a starting point 
to tentatively suggest some policy recommendations that can improve the efficiency of the 
contract in Chapter 5.   
Considering the AT concepts and Baron’s model, the leading logic of this study is as 
follows: securitisations, characterised by their opaqueness (thus with embedded hidden 
information that causes asymmetry of information) are used by banks (the regulator’s 
agent) to engage in regulatory capital arbitrage (a hidden action that also questions its 
risk-averse position), versus regulatory compliance (conflicting goals) or as a funding 
source (if agent is risk-averse). However, any of these actions can affect banks’ stability 
negatively or positively (outcome uncertainty) depending on how much risk from the 
regulator was shifted to banks (risk transfer), and other random exogenous effects such as 
economic conditions.  
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2.2.2 Presenting Institutional Theory 
Institutional Theory attempts to answer the question of how and why organisations behave 
as they do, with inherent consequences (Greenwood, Oliver, Suddaby & Sahlin, 2008). 
For this analysis, I lean on organizational institutionalism, which is the institutional 
perspective of organizational behaviour. The common ground between Agency Theory 
(AT) and Organisational Theory (OT) is their concern to reduce uncertainty. However, 
moving from the contractual perspective, OT looks at the structural and cultural aspects 
such as shared values, traditions, beliefs and commitments through organization design, 
trust and collaboration (Nilakant & Rao, 1994). 
Since 1977, that marked the beginning of the neo-institutionalism (Greenwood et al., 
2008) with the works of Meyer and Rowan (1977), Zucker (1977, 1983), Meyer and Scott 
(1983) and DiMaggio & Powell (1983), various concepts such as rationalised myths, de-
coupling, cultural persistence, stability, deinstitutionalization, environment, organisation, 
isomorphism, change, relational networks, organizational field, institutional context, and 
legitimacy (Currie & Swanson, 2009) underpin this theory.  The last concept, which is 
legitimacy, anchors the analysis of the contextual aspect of this research.  
Scott (2001) viewed institutions as “social structures that have attained a high degree of 
resilience”. These institutions are “composed of cultured-cognitive, normative, and 
regulative elements that, together with associated activities and resources, provide stability 
and meaning to social life. They are carried by various types of carriers, including symbolic 
systems, relational systems, routines, and artefacts, and they operate at multiple levels of 
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jurisdiction”. He further posited that institutions are by definition stable but they are 
subject to change processes.  
The institutional context is defined as the rules, norms and ideologies of the wider society 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1983, 84). Emirbayer and Mische, (cited in Scott 2001, 195), said that 
in fact, an agent’s action reflects the temporal-relational contexts and the agency itself.  
Where legitimacy comes into play is that, as posited by Dowling and Pfeffer (1975), 
organizational legitimacy occurs when the social values associated with or implied by the 
organizations’ activities coincide with the norms of acceptable behaviour in the larger 
social system of which they are part. 
Suchman, (cited in Scott, 2001), defined legitimacy as a “generalized perception or 
assumptions that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed (institutional frameworks) systems of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions”.   
Under the regulative pillar of institutions, Scott (2001) posited that legitimacy is based on 
conforming to rules. He further stated that it is complying with the legal or quasi-legal 
requirements that confer legitimacy to an organization. Moreover, this legitimacy must be 
observable to outsiders and convened by cultural or political authority.  
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2.2.2.1 Applying the Institutional Theory to the study 
Relating the concept of legitimacy as defined above to the study, the researcher postulates 
that banks are financial institutions with a large component of government intervention 
and public visibility that need legitimacy for their survival (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). 
From Scott’s (2001) point of view, the survival of organizations does not only hinge on 
material resources and technical information, but also on their social acceptability and 
credibility.  
Confidence (credibility) is so important for financial institutions that the lack of it can 
trigger runs in liquidity (Gorton & Metrick, 2010) and eventually lead to a shut down. 
Given the impact of RCA on banks’ capital and ultimately on banks’ risk level, RCA is 
likely to go against the definition of legitimacy. Engaging in RCA would consequently 
question the ‘well-capitalised banks’ ’ status of South African Banks granted by the South 
African Reserve Bank, which is the authority conferring legitimacy. On the contrary, 
securitising for funding motives would possibly sustain this status.  
 
Section 2.3 Empirical studies 
This section presents key empirical studies that are related to the subject of this thesis. It 
concludes with the similarities and differences between these studies and the thesis. Table 
2.1 exhibited in Appendix 1 condenses the survey of the existing studies with the authors, 
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the periods covered, the variables used and the findings. Their brief descriptions are as 
follows: 
 
[1] Calomiris and Mason (2004) explored two views of the motivation for RCA employing 
the securitisation of credit card receivables during the year 1996 in the USA, a year 
reflecting the peak of recourse events. They tested the securitisation with implicit recourse 
from the efficient contracting view where capital is set in line with the market to avoid 
information asymmetry, and the safety net abuse view, where the deposit insurance 
subsidy is maximised by increasing the level of risk comparative to capital. Ninety-six bank 
credit cards observations were involved in the study. Findings demonstrated the 
significance of the efficient contracting view at the expenses of the safety net abuse view. 
  
[2] Ambrose, Lacour-Little & Sanders (2005) examined whether taking advantage of 
asymmetry of information to securitise low-risk mortgage loans while retaining the riskier 
portion on the balance sheet, was motivated by RCA or was a reputation concern. Looking 
at 14 285 conventional fixed rate mortgages in USA banks, they first built a model that 
predicted the prepayment and default probabilities of mortgages. The purpose was to 
analyse whether a mortgage is securitised or held in portfolio. To test the role of 
asymmetric information in this decision, they measured the level of effective yield spreads 
at the origination of the loans. They found that higher risk loans were retained and lower 
risk loans securitised. This was the evidence supporting both the RCA and reputation 
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motives. 
 
[3] Martin-Oliver and Saurina (2007) investigated the determinants of assets 
securitisation by Spanish banks. Specifically, they tested whether liquidity needs drive 
covered bonds backed by mortgages and whether capital arbitrage and risk transfer 
motivated ABS issuances. Using solvency and liquidity ratios, as well as risk profile 
measurement to see whether riskier banks securitise, they found that liquidity needs are 
the main driver of covered bonds, ABS issuance and RMBS, not capital arbitrage. They 
also concluded that the originate-to-distribute model does not apply to Spain as ABS do 
not depend on banks’ risk profile.  However, looking at securitised loans to small and 
medium enterprises, they also established that capital arbitrage may well justify banks’ 
decision to securitise them.  
 
[4] Uzun and Webb (2007) studied the difference between securitising and non-
securitising banks, and the way securitisation of different type of assets impacts bank risk 
using capital ratios. Their purpose was to show evidence of the securitisation likelihood 
and the capital arbitrage theory of securitisation. Based on data from 112 USA banks and 
3000 bank-quarters, they found that larger banks are more eager to securitise. So, the size 
is a determinant of the likelihood to securitise.  With regards to capital arbitrage, in 
general, securitisation negatively impacts banks’ capital ratio. But taken separately, only 
credit cards ABS were negatively related to banks’ total risk-based capital ratio. They 
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advocated that this type of asset is securitised for capital arbitrage purpose and others, 
such as mortgages or car loans, instead, have a positive relationship and thus exclude the 
idea that risky assets remain in the portfolio. 
 
[5] Dionne and Harchaoui (2008) considered the relationship between securitisation, 
bank capital and risk-taking. They employed Canadian financial sector data over the 
period 1988 to 1998. Their findings established a negative relationship between 
securitisation and Tier 1 as well as Total risk-based capital ratios, suggesting regulatory 
capital arbitrage. The results further conclude a positive relationship between the level of 
securitisation and banks’ risk taking. This suggests that securitizing banks with higher 
capital ratio are likely to be riskier.  
 
[6] Hänsel & Bannier (2008) examined firm-specific and macro determinants of the CLOs 
securitisation of 316 EU countries’ banks over the period 1997 – 2004. Their findings are 
mixed regarding RCA. They revealed mostly that the predominant purposes were funding 
and risk transfer even though their significance remained limited. Also, securitising CLOs 
served as a path for accessing capital market-based businesses with the associated fee 
income, thus increased their performance.  
 
[7] Cardone-Riportella, Samaniego-Medina & Trujillo-Ponce, (2010) looked at the reason 
why Spanish banks securitised. They oriented their focus on liquidity, credit risk transfer, 
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RCA and performance motives. Based on 408 observations during 2000 to 2007, they 
found that liquidity and performance were the divers of securitisation by banks in Spain 
and not RCA, nor transfer of credit risk. Additionally, they drew the differences between 
banks securitising assets and banks securitising liabilities. In both cases, liquidity remained 
the main determinant of securitisation.   
 
[8] Agostino and Mazzuca (2011) analysed whether the probability of securitising was 
affected by RCA, funding and specialisation. Their study is based on data from Italian 
banks covering the period 1999 to 2006. Securitisation, in general, was found positively 
related to the funding reason while taken individually, RCA and funding drove RMBS. On 
the contrary, the needs of funding and specialisation lead to the securitisation of non-
performing loans.  
 
[9] Cerato, Choudhry, Crosby & Olukuru (2012), similar to the previous studies, explored 
the reason why banks securitise. This time, data were drawn from UK banks for the period  
2000 to 2010.  Interestingly, the period starts from the pre-financial crisis through to the 
post-financial crisis. This study investigated three hypotheses: RCA, liquidity and risk 
transfer. They also looked particularly at ABS from the assets side and CDOs from the 
liabilities side. Furthermore, they examined the impact of the Originate-to-Distribute 
(OTD) model on these ABS and CDOs. In addition, the impact of securitisation on UK 
banks’ profitability was studied. Liquidity was found to be the leading factor generally. 
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However, individually, RCA and credit risk transfer motivated ABS, while RCA and 
funding influenced CDOs. The OTD model created a high defaults rate for both, but even 
more for ABSs. Finally, large banks, particularly investment banks, improved their 
profitability via securitisation during the period referenced. 
 
[10] Jiangli and Pritsker (2008) investigated the impact of mainly mortgages but also other 
assets on US Banks’ Holding Companies’ insolvency risk, profitability and leverage ratio 
from 2001 to 2007.  They considered three methods: when securitised assets are placed 
back in these banks’ balance sheets; compared average performance of securitising and 
non-securitising banks; and used banks’ size as an instrument of securitisation. For the 
first time, time deposit premium was used as the measure of bank insolvency risk. In all 
cases, their results showed that mortgages securitisation reduced the latter, increased 
profitability as well as banks’ leverage ratio.  
 
[11] Michalack and Uhde (2011) considered the impact of cash and synthetic 
securitisation on 60 EU and Switzerland banks’ financial soundness. Data were composed 
of 749 securitisations transactions. Authors used two proxies of bank soundness, the 
accounting based Z-score and the market-based Z-score. They remarked that these banks 
were freeing up some capital via securitisation for RCA purposes. In effect, freed up capital 
were used to accumulate riskier assets on the balance sheets. Furthermore, they were 
holding most of their credit risk exposures within the first loss position. Consequently, 
 61 
  
evidence indicated a negative impact of securitisation on these banks’ financial soundness, 
thus supporting the ‘securitisation-fragility’ view.  It also presented a negative impact on 
their profitability. Moreover, it showed that securitisation rendered these banks’ return 
volatile. The authors further noticed that a combination of market concentration, strict 
regulatory and supervisory environment and market discipline fostered stability. 
Surprisingly, high-developed capital markets with high-quality legal institutions seemed 
to expose banks to fragility.  
 
[12] Ben Salah and Fedhila (2012) employed data on 174 US banks from 2001 to 2008, 
looking at the impact of securitisation on their risk behaviour and stability. As measures 
of risk, they took RWA/total assets and the Z-score, which encompasses capital, 
profitability and return volatility measures.  Outcomes showed that the quality of US 
banks’ loans portfolio had deteriorated because of the high volume of securitisation and 
their credit risk, which accordingly worsened as they continually increased their level of 
riskier assets. With regards to banks’ stability, mortgage loans securitised were found to 
have a stabilising effect on these banks but not on non-mortgage assets. They explained 
that the risk retention that followed the former group of assets acted as incentives for 
better monitoring, while the later did not.  
 
[13] López-Andión et al., (2015) studied the impact of securitisation on 61 Spanish banks 
over the period 1998 to 2012. They dissociated assets securitisation and liabilities 
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securtisation (covered bonds). Using Z-score as a measure of bank financial solvency, 
assets securitisation were found to have a slightly negative effect on banks’ stability. It is 
worth noticing that this result is valid for the period before the financial crisis (1998-2006) 
and is justified by RCA. After the crisis, the impact is not significant. Regarding the 
liabilities securitisation (covered bonds), given that covered bonds do not by nature 
transfer risks, their impact on banks’ stability was found insignificant because the liquidity 
from their sales was invested in assets that preserved the stability of these banks’ financial 
solvency.  
  
The researcher remarks are as follows: similar to studies [1] to [9], this thesis will seek 
evidence whether RCA is a motive of securitisation, under the Basel Accords. Study [4] is 
the closest to this project in terms of choice of variables. Furthermore, just as studies [10] 
to [13], the author will look at how securitisation can impact a bank’s stability.  
 
However, 99% of these studies [1] were conducted over the periods when banks were 
mostly subjected to Basel Accord I only. This thesis covers a more extensive period, from 
Basel II to Basel III, partially. Moreover, the studies above [2] were concentrated on 
developed countries in Europe and America while the author, in a first study of its kind, 
will fill the gap by focusing on South Africa, an emerging economy with a banking system 
qualified as robust, sophisticated and aligned to international standards (International 
Monetary Fund, 2015).  Concerning the variables, the studies [10] to [13], on the impact 
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of securitisation on banks’ stability, used mostly the Z-score as a proxy of banks’ stability. 
Only one case employed a different measure, the time deposit premium. Study [3] 
similarly considers the Z-score but introduces a novelty by using one more proxy, the 
CAMELS. With regards to the data and methodology, the author likewise uses time series 
data and a multivariate regression model.  Nevertheless, [4] the researcher utilizes the 
Ordinary Least Squares and the Two Stages Least Squares methods. The methodology will 
be defined in more details in Chapter 3 of this thesis.    
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Chapter 3 
Research Design, Data and Statistical Techniques 
“A theory or hypothesis that is not verifiable by appeal to empirical evidence may not be admissible as part of scientific 
enquiry” Milton Friedman - (as cited by Damodar N. Gujarati) 
 
This chapter introduces the methodology selected for the study, dawn from the research 
design (1). The chapter presents the data/variables and their sources (2), the statistical 
techniques employed, and the models’ specifications (3).  
 
Section 3.1 Research design 
 
In research, there are roughly three paradigms: a scientific research paradigm, an 
interpretive research paradigm, and a critical research paradigm (Scotland, 2012). As per 
the American sociologist George Ritzer, a paradigm is a fundamental image of the subject 
matter within a science. A paradigm serves to define what should be studied, what 
questions should be asked, how they should be asked, and what rules should be followed 
in interpreting the answer obtained. The paradigm serves to differentiate one scientific 
community (or sub-community) from another. A paradigm subsumes, defines and inter-
relates the exemplars, theories, methods, and instruments that exist within it (Ritzer, 
1975). 
 
Each one of the three paradigms given above is made of five constituents: ontology, 
epistemology, theoretical perspective, methodology, and methods.  
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This study is classified within the scientific research paradigm. In line with the 
components of a paradigm, the framework the researcher has adopted for this study is 
presented below and must be read from top to bottom in terms of what informs what [see 
(1) to (4)] (M. Crotty, 1998). The researcher’s ontological view has informed the 
epistemology stance, which in turn informed the theoretical perspective, this then informs 
the methodology and finally the methods.  
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Figure 3.1 Diagrammatic Overview of the Theoretical Methodology  
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3.1.1 Ontology [1]: realism 
 
Referring to the Greek philosopher and scientist Aristotle, the ontological component of a 
paradigm or ontology is defined as the science of the “being qua being”, meaning the study 
of attributes that belong to things because of their nature, even independently of their 
actual existence (Guarino, Oberle, & Staab, 2009). Ontology has to do with the description 
of reality as it really is (Scotland, 2012). Blaikie (cited by (Mack, 2010)) defined ontology 
as “claims and assumptions that are made about the nature of social reality, claims about 
what exists, what it looks like, what units make it up and how these units interact with each 
other”. At this level, the researcher will adopt the realism position as opposed to relativism. 
A realism perspective considers that the researcher’s findings about a phenomenon are the 
absolute truth, the reflection of the reality, while relativism views the findings as the 
interpretation given by the researcher, so that, consequently, there can be different 
realities about the same phenomena depending on how it is interpreted (Crotty, 1998). 
Relating realism to the main topic of this research, regulatory arbitrage with its 
consequences is a fact that can be evidenced.  
 
3.1.2 Epistemology [2]: objectivism 
 
According to the Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (peer reviewed), epistemology 
refers to the study of knowledge as translated from the Greek words “episteme” 
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(knowledge) and “logos” (science). Epistemology has to do with how knowledge can be 
created, acquired and communicated (Scotland, 2012). Epistemology refers to a picture of 
the way knowledge is achieved (Mack, 2010). Epistemology is concerned with the nature 
of knowledge and thought, in other words, what it means to know (M. Crotty, 1998). There 
are three main epistemological constructs: objectivism, constructionism, and subjectivism. 
This research project aligns with objectivism as an epistemological stance. From the 
objectivism point of view, reality as it exists is intrinsically meaningful regardless of the 
consciousness of it  (M. Crotty, 1998). Vrasidas further explains that an objectivist believes 
that there is one true and correct reality which we can come to know following the objective 
methods of science (Vrasidas, 2000). Objectivism is often opposed to another paradigm 
which is constructionism. The latter is rooted in the idea that reality is socially constructed 
with the assumption that what is found in the world is the result of human social and 
construction acts (Harre, 2002 cited by (Leeds-Hurwitz, 2015). That is why 
constructivism has often served as a philosophical perspective for qualitative studies 
(Crotty, 1998).    
 
3.1.3 Philosophical paradigm or theoretical perspective [3]: positivism 
 
The purpose of the theoretical perspective is to indicate the underlying assumptions that 
support the researcher’s stance regarding reality and understanding of human knowledge. 
It also informs the methodology that can be adopted. The researcher has chosen positivism 
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as a theoretical perspective. Positivism, credited to a French philosopher Auguste Comte, 
is a philosophical paradigm that regards reality (the real world) as external to the knower 
(Jonassen, 1991). Mack tells us that the scientific paradigm mentioned above is identical 
to the positivist paradigm. He further explained that positivist research is involved in 
proving or disproving hypotheses using the scientific method and statistical analysis while 
looking at generalizable findings (Mack, 2010). Positivism’s other assumptions include 
the claim that the meaning is external to the enquirer, while thought is governed by 
external reality and the mind is the mirror of nature (Jonassen, 1991). 
 
3.1.4 Methodology: regression/correlation research 
 
The research methodology is the plan of action or process lying behind the choice and use 
of particular methods and linking the choice and use of methods to the desired outcome 
(M. Crotty, 1998). Crotty gives some examples of common methodologies and they 
include experimental research, survey research, ethnography, phenomenological research, 
grounded theory, action research, heuristic inquiry etc. A research methodology is also 
viewed as the science and philosophy behind all research, a kind of answer of how we know 
what we know (Gray, 2013). 
In terms of methodology, the project is essentially a relational research. This thesis 
investigates the phenomenon of regulatory arbitrage. That is, whether there is a 
correlation between securitisation and the reduction of the banks regulatory capital 
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requirement on one hand, and the increase in risk taking behavior on the other hand.  It 
also looks at the correlation between securitisation and its possible impact on bank 
stability. In other words, it examines whether securitisation improves or fragilizes involved 
banks’ stability.   
  
3.1.5 Methods: statistical analysis 
 
Methods in research are the techniques used to gather and analyse the data related to 
particular research questions (Scotland, 2012). Two methods are commonly used: 
quantitative and qualitative. A quantitative method is based on the use of numbers as 
empirical tools while qualitative research utilises texts. A qualitative method is also based 
on the idea that realities are socially constructed (Flick, 2008). Complementing this idea, 
Dinzin and Lincoln qualified the qualitative method as an interpretive, naturalistic 
approach of the world where the study is carried out in the natural settings, attempting to 
make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings the participants bring to 
the researcher. So, the method here is all about qualities of entities, processes and meaning 
in a value-laden framework. Quantitative method for them, in contrast, refers to the 
measurement of the causal relationship between variables in a value-free framework. A 
quantitative method uses concepts such as quantity, amounts, intensity and frequency 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2006). From this characterization, a quantitative method is 
appropriate for this study,   
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Section 3.2 Data collection and variables description 
 
This section describes the techniques used in this study to collect the data, and defines the 
variables. 
3.2.1 Data collection 
The data collection was carried out via a document studies method. The sample consists 
of four out of the five biggest banks (ABSA Bank Ltd, The Standard Bank of South Africa 
Ltd, Nedbank Ltd and Investec Bank Ltd) operating in South Africa and consistently 
securitising mortgage loans. The four banks selected for this research dominate the 
banking sector by holding not less than 70% of total assets. First Rand Bank could not be 
added in the sample because their securitisation programme started in 2007 and end in 
2011, leaving me with only 5 years. 
The study covers the period 2008 – 2015 corresponding to the publication of better 
regulatory frameworks for securitisation activities in South Africa. It also marks the spike 
(2008) of substantial growth of securitisation transactions by South African financial 
institutions, which was followed by their decline. In this thesis, the period is purposively 
chosen in order to capture the effect of the Basel Accords’ evolution and implementation 
in South Africa, i.e. Basel II (2008 - 2012) to Basel III (2013 - current).   
 
The main source of data were banks’ annual and SPV’s financial reports. Wherever 
necessary we requested additional data from the banks directly. Other source details are 
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indicated in Table 3.1 below. Regarding some issues related to our data, it is worth 
mentioning that the big four banks have different timelines with regards to the closure of 
their financial year. For example, ABSA Bank Ltd, The Standard Bank of South Africa and 
Nedbank Ltd end their financial year on the 31st of December. However, Investec Bank 
Limited ends its financial year on the 31st of March. We initially intended to group these 
banks according to their year-end date and analyse the data separately and then compare 
the results. After the data collection, the researcher realised that the volume of residential 
mortgage securitised were lower than expected and carrying out the analysis that way 
would have led to meaningless results. We decided to ignore these timing differences and 
proceeded with aggregate data.  
Also, access of additional data was denied to the researcher on the grounds of 
confidentiality. The researcher was told that a huge number of securitised mortgages are 
not listed and details are not for the public domain.   
 
Data were collected retrospectively, meaning that we started collecting from 2015 and 
proceeded back to 2008. The fact is annual reports of banks contain information of year T 
and year T-1. So, for example the 2015 annual report roughly contains the 2014 financial 
results as well. But we noticed during data collection that quite often there are differences 
(although few) between the figures reported for example in 2014’s annual report for the 
year 2014 and the information that was supposed to be the same for 2014 reported in 2015. 
The discrepancies are justified by ever-changing accounting rules and practices in the 
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banking sector. So, data collected retrospectively allowed us to capture all the adjustments 
as published by these banks at T on the T-1 financial statements. It will also justify the fact 
that sometimes, there appears an abnormal percentage change of an account between year 
T value and T-1.  
 
3.2.2 Variables description 
 
The variables used, their definitions/measurements and data sources are summarised in 
the following table (3.1). The choice of each variable is constrained by the availability of 
data.  
 
Table 3.1 Variables and Definitions 
 
Variables Definitions Sources 
IV – Outstanding Balance 
Securitisation Mortgage 
Loans (SEC_TA) 
Annual outstanding Volume 
of Securitised Mortgages / 
Total Assets 
Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange, Banks’ and 
SPVs’ Financial reports, 
Banks’ staff.  
DV and CV- Capital Ratio* 
(CAR) 
Tier 1* + Tier 2* Capital / 
Risk-Weighted Assets* 
Banks Annual Reports – 
Risk management sections 
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DV and CV- Loan Ratio 
(TL_TA) 
 
Total Loans / Total Assets Banks Annual Reports – 
balance sheets 
CV- Retain interests / 
outstanding balance 
securitised assets 
(SBL_SEC) 
Subordinated loans (first and 
2nd loss) / Outstanding 
balance securitised mortgages 
RMBS programmes 
reports 
DV and CV- Liquidity  Ratio of liquid assets + cash 
and overnight interbank loans 
to Deposits and other Short-
term funding (LA_DST) 
Total loans / Deposits and 
other Short-term 
funding(TL_DST) 
Liquid assets to total assets 
ratio(LA_TA) 
 
Banks Annual Reports – 
balance sheets 
DV - CAMELS (bank 
stability proxy) 
 
Capital: leverage Ratio = 
Equity / Total 
Assets(TE_TA); Quality of 
Assets: OBS activities: ratio of 
Banks Annual Reports: 
balance sheets, risk 
management sections and 
income statements 
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off balance sheet activities to 
Risk-Weighted 
Assets(OBS_RWA); 
Management: cost efficiency 
= operating expenses to 
operating income ratio (cost 
to income ratio – OE_OI). 
Earnings: return on assets = 
results before tax to total 
assets ratio(ROA) or ROE 
(return on equity) 
Liquidity: ratio of liquid 
assets to Deposits and other 
Short-term funding 
Sensitivity: ratio of net 
interest income to total assets  
DV and CV- Z-score ROAA + CAR / SDROAA (**)  Banks Annual Reports: 
balance sheets and income 
statements 
CV – Interbkrate Interbank interest rate  
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CV- DST_TA Deposits and other short-
term funds to total assets ratio 
Banks Annual Reports: 
balance sheets 
CV- IE_DST Interest expenses to Deposits 
and other short-term funds 
ratio 
Banks Annual Reports: 
balance sheets 
DV and CV - RWA_TA Risk-weighted assets to total 
assets ratio 
Banks Annual Reports: 
balance sheets 
CV - Banks Size (BKSIZE) Log Total Assets Banks Annual Reports: 
balance sheets 
CV - Banks Concentration 
(BCON) 
Herfindahl–Hirschman index 
(HHI) 
SA Reserve Bank annual 
reports 
CV - Houses Price (HP) Nominal House price changes ABSA Bank 
CV – GDP Real GDP growth SA Reserve Bank annual 
reports 
Dum2008 Dummy for the 2008 GFC  
IV: independent variable - DV: dependent variables - CV: controlled variables (**) ROAA: Return on 
Average Assets – CAR: capital ratio – SDROAA: standard deviation of the ROA. [*] Capital ratio includes 
foreign subsidiaries figures but “Banks solo” (South Africans main bases) account for 80% to 90% of the 
aggregate assets.   
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Section 3.3 Statistical techniques and models’ specifications 
3.3.1 Statistical techniques 
The study’s statistical techniques are oriented toward inferential analysis where the focus 
is on a sample from the population and does not employ a descriptive analysis30. 
 
The core statistical models utilised in this study are the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
and the Two Stage least squares (TSLS) regressions. According to Haldane, when the 
sample is small, the best way to obtain more accurate estimates is to use a simple model 
(Haldane, 2012).  
The step by step methods of the statistical techniques employed in this study are exhibited 
in a diagram presented in Figure 1 (Chapter 1). This section explains these steps. 
 
[1] The data collection process and their sources are detailed in Section 3 below.  
 
[2] Data are partially31 converted into ratios. In effect, all dependent and independent 
variables (except bank size and the macroeconomic variables) are translated into ratios as 
                                                          
30 Descriptive analysis measures the characteristics of an entire population (O’Rourke, Hatcher, & Stepanski, 2005) 
31 Others are indexes. 
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the researcher measures the impact of the latter on the former in terms of percentage 
change.   
 
[3] Natural log conversion of all data: the researcher has used time series data. As such, all 
variables are measured in natural logarithms because doing so aligns the data to one of the 
assumptions of the regression model, namely linearity. Furthermore, it facilitates the 
interpretation of the results. Coefficients can now be understood in terms of elasticities 
and not in terms of unit changes, resembling for example “ Y tends to change by β percent 
for one percent change in X” (Koop, 2009).  
 
[4] The examination of the data is completing the visual inspection and descriptive 
statistics.  
Descriptive statistics talks mainly about the use of mean and standard deviation. In 
statistics, the mean refers to the average or the centre of a distribution. The standard 
deviation (SD) measures the dispersion of a distribution, meaning given two distributions, 
the one with the higher SD will be interpreted as more dispersed than the other (Koop, 
2009).  
 
[5] Unit root tests: this study deals with time series data. As such, it is important to insure 
they are stationary32, meaning their mean, variance and covariances must remain constant 
                                                          
32 Conditions of covariance stationarity: E (Yt) = constant for all t; Var (Yt) = constant for all t; Cov (Yt, Yt+k) = 
constant for all k ≠ 0 (Asteriou & Hall, 2011).  
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over time, otherwise the results after the regression analysis will be qualified as “spurious” 
(Asteriou & Hall, 2011).  
 
To avoid the spurious regression problem, we have tested for the stationarity of our 
variables using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test and the Philip Peron tests. The presence 
of a unit root attests to non-stationarity. Differencing the data eliminated the trends and 
rendered them stationary (Asteriou & Hall, 2011).  
   
3.3.1.1 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method 
 
This study used multiple regression models because we examined the relationship between 
some dependent variables and several independent variables. As presented by (Koop, 
2008), this multiple regression model generally takes the following form: 
Yi  =  β0 + β1𝑋1i + ⋯ +  β𝑘Xki +Ωit          
, where Yi is the dependent variable, i=1…N are the observations,  Ωit is the error term 
(the gap between the true regression line and a specific data point), 𝑋1i, … + Xki are the 
independent variables, and β(′s) are the coefficients to be estimated.  
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS hereafter) is a method that allows one to estimate the 
coefficients by producing what is called the best-fitting line between the dependent 
variable and its determinants (the explanatory variables). The OLS does that by 
minimizing the sum of squared residuals (Koop, 2008). The residual emanates from the 
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fact even when a straight line is found, there is always a difference from the true regression 
line. The sum of squared residuals (SSR) then measure the size of all the residuals. 
 
For a regression model with one explanatory variable:  Yi  =  β0 + β1𝑋i+Ωi   
the fitted regression line will be:     ?̂?i  =    β̂0 +    β̂1𝑋i 
the residuals will be given by:      Ω̂i = Yi −   β̂0 −    β̂1𝑋i ,  
and the SSR will be equal to:     ∑ (Yi −   β̂0 −    β̂1𝑋i)
2𝑁
𝑖=1  
Koop further elucidated that the SSR is not enough because there are cases where the 
number of residuals is so great that it has become necessary to have one number, the R2, 
that will include all the information in the residuals:  
R2 = 1- 
𝑆𝑆𝑅
𝑇𝑆𝑆
 
where TSS is equivalent to the variance of the data. It is equal to RSS + SSR.  
The RSS is in turn equal to  ∑ (  Ŷ𝑖 − ?̅?)
2𝑁
𝑖=1 , where  ?̅? = 
∑ 𝑌𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁
 is the mean of Y.  
R2 indicates the percentage of the variance of Y that can be attributed to X (Koop, 2008).  
 
The assumptions of the multiple regression model in terms of the regression errors are 
(Koop, 2008): 
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- E(Ωi) = 0 meaning that it is assumed the errors will have a mean equal to zero on 
average. In other words, E(Yi ) =  β0 + β1𝑋1i + ⋯ +  β𝑘Xki  is the proper regression 
model with appropriate explanatory variables. 
- Var(Ωi) = E(Ω𝑖
2) = σ2, meaning that it is assumed that all the errors will have equal 
variance. This assumption is also termed homoscedasticity. The contrary would be 
heteroskedasticity.   
- Cov(Ωi, Ωj) = 0 for i ≠ j, meaning that there is no correlation between the errors.  
- Ωi is normally distributed 
- Xi , the explanatory variables, are fixed and not a random variables. 
Where i=1,…,N observations. 
 
Under these assumptions, the OLS is considered as the best linear unbiased estimator 
(BLUE) from the Gauss-Markov theorem view. 
 
The diagnostic tests for normality, the existence of serial correlation, and 
heteroskedasticity employed in the study are provided respectively by Jacque-Bera test, 
the Breusch-Godfrey test and the Breusch-Pagan test as indicated by (Kennedy, 2008).  
 
The null hypothesis of the Jarque-Bera test is that the errors are normally distributed. The 
null hypothesis of the Breusch-Godfrey test is that the errors are not serially correlated 
and the null hypothesis of the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test is that the errors terms are 
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homoskedastic. Therefore, for all these tests, probability values of less than 5% would 
reject these hypotheses and thus violate the assumptions op-cited, and probability values 
of more than 5% would accept these hypotheses. 
3.3.1.2 Two Stage Least Square (TSLS) method 
 
While examining the relationship between securitisation and bank stability, measured by 
CAMELS (Capital Assets Management Earnings Liquidity Sensitivity), we were faced 
with a system of equations that presented the characteristics of what is called simultaneous 
equations.  
 
Simultaneous equations can be viewed as a set of different equations meant to capture an 
economic fact where dependent variables, acting together as dependent and independent 
variables, are predicted at the same time (Asteriou & Hall, 2011). According to Dougherty, 
using the Ordinary Least Square as an estimation method for this type of equations will 
only yield biased and inconsistent estimates along with invalid statistical tests. He then 
suggested instrumental variables estimation (Dougherty, 2011). Specifically, the 
instrumental model has been indicated to be suitable when at least one independent 
variable is significantly correlated with the error term (Agung, 2009). This is because one 
of the assumptions of OLS that is of the distribution independence of the error term vis-
a-vis independent variables is easily violated in the simultaneous equations system. The 
reason is that a change in the error term of one equation causes a change in the dependent 
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variable of that equation, which in turn causes a change in the dependent variable of the 
other equation where the latter is an explanatory variable and so forth. As a result, 
correlation between the error terms and explanatory variables seems inevitable (Asteriou 
& Hall, 2011). 
To solve this problem, the literature recommends the TSLS. The interest in the TSLS 
method resides in the fact that it creates a substitute to the endogenous variable correlated 
to the error term which is uncorrelated, and in so doing cancels the bias (Asteriou & Hall, 
2011). The properties of the TSLS are said to produce consistent and robust estimates as 
its properties are not particularly affected by the multicollinearity and other specification 
errors issues (Kennedy, 2008).  
Asteriou & Hall described the two stages (hence TSLS model) that are to be considered in 
performing a proper estimation of simultaneous equations and we have followed these 
steps. The first stage consists of determining the fitted values of the endogenous variables 
via OLS method. The second stage entails regressing the initial equations with the sus-
determined fitted values as instruments for the endogenous variables.    
The choice of proper instruments is crucial for reliable estimates. Before the instruments 
can be used in the TSLS, they must meet a number of requirements.  
The general instrumental variable regression model is presented as follows by (Stock & 
Watson, 2003): 
Yi  =  β0 + β1𝑋1i + ⋯ +  β𝑘Xki+ β𝑘+1𝑊1i + … +  β𝑘+𝑟Wri+Ωit     
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, where Yi is the dependent variable,  Ωit is the error term, 𝑋1i, … +  Xki are the troublesome 
variables (also called endogenous variables) that are presumed to be correlated with Ωit, 
𝑊1i, … , Wri are the other explanatory variables (also called exogenous variables) and 
correlated with Ωit, and β(′s) are the coefficients to be determined. 𝑍1i, … , Z𝑣𝑖 will be the 
instrumental variables.   
According to these authors,. 𝑍1i, … , Z𝑣𝑖 will be valid instruments if (1) corr(𝑍1i, … , Z𝑣𝑖 , 
𝑋1i, … +  Xki) ≠ 0, meaning the instruments are correlated with the troublesome variables 
(some say preferably highly correlated (Kennedy, 2008)) and (2) corr( 𝑍1i, … , Z𝑣𝑖 , Ωit) = 
0, and that means there is no correlation between the instruments and the error term Ωit. 
As they explained, the reason behind these conditions is that, on one hand, with the 
correlation between the instruments and the troublesome variables, the variation of the 
latter will translate into the variation of the former. On the other hand, because of the 
exogeneity of the instruments, the troublesome variables portion that is also exogenous is 
in fact identified by the instruments. Thus, it is the variation of this exogenous fragment 
of the troublesome variables that is employed for the estimation of their coefficients.   
(Dougherty, 2011)33 broke down the requirements for good instruments in a different 
fashion and the researcher strives to follow that path. Any variable used as instrument for 
each endogenous variable (troublesome) included in our models has first been ascertained 
in the literature as a determinant of that variable. (i) Being a determinant that makes that 
                                                          
33 In brief, a good instrument is correlated with the troublesome variable, independent from the disturbance term and is 
not listed among the variables already included in the structural equation(Dougherty, 2011)  
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instrument correlated with the troublesome variable, thus making it relevant. Also, as a 
determinant, the instrument is (ii) not correlated with the error term in the model because 
of its exogenous nature. Because there were many determinants available, we took the one 
with the highest coefficient of correlation with the endogenous variable as suggested by 
(Kennedy, 2008). Furthermore, that variable (instrument) has the particularity of (iii) not 
having been previously included in the structural equation of the model. Lastly, because 
we have multiple endogenous regressors, we have included all the explanatory variables of 
the system as seen in (Asteriou & Hall, 2011) and all the new instruments in the list of 
instruments as suggested by (Kennedy, 2008).   
The preceding authors also mentioned the importance of identification. When the number 
of instruments is strictly equal to the number of troublesome variables in an equation, it is 
said that there is exact identification. More instruments than troublesome variables lead 
to overidentification and less, to the conclusion that there is underidentification of 
equation. Our models are categorized as overidentified as it can be seen in  Table 3.2 
below. The overidentification further explained why we are utilizing the TSLS because 
according to (Dougherty, 2011) it is the adequate method for that type of identification.  
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Identification procedure: we have followed the steps described by Asteriou and Hall (2011).   
Endogenous variables (in the first column): Capital (TE/TA); Asset quality (OBS/RWA); Management efficiency (OE/OI); 
Earnings (ROA); Liquidity (LA/DST); Sensitivity to market risk (NII/TA) 
We have 20 variables used in the CAMELS system of equations (seen in the first row).  
Table 3.2 Identification of simultaneous equations models 
 TE/TA SEC/TA TL/TA LA/DST TL/DST ROE ROA OE/OI OBS/RWA IE/DST CAR 
 
Interbkrate NII/TA ZSCORE 
  
DST/TA 
 (-1) 
BKSIZE 
 (-1) 
HP 
 (-1) 
GDP GDP 
(-1) 
Dum08 
C ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  0 ✓  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ✓  ✓  0 0 ✓  
A 0 ✓  0 0 ✓  ✓  ✓  0 ✓  0 ✓  ✓  0 0 0 ✓  ✓  ✓  0 ✓  
M 0 ✓  ✓  0 ✓  ✓  0 ✓  ✓  ✓  0 0 0 0 0 ✓  ✓  0 0 ✓  
E ✓  ✓  ✓  0 ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓ 0 ✓  0 0 0 0 0 0 ✓  ✓  0 0 ✓  
L 0 ✓  0 ✓  ✓  0 ✓  0 ✓  0 0 ✓  0 ✓  0 ✓  ✓  0 0 ✓  
S ✓  ✓  0 0 ✓  0 0 0 0 0 0 ✓  ✓  0 ✓  ✓  ✓  0 ✓  ✓  
 
✓ means the variable is included in the equation and 0, means it is not.  
If we call G the number of endogenous variables, G = 6 (C-A-M-E-L-S) 
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Let us consider N as the number of missing variables (out of the overall 20) in each of the 6 equations. The equation 
pertaining to Capital has N = 10; for Asset quality, N = 9; for Management efficiency, N = 10; for Earnings, N = 9; for 
Liquidity, N = 10; and for Sensitivity to market risk, N = 10.  
For any equation, if N < G-1, then the equation will be qualified as under-identified; if N = G-1, the equation will be seen 
as exactly identified; if N > G-1 would mean the equation is over-identified. For the CAMELS, each of the equations has a 
N > G-1. This means that all the equations are over-identified. According to Asteriou and Hall, in such case these equations 
can be estimated with the TSLS method (Asteriou & Hall, 2011).
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3.3.2 Models specification  
 
This section specifies the models for the relationship between securitisation and 
regulatory arbitrage (1), then for the relationship between securitisation and bank stability 
measured by CAMELS (2) and then by the Z-score (3).  
 
3.3.2.1 Securitisation and regulatory capital arbitrage 
 
From the empirical literature survey, the researcher follows Uzun and Webb’s (2007) 
approach for evidencing RCA (regulatory capital arbitrage) and risk retention. Similar to 
their study, we evidence the regulatory capital arbitrage theory of securitisation using the 
volume of assets securitised to total assets ratio, banks’ total capital to risk-weighted assets 
ratio and loan ratio. However, Uzun and Webb study covers the period 2001 to 2005 while 
we start from 2008 through to 2015. Also, their data are quarterly panel data while for 
availability reason, we use annual data. Moreover, Uzun and Webb analysed different types 
of assets (residential mortgages, credit cards etc.) while we focus on RMBS (residential 
mortgage backed securities).  
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Our models are specified as follows:  
 
lnCARit  =  Φ0 + Φ1lnSEC_TAit +  Φ2lnDST_TAit + Φ3lnTL_DSTit +
Φ4lnBKSIZEit+ Dum2013 + δit              (1)                                                                                                                                                            
, where δit is the error term and i =1,...n and t=1,…,T 
 
lnRWA_TAit  =  φ0 + φ1lnSEC_TAit +
                                φ2lnROEit + φ3lnTL_TA
it
+ φ4lnDST_TAit+ φ5lnTL_DSTit +
                                 φ6lnBKSIZEit+ Dum2013 + υit                                                            (2)                                                                                           
, where υit is the error term.  
 
lnTL_TAit  =  ω0 + ω1lnSEC_TAit +
                        ω1lnROEit + ω2lnInterbrateit+ ω3lnIE_DSTit(−1) +  ω4lnROAit +
                        ω5lnDST_TAit   + ω6lnTL_DSTit + ω7lnBKSIZEit+ Dum2013 + εit                         
            (3)                                                                           
, where εit is the error term.  
 
Key variables involved in evidencing regulatory arbitrage are presented and explained as 
follows: 
Ratio of Securitisation / total assets: securitisation here is materialised by end of financial 
year outstanding balance of residential mortgage-backed securities RMBS and through the 
period delimitated for the study.    
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Ratio of Total regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets. The numerator is the aggregate 
of Tier 1, Tier 2 and eventually Tier 3 (depending of the years it was implemented) capital 
as defined by the Basel Accords between 1988 and 2010. The Accords require banks to 
maintain this ratio at a minimum of 8% to be able to absorb unexpected losses. This ratio 
was useful in other different settings such as in (Calomiris & Mason, 2004), (Martín-
Oliver & Saurina, 2007), (Uzun & Webb, 2007), (Dionne & Harchaoui, 2008), (Cerrato, 
Choudhry, Crosby, & Olukuru, 2012) and (Cardone-Riportella, Samaniego-Medina, & 
Trujillo-Ponce, 2010). 
Total loans / total assets: total loans in this ratio includes loans and advances to customers, 
banks, and Groups companies. This ratio was also utilized by (Uzun & Webb, 2007), 
(Dionne & Harchaoui, 2008), (Agostino & Mazzuca, 2011) and (Jiangli & Pritsker, 2008).  
 
Equation 2 is close to Salah and Fedhila’s model where they defined RWA_TA as a 
measure of risk (Salah & Fedhila, 2012).  
 
Size: The same study conducted by Uzun and Webb showed that banks’ size is a 
determining factor in the decision to securitise (Uzun & Webb, 2007).  
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3.3.2.2 Securitisation and Bank stability  
 
We use two popular measures of bank stability found in the literature: CAMELS and Z-
Score.  
3.3.2.2.1 Securitisation and CAMELS 
 
CAMELS is an acronym which stands for Capital - Assets quality - Management -  
Earnings - Sensitivity to market risk. As dependent variables (or endogenous variables), 
they can be understood as follows (MacDonald & Koch, 2006)(Evans, Leone, Gill, & 
Hilbers, 2000):    
Capital adequacy serves as a cushion constituted for covering the risks banks are exposed 
to. Its level informs third parties of how well these risks are being taken care of by the 
management team and how resilient they can be if their balance sheets are subjected to 
shocks.  As for Assets quality, it points out the credit risk deriving from such transactions 
as loans, investment portfolio and off-balance sheet businesses. Management quality is the 
response of the management team to the regulatory requirements as well as the handling 
of risks. Earnings entails its quantity, trend and determinants of its sustainability. Liquidity 
refers the quality of the liquidity reservoir in the short and long run. Sensitivity to market 
risk tells about how the capacity of a bank’s earning can be impacted by the volatility of 
interest and foreign exchange rates and other commodity/ equity prices, etc.  
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The purpose in this section is to capture how securitisation affects SA banks’ stability, here 
proxied by CAMELS. This measure of bank stability is considered by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank as part of “aggregated microprudential indicators” 
of financial system soundness, “core financial soundness indicators”, or Financial 
Soundness Indicators (FSIs) (Evans et al., 2000), (Gersl & Hermanek, 2006) (Sluijs, 
2006).  It is used in the economic literature which is indirectly close to this research 
project, see for example (Koetter & Poghosyan, 2010), (Mayes & Stremmel, 2012) even 
though these studies do not specifically refer to securitisation. After the GFC, Cole and 
White looked at the reasons why some small US commercial banks closed down in 2009. 
They employed CAMELS rating as explanatory variables and found that they remain 
“excellent” determinants of bank failure. They further discovered that there was an inverse 
relationship between CAMELS rating and real estate loans which lead to bankruptcy. As 
the real estate loans increased, the CAMELS rating deteriorated. However, RMBS 
(residential mortgage-backed securities) seemed not to have been involved in these 
failures (Cole & White, 2012).  
The six components of CAMELS are all dependent variables but are concurrently also 
determinants of each other in the right side of the equations as depicted by the green 
arrows in the path diagram of the model below. This makes them qualified as simultaneous 
equations. That is why we adopt an instrument variable estimation method, particularly, 
the two stage least square technique (TSLS, here after). The black arrows in the path 
diagram show the influence of the exogenous variables on the CAMELS variables. 
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Figure 3.2: Path diagram of the CAMELS model 
           Indicate the simultaneous feature of the endogenous variables in the system 
           Indicate the influence of the explanatory variables in the system 
 
The researcher will now proceed to describe the CAMELS model via each term in the 
acronym. The model specification of each term will then be followed by the elucidation of 
the independent variables and the reasons for their use.  
 
Capital 
The capital expresses the level of coverage of a bank’s total risk. From the IMF point of 
view, this variable is measured by the ratio of capital to risk adjusted assets (Evans et al., 
2000), and is the same as the one defined by the Basel Accords. It has now been empirically 
proven that this ratio could well not reflect the real level of risk of a particular bank (Hau, 
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Langfield, & Marques-ibanez, 2012). Following Mayes and Stremmel, we use the simple 
leverage ratio (equity to total assets) instead of regulatory capital adequacy ratio (CAR) as 
defined by the Basel Accords. The authors demonstrated in their 2012 study that this ratio 
performs better than the latter in predicting bank distress (Mayes & Stremmel, 2012). 
They conducted a study on the “effectiveness of capital adequacy measures in predicting 
bank distress”. They employed the CAMELS indicators but with three different capital 
measures, including the risk-weighted measure of the Basel Accord, the simple leverage 
ratio, and the gross revenue ratio.  They found that the leverage ratio illustrates bank 
failure in a more substantive fashion. These authors expanded on the advantage of this 
ratio by stating that it is also difficult to elude and to manipulate (Mayes & Stremmel, 
2012). Another advocate of the simplicity and yet superiority of the leverage ratio as a 
good predictor is Haldane (Haldane, 2012). Additional support comes from empirical 
studies including (Estrella, Park, & Peristiani, 2000), (IMF, 2009) and (Demirguc-Kunt, 
Detragiache, & Merrouche, 2010). That is why we will be using the leverage ratio, also 
called the economic capital ratio (Acharya et al., 2013), instead of the risk-weighted capital 
adequacy ratio. The leverage ratio is defined as Equity to total assets and was also used by 
(Cole & White, 2012).  
 
We drew the determinants of bank capital mainly from (Jokipii & Milne, 2008). These 
include the cost of capital. The ROE (return on equity) is often used even though this 
variable is also considered as a measure of profit. Also, the expected cost of failure. Here 
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the authors used non-performing loans to total loans as measure of risk. Due to lack of 
uniformity of data on non-performing loans in our sample’s balance sheets, we will instead 
use the ratio of total loans to total assets. The third determinant is profit that we measured 
by ROA (return on assets). As needed, for all the equations we added bank size. Uzun and 
Webb demonstrated that bank size influenced significantly banks’ decisions to securitise 
(Uzun & Webb, 2007) and other macroeconomic variables such as GDP growth, house 
price in replacement of inflation, and interbank interest rate to account for the economic 
pressures and shocks banks are exposed to and that could contribute to their failure (Mayes 
& Stremmel, 2012).   
 
Econometric model specification 
 
lnTE_TAit  =  α0 + α1lnSEC_TAit +
 α2lnTL_TAit+ α3lnLA_DSTit + α4lnTL_DSTit + α5lnROEit + α6lnOE_OIit+ α7lnBKSIZE(−1)it +
 α8lnHP(−1)it+ Dum2013 + μit                     (4) 
, where μit is the error term.  
 
TE_TA is the solvency ratio measured here by total equity to total assets. It is the first 
component of the CAMELS. This ratio indicates the level of preparedness of banks to 
absorb economic shock. Berger and Bouwman demonstrated how supportive the level of 
capital can be during financial crisis (Berger & Bouwman, 2013). Because securitisation 
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is carried out for multiple reasons (regulatory arbitrage, reputation, liquidity, 
diversification of funding sources etc.), the expected sign of the relationship between 
TE_TA and SEC_TA can be either positive or negative. SEC_TA is the ratio of the 
outstanding volume of mortgage securitised to total assets.  
 
TL_TA is the ratio of total loans to total assets. It indicates the portion of assets in the 
balance sheet that has been transformed into loans (Cerrato et al., 2012). (Jokipii & Milne, 
2008) while considering the determinants of bank capital interpreted this ratio as an 
indicator of a riskier profile.  
 
LA_DST is the ratio of liquid assets to deposits and other short-term funds. The ratio 
measures the ability of banks to respond to their short-term commitments. Also called the 
deposit run off ratio, it reflects the amount of assets immediately available should 
customers decide to make massive withdrawals (Cerrato et al., 2012). Depending on 
whether liquidity definitely had a positive or negative impact on profitability, because it 
also has an opportunity cost (Alper & Anbar, 2011), the level of TE_TA will improve via 
more retained earnings or not. This liquidity ratio was also used by (Ahmad, Ariff, & 
Skully, 2008) when they looked at the determinants of banks capital ratios. They argued 
that a high level of liquidity ratio would reduce liquidity risk, thus also the cost of capital 
and facilitate new capital raising.  
 
 97 
  
TL_DST is another measure of liquidity. Viewed as the reserve to deposits, it shows the 
weight of illiquid assets financed by deposits (Cerrato et al., 2012).  
 
ROE is the ratio of the profit to total equity. ROE here is considered as the cost of equity. 
As such, the relationship with TE_TA is expected to be negative. It can also be found as a 
determinant in (Jokipii & Milne, 2008).  
 
OE_OI is the ratio of operating expenses to operating income (interpreted as management 
quality). It appears to be a determinant of TE_TA in the sense that as the operating 
expenses diminish compared to total income, the profit increases. In the end when more 
profit is held as retained earnings, total equity increases as well, and we would expect the 
sign of the relationship to be negative. Similar to (Ahmad et al., 2008), we included 
management quality as determinant of bank capital ratios. However, we used a different 
measure (OE-OI) while they employed the ratio of net interest income to total earning 
assets.  
 
BKSIZE is measured by the total assets of the sample involved in the study. Uzun and 
Webb evidenced that bank size has an impact on the decision to securitise (Uzun & Webb, 
2007). Larger banks have a greater propensity to securitise than smaller banks because 
they are better equipped in terms financial resources and skills to carry out such complex 
transactions. 
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HP stands for house price. House price is the index computed by ABSA Bank, one of the 
banks in the sample. House price has been demonstrated by Koetter and Poghosyan and 
others to be a determinant of bank stability. It pushes the value of collateral upwards when 
it increases, assuming it does not deviate from its fundamental value. When HP increases, 
it enhances borrowers’ net wealth and their capability to pay their debts. As a result, banks 
are better off in terms of their stability (Koetter & Poghosyan, 2010). The sign here is 
expected to be positive.  
 
Assets quality 
 
OBS_RWA is here the measure of assets quality as seen in (Koetter & Poghosyan, 2010). 
It is the ratio of Off Balance Sheet activities to Risk-Weighted Assets. Following these 
authors, we will infer an increase of this ratio as a decrease of asset quality. OBS here are 
defined by SA banks themselves as including guarantees, letters of credit, irrevocable 
commitments, unutilised facilities, borrowing transactions, and sometimes credit 
derivatives instruments. The problem here is the counterparty risk. Any 
underperformance of the counterparties will incur significant losses for these banks 
(MacDonald & Koch, 2006). In the literature, the common indicator of banks’ asset quality 
used is non-performing loans to total loans ratio. However, as the (IMF, 2009) study 
showed, NPL does not truly reflect whether the assets quality has worsened.  
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Econometric model specification 
 
lnOBS_RWAit =  ε0 + ε1lnSEC_TAit +
 𝜀2lnCARit+ 𝜀3lnTL_DSTit + ε4lnROEit+ ε5lnInterbkrateit+ ε6lnROAit+ ε7lnBKSIZEit(−1) +
+ ε8lnHPit(−1) + ε9lnGDPit +  Dum2013 + πit                  (5) 
, where πit is the error term.  
 
TE_TA is the ratio of total equity to total assets. It expresses the strength of banks. From 
(D. M. Nachane & Ghosh, 2002)’s point of view, a positive or negative relationship will be 
a response, respectively, to the strength of the equity ratio on one hand and on the other 
hand an action (hedging), when confronted with weaker equity ratio to prevent the bank 
from failing. This was also deemed as determinant by (Khasawneh & Hassan, 2010) and 
(Cooper, 2011).  Khasawneh and Hassan concluded that the relationship can be positive 
as an increase in capital lead to less risk and thus to less OBS. But also, it could be the case 
if an increase in capital as a good signal, draw more customer that are eventually in need 
of OBS services. Because CAR, the capital adequacy ratio performed better, we have 
replaced TE_TA, knowing that earlier explanations also hold for the former and are also 
used by (P. Calem & Rob, 1999).  
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TL_TA is the ratio of total loans to total assets and has been used by (D. Nachane & 
Ghosh, 2007) (Khasawneh & Hassan, 2010) (Elian, 2012). They explained that if this ratio 
increases, then interest rate risk will increase as well. Consequently, OBS will soar as banks 
will likely try to hedge against the risk. The former added that higher level OBS might 
simply result from it offered as service to customer while assessing their loans demand. 
We have replaced the ratio with an equal one which is TL_DST (total loans to deposit and 
short-term funds).  
 
Interbank interest rate can influence assets quality because of a ripple effect caused by the 
rise of the ratio of total loans to total assets or deposits. Also, interest rate variation results 
in a variation in off balance sheet structure and volume (MacDonald & Koch, 2006).  
 
ROE is the ratio of return on equity, looked at here more as a signal of creditworthiness 
(D. M. Nachane & Ghosh, 2002) (Khasawneh & Hassan, 2010) and has also been used by 
(Cooper, 2011).  
 
ROA is the ratio of profit to total assets. It is a measure of profitability (IMF, 2009) from 
the assets perspective. ROA paints the performance of the assets of the sample. It is related 
to the OBS_RWA partly because of these OBS in terms of fees expenses and inherent 
income. We expect the sign also to be negative or positive.  
 
 101 
  
SIZE: According to (D. M. Nachane & Ghosh, 2002) the relationship between bank size 
and OBS will be positive depending on whether the barriers to entry are or economies of 
scale hypothesis is accepted. A rather negative sign would result from moral hazard and/or 
the positioning of the banks as too-big-to-fail. This determinant is also found in (Elian, 
2012).  
 
GDP is the growth domestic product, viewed as an indicator of economic pressure with 
the capability of impacting banks’ stability 
 
Management efficiency 
 
OE_OI defined as the ratio of operating expenses to operating income. Also known as the 
cost-to-income ratio, it is the measure of banks’ management team efficiency, their ability 
to keep their expenses at a reasonable level. OE_OI is used in a similar way by (Petria, 
Capraru, & Ihnatov, 2015) and (Chiaramonte, Croci, & Poli, 2015).  
 
Management is the third component of CAMELS. The better the ratio is contained the 
better the profits that will ultimately strengthen bank stability. Securitisation is a costly 
process that also indirectly generates a lot of profits. We expect a positive or negative sign 
on the relationship between OE_OI and SEC_TA as it depends on how well the 
management team balanced the two.  
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Econometric model specification 
 
lnOE_OIit  =  β0 + β1lnSEC_TAit +
 β2lnTL_TAit+ β3lnIE_DSTit + β4lnOBS_RWAit+ β5lnTL_DSTit+ β6lnROEit+ β7lnBKSIZE(−1)it +
+ β8lnHP(−1)it+ Dum2013 + Ωit                        (6) 
, where Ωit is the error term.  
TL_TA is the ratio of total loans to total assets, one of the measures of bank liquidity 
(Munteanu, 2012)(Roman & Sargu, 2015). It is a determinant of OE_OI in that the 
interest income from loans is a major portion of operating income. We here expect a 
negative sign between the two variables.   
 
IE_DST is the ratio of interest expenses to deposits and other short-term funds. This ratio 
measures the cost of short-term funds (Kasman & Yildirim, 2006)(Lozano-vivas & 
Pasiouras, 2010). The funding costs which are a function of the combination of the nature 
of the funds, the interest rate, banks’ creditworthiness, and competition (Dietrich & 
Wanzenried, 2011).  
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OBS_RWA is the ratio of off balance sheet operations to risk-weighted assets. Off balance 
sheet activities comprise securitisation, derivatives and so forth. Total operating expenses 
include fees and commissions incurred during these operations. On the other hand, 
operating income include revenues from these activities. We expect the sign to be negative 
as an increase in OBS would increase income compared to expenses.  
 
TL_DST is a ratio of total loans to deposits and other short-term funds known as the 
intermediation measure equally utilized by (Manlagnit, 2011). OE comprises interest paid 
on DST while OI is an aggregate made also of interest received from loans granted. We 
expect the sign of the relationship OE_OI / TL_DST to be positive or negative. 
 
ROE is the ratio of profit to equity (other authors used ROA instead). It is considered here 
as the measure of bank profitability of the sample during the period investigated, from the 
equity perspective. It is a determinant of OE_OI as the profit is essentially the result of 
the difference between OE and OI. We expect the sign to be negative or positive.  
 
BKSIZE can have a positive impact on the management efficiency as large size banks 
would benefit from an economy of scale.  
 
HP (see explanation from Asset quality in (Koetter & Poghosyan, 2010)).  
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Earning (profitability) 
 
ROA is the ratio profit to total assets (Yüksel & Zengin, 2016). It is a measure of 
profitability from the assets perspective. It reflects the performance of the assets of the 
sample. The relationship between SEC_TA and ROA is expected to be positive because 
we assume banks would engage in the securitisation transactions to generate profits.  
 
Econometric model specification 
lnROAit   =  φ0 + φ1lnSEC_TAit +
 φ2lnOE_OIit+ φ3lnTL_TAit + φ4lnTE_TAit+ φ5lnOBS_RWAit+ φ6lnTL_DSTit+ φ7lnROEit +
+ φ8lnBKSIZE(−1)it + φ9lnHP(−1)it+ Dum2013 + ψit                                                     (7) 
, where ψit is the error term. 
OE_OI is the cost efficiency measure. The ratio is the cost (operating expenses salaries, 
administration, general expenses, but not loans write off) to operating income (here net 
operating income including interest income, net fees and commission and other net 
income before taxation). We have also excluded all impairments and charges. The lower 
the ratio the better (Chiaramonte et al., 2015).  
 
TL_TA is the ratio of total loans to total assets. This ratio could have a positive impact on 
the profitability thanks to the interest income they can generate, assuming the level of 
non-performing loans are limited.  
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TE_TA is the ratio of total equity to total assets, the measure of bank solvency. It reflects 
banks’ resilience ability in the face of financial shocks. Thus the relationship between 
TE_TA and ROA can be expected to be positive when lessening the one-period perfect 
capital market assumption with symmetry information (Athanasoglou, Brissimis, & Delis, 
2006), (Petria et al., 2015), (Moussa, 2015)(Petria et al., 2015). Better capitalized banks 
gain from the volume of customers and from the funding cost on the market because of 
their appreciable rating on one hand and because of their limited funding requirements 
on the other hand (Pasiouras & Kosmidou, 2007).  From the risk-return perspective, lower 
TE_TA can lead to higher return (Dietrich & Wanzenried, 2011). Overall, the sign can be 
positive or negative. 
 
OBS_RWA is the ratio of off balance sheet activities to risk-weighted assets. These 
activities generate non-interest income. An increase of the ratio via securitisation would 
also increase ROA. We thus expect the sign to be positive. 
 
TL_DST is the ratio of total loan to deposits and other short-term funds, and is one of the 
liability liquidity measures (MacDonald & Koch, 2006). More liquidity improves ROA via 
economy on financing costs even though holding excessive liquidity might also cause 
higher opportunity cost (Petria et al., 2015). However there is a balance that needs to be 
observed between the level of loans financed by deposits (that generate interest income 
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and thus improve ROA) and the level of liquidity to be held in the case of liquidity runs 
(Albulescu, 2015).  Overall, the sign can be either positive or negative, where a higher 
ratio means lower liquidity. 
 
ROE is the return on equity, here considered as one measure of profitability.  The link 
between the ROE and ROA is established by the equity multiplier where ROE equals ROA 
times the Equity Multiplier [Total assets to Equity] (MacDonald & Koch, 2006). To put 
it differently, we would say that ROA equals ROE divided by the equity multiplier (EM), 
also viewed as the level of leverage. The change in ROA now being a function of the level 
of ROE and EM, we expect a positive or negative sign on the relationship between ROE 
and ROA.   
 
Bank Size. The impact of the size on ROA is mix according to (Athanasoglou et al., 2006) 
(Petria et al., 2015). Big size might mean an economy of scale but also imply actions 
paralyzed by heavy bureaucracy.  
 
House Price - see explanation from Asset quality in (Koetter & Poghosyan, 2010)  
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Liquidity 
 
Liquidity here is measured by the ratio of liquid assets to deposits and other Short-term 
funding. Liquid assets as collected for this study comprise cash and overnight interbank 
loans, government bonds and treasury bills. Core deposits have the characteristic of being 
stable and depending on it is a source of stability (Berger & Bouwman, 2013). Core 
deposits reflect the readiness of banks to face liquidity shocks. If securitisation is carried 
out to generate more liquidity, then the sign will be positive, otherwise it will be negative. 
Therefore, we expect a positive or negative sign. The same measures of liquidity can be 
found in the studies such as (Cardone-Riportella et al., 2010), (Salah & Fedhila, 2012), 
(López-Andión et al., 2015).  
 
Model specification 
lnLA_DSTit  =  Φ0 + Φ1lnSEC_TAit +
 Φ2lnTL_DSTit + Φ3lnInterbkrateit+ Φ4lnOBS_RWAit + Φ5lnZSCOREit +
 Φ6lnROAit+ Φ7lnBKSIZEit(−1) + Φ8lnHPit(−1) +   Dum2013 + δit                              (8)                                        
, where δit is the error term.  
Interbkrate is the interbank short-term interest rate as applied within the SA banking 
system. An increase in interest rate can be an impediment for liquidity provision. 
Therefore, the expected sign is negative. This determinant was also used by (Munteanu, 
2012).  
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OBS_RWA is the ratio of off balance sheet activities to risk-weighted assets. OBS was 
utilized by (Imbierowicz & Rauch, 2014) when they were looking at the relationship 
between liquidity risk and credit risk. 
 
ROA is the ratio of return on assets. This ratio indicates how much net revenue banks have 
been able to make in utilizing their short-term and long-term assets (Moussa, 2015). The 
higher the return the higher the level of liquidity via retained earnings (Roman & Sargu, 
2015).   
 
BKSIZE is an important determinant. Roman and Sargu mentioned the crowding-in effect 
that is engendered when a bank is large. They meant that having more customers is 
synonymous with more deposits being received by the bank and that ultimately more 
liquidity is engendered. However, a shift may occur in favour of small banks when there is 
a competitive advantage in terms of interest rates offered on deposits. Overall, the 
relationship between bank size and liquidity can be positive or negative (Roman & Sargu, 
2015).    
HP (house price) - see explanation from Asset quality in (Koetter & Poghosyan, 2010) 
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Sensitivity to market risk (interest rate risk) 
 
NII_TA is one measure of the sensitivity of banks to interest rate risk. The volatility that 
can be observed in the NII echoes the interest rate risk (MacDonald & Koch, 2006) . 
NII_TA is the ratio of net interest income to total assets. Net interest income is the 
difference between total interest income and interest expenses. When an interest rate 
varies (interest rate risk), it destabilizes the net interest income and the structure and 
volume of bank assets and liabilities (MacDonald & Koch, 2006). This ratio is also viewed 
as the reflection of financial intermediation effectiveness (Moussa, 2015). We examine 
here how securitisation of mortgage loans impacts net interest income to total assets ratio.  
The model specification is: 
lnNII_TAit   
=  λ0 + λ1lnSEC_TAit +  λ2lnTE_TAit + λ3lnInterbkrateit+ λ4lnTL_DSTit +
+ λ5lnDST_TA(−1)it + λ6lnBKSIZE(−1)it + λ7lnHP(−1)it +  λ8lnGDP(−1)it+ Dum2013 +
ռit                 (9) 
, where ռit is the error term.  
TE_TA is the solvency ratio. A different aspect of interest rate change is its impact on the 
market value of stockholders’ equity (MacDonald & Koch, 2006). Because change in 
interest rate is part of market shocks, a well-capitalized bank will be preserved from shock 
(Ballester, Ferrer, Gonzalez, & Soto, 2009).  
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Interbkrate is the interbank interest rate. The direction of the relationship with the 
dependent variable will indicate how much the latter changes when there is an increase of 
interest rate (MacDonald & Koch, 2006).   
 
TL_DST is the ratio of total loans to deposits and other short-term funds. It indicates the 
portion of loans financed by deposits (Entrop, von la Hausse, & Wilkens, 2016). According 
to (Ballester et al., 2009), the fact that there is a maturity mismatch between loans and 
other assets and liabilities further exposes banks to interest rate risk when the volume of 
loans increases (Ballester et al., 2009).  
 
DST_TA is the ratio of deposit and other short-term funds to total assets. Deposit and 
other short-term funds growth relative to total loans has a mix influence on the exposure 
to interest rate risk. Depending on the country, exposure to interest rate risk can increase 
or decrease following an increase of deposits (Racic, Stanisic, Racic, & Gmbh, 2014).  
  
Bank size in the log of total assets. Size matters, especially regarding big banks, in terms 
of risk sharing, portfolio diversification in order to reduce risk, but also because a notion 
of too-big-to-fail can lead to incommensurate risk taking behaviour for greater return 
(Entrop et al., 2016)(Ballester et al., 2009). Total assets growth has a mix influence on the 
exposure to interest rate risk. Depending on the country, exposure to interest rate risk can 
increase or decrease following an increase of bank assets (Racic et al., 2014).  
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House Price (Koetter & Poghosyan, 2010) and Growth Domestic Product are all 
macroeconomic variables. 
3.3.2.2.2 Securitisation and Z-score  
 
Following  (Michalak & Uhde, 2011), (Salah & Fedhila, 2012) and  (López-Andión et al., 
2015), we employ Z-score as a proxy of bank stability. The version used here is the banks 
accounting database which is different from the version called distance-to-default that 
relies on the banks stock price data.  
 
Z-score is credited to (ROY, 1952), (Hannan & Hanweck, 1988) and (Boyd, Graham, & 
Hewitt, 1993) according to (Strobel, 2011). Z-score is known as a measure of insolvency 
risk. ´It represents the number of standard deviations that a bank’s rate of return on 
assets has to fall from the mean for the bank to become insolvent´(Anginer, Demirgüç-
Kunt, Huizinga, & Ma, 2014), that is, for a bank to see its equity washed-out.  As Delis et 
al. argue“it is the standard deviation between the expected values of ROA and the negative 
values of ROA = -EA that yield insolvency”(Delis, Hasan, & Tsionas, 2014). A higher 
score indicates a lower probability of failure. 
 
The advantage of the measure is that it is relatively straightforward to calculate. It also 
requires little data. The evidence from Chiaramonte et al.’s study demonstrated that Z-
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score and CAMELS have comparative advantage in detecting distress events during the 
GFC. The same study showed that Z-score performs better when it comes to sophisticated 
financial institutions (Chiaramonte et al., 2015). However, it does not provide an 
indication on the contagion relation or correlation between financial institutions (Diaconu 
& Oanea, 2014). (Delis et al., 2014) also argued that this measure is based on historical 
data and does not capture a bank’s short-term risk nor the endogeneity of bank risk to 
other bank characteristics.   
 
Strobel justified the use of Z-score as follows: he starts with the definition of bank 
insolvency as the state where (car + roa) ≤ 0, with car is the bank’s capital-asset ratio and 
the roa, the bank’s return on assets. According to this author, if roa is a normally 
distributed random variable such that roa  ̴N (𝜇𝑟𝑜𝑎, 𝜎𝑟𝑜𝑎2 ), the author reported, referring 
to  (Boyd & Graham, 1986) that, the probability of insolvency can be given as  
 
  P(roa ≤ -car ) = p ( 
𝑟𝑜𝑎−𝜇𝑟𝑜𝑎 
𝜎𝑟𝑜𝑎
 ≤ -Z) = Φ (-Z), 
 
 where the Z-score is defined as Z =  
𝑐𝑎𝑟+𝜇𝑟𝑜𝑎 
𝜎𝑟𝑜𝑎
  > 0  
 
and Φ(.) is the cumulative distributive function of the standard normal distribution 
N(0,1) (Strobel, 2011)  
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Salah and Fedhila put the mathematical formulation of the Z-score as it follows (Salah & 
Fedhila, 2012),  
𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 =
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑡 +
𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡
⁄
𝜎(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑡)
 
 
Where 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑡 is the return on average assets and 
𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡
⁄  the ratio of equity to total assets.  
 
We constructed our Z-score following the steps used by (López-Andión et al., 2015). For 
each year, we calculate the Z-score by adding the ROAA to the ratio of equity to total 
assets all divided by the standard deviation of the ROAA calculated over the whole period 
designed for the study. The ROAA is the return on average assets before taxes.  
 
Bank Size: in a  study conducted by Uzun and Web, they demonstrated that banks’ size is 
determinant in their decision to securitise their assets (Uzun & Webb, 2007). 
 
Z-score (I) 
 
lnZscore(1)it  =  α0 + α1lnSEC_TAit +  α2lnRWA_TAit+ α3lnTE_TAit +
 α4lnLA_TAit + α5lnTL_DSTit + α6lnROEit +
 α7lnInterbrateit+ α8lnBKSIZEit  α9lnHPit(−1) +  α10lnGDPit(−1) +  Dum2013 + μit                                                                                             
            (10) 
, where μit is the error term.  
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Z-score (II) 
 
lnZscore(2)it  =  α0 + α1lnSEC_TAit +
 α2lnSBL_SECit+ α3lnInterbkrate(−2)it + α4lnTL_DSTit + α5lnRWA_TAit +  α6lnNII_TAit +
 α7lnBKSIZEit+ α8lnBKCON(−1)it + α9lnHP(−1)it +  α10lnGDP(−1)it + Dum2013 +
μit                                        (11) 
where the μit of both Z-scores are the error terms.  
 
 
And where in either equation: 
We use the log of the Z-score because according to (Lepetit & Strobel, 2015), under this 
form its distribution is not as heavily skewed as the simple one’s.  
RWA_TA is the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets and it is viewed as an indicator 
of credit risk (Salah & Fedhila, 2012). In their study on the impact of securitisation on 
credit risk and bank stability, Salah and Fedhila used this ratio as a dependent variable 
along with the Z-score which they all see as measures of risk. We utilised the RWA_TA 
ratio instead as one of our independent variables for bank stability with the understanding 
that it can contribute to the contraction of the distance from insolvency that defined the 
Z-score.  
 
TE_TA is the ratio of total equity to total assets. This was used as well in the literature as 
a determinant of bank stability measure by Z-score (Salah & Fedhila, 2012).  
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SBL_SEC (Sarkisyan & Casu, 2013) is the ratio of Retain interests (specifically 
Subordinated loans) to Outstanding securitised assets: retain interests in the 
securitisations programmes are credit enhancements and other guarantees meant to 
protect investors from potential losses. A 2013 study showed that  they can have a negative 
impact on banks’ insolvency risk, in particular the provision of subordinated (first loss) 
facilities (Sarkisyan & Casu, 2013). The 2008 Financial Crisis revealed that securitisations 
were carried out for regulatory arbitrage purposes via the setting up of conduits provided 
with explicit guarantees that in the end prevented risk transfer (as it should) to investors 
(Acharya et al., 2013). Building on these two papers, we introduced the variable 
subordinated loans (first and second loss) to the securitised assets ratio. Other liquidity 
and redraw facilities could be added but they have not been used on a consistent basis in 
our sample.  
 
LA_TA is the ratio liquid assets to total assets which indicate the level of bank liquidity. It 
can be found in several studies as determinant of bank stability, for example (Salah & 
Fedhila, 2012)(López-Andión et al., 2015)(Sarkisyan & Casu, 2013) 
 
TL_DST is the ratio of total loans to deposit and other short-term funds. This ratio is 
another indicator of liquidity level as it tells how the level of short-term funds remaining 
available after a share has been allocated to loans.   
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ROE is a return on equity, an indicator of bank performance. Following Salah and Fedhila, 
then Jiangli and Pritsker, we considered this ratio as another useful independent variable 
(Salah & Fedhila, 2012)(Jiangli & Pritsker, 2008).  
 
NII_TA is the ratio of net interest income to total assets. It was employed by López-Andión 
et al in their study on the solvency of financial instritutions where they drew lessons from 
securitisation. They viewed this ratio as a measure of bank profitability (López-Andión et 
al., 2015) 
 
Bank size is measured by the logarithm of total assets. Salah and Fedhila posited that large 
banks has more opportunities to diversify their activities and thus would have a negative 
relation with credit risk (Jiangli & Pritsker, 2008).  
 
We included some macroeconomic variables: 
 
From Mayes and Stremmel’s point of view, interbank interest rate, inflation, and GDP 
(Gross Domestic Product) are indicators in which economic burdens become apparent. 
Their deterioration is able to fragilize the banking stability (Mayes & Stremmel, 2012).  
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Interest rate is equally utilised as determinant by (Salah & Fedhila, 2012)(López-Andión 
et al., 2015) 
 
We have replaced inflation with house price. Koetter and Poghosyan, looking at the 
relationship between real estate markets and banks’distress in Germany, demonstrated in 
their study that house price deviations from their fundamental values are contributing 
factors to bank instability (Koetter & Poghosyan, 2010).   
 
Bank concentration is measured by HHI. It is defined as the sum of the squares of banks’ 
market shares (Petria et al., 2015). We have added this variable as seen in the study by 
Salah and Fedhila, and López-Andión et al where is it surmised (from the literature) that 
the higher the level of concentration the higher the exposure of banks to risk. At the same 
time, it seems that too much competition would not be desirable either (Salah & Fedhila, 
2012)(López-Andión et al., 2015).  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
We conclude this chapter on the key assumptions that underpinned this study. (1) The 
researcher has assumed that the financial information available in the banks’ annual 
reports are reliable since they are referred to most of the time as audited by well-known 
audit firms. Also, financial reports are available to investors and other third parties for 
them to make informed decisions. (2) The researcher has also assumed that the four big 
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banks chosen in this study are representative of the banking population in South Africa 
since they hold a monopolistic position in the South African banking system.   
(3) The data regarding the volume of RMBS are assumed accurate as we collected them 
from different sources (the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, the respective banks and looked 
on the South African Banking Association website) and found that the volume securitised 
matched approximately year by year (specifically the last two sources).  
(4) Other assumptions are drawn from the theories underpinning this study: i.e. agency 
and institutional theories. They are indicated in chapter 2.  
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Chapter 4 
Empirical Results 
“All parameters associated with economic behaviour are local approximations applying to a specific time and place” 
(Kennedy, 2008) – (recalling John Maynard Keynes’ description of econometrics) 
 
This chapter presents the estimation process and the interpretation of the research 
findings. The data were analysed with the support of Eviews 9.5 software version.  
 
The common features regarding the handling of all the data are the following: first, all the 
variables were log-transformed to ensure their linearity. Second, challenged with the 
limited number of observations needed to achieve models stability and perform other 
tests34, we converted the data from a lower frequency (annually data) to higher frequency 
(quarterly data). We opted for the constant-match average conversion method, among 
others proposed in Eviews software, where the annual outstanding balances of our 
variables were reported identically in each quarter. We justify this choice by the fact that, 
as equally explained in the software, the values remained constant each quarter during the 
year and seems not to have significantly changed the standard deviations and the quarterly 
data variations from one year to another. However, because of this transformation, some 
of the log variables (three out of twenty-four) that were originally normally distributed 
                                                          
34 For example, a minimum of 20 observations were required by the software for the ADF and PP tests, while we only 
had 8 years of data. The conversion then increased the number to 32 quarterly observations.   
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now appeared non-normally distributed at less than 1% significance level35. However, a 
sample size (understood as the number of observations) of more than 30 or 40 can still 
yield good parametric inferences even though the normality assumption is violated 
(Ghasemi & Zahediasl, 2012). In this study, we have 32 observations from our time series 
data. Furthermore, McDonald argued that after transformation, if the data remained non-
normally distributed, parametric tests can nevertheless be used because they are not so 
easily responsive to non-normality (McDonald, 2014).  The third common feature is that 
all our variables were first-differenced to avoid spurious regression because as shown in 
Table 4.5 in the appendix, they were all found to have unit roots. Units roots tests were 
performed employing the Augmented-Dicker Fuller and Phillips-Peron unit roots tests. 
Fourth, all the baseline specifications included a dummy variable that accounts for the 
2008 global financial crisis with 1-(one) throughout 2008 and 0-(zero) elsewhere. Fifth, 
another dummy variable was added each time needed to capture some few outliers. Sixth, 
some variables were incorporated in the models with a one period lag aiming at mitigating 
the unpredictable effects of multicollinearity. Seventh, the results are interpreted ceteris 
paribus (meaning, holding all other explanatory variables constant (Koop, 2008)).    
 
The research questions of this study, in a nutshell, were knowing why SA banks securitise 
mortgage loans – with a special focus on regulatory capital arbitrage - and how these 
                                                          
35 Please see annotations on Table 4.1 in Appendix (a Jarque-Bera probability value of more than 5% indicates normal 
distribution)  
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activities affect their soundness. The ultimate objective of this chapter is to answer these 
questions by estimating a model of mortgage loans securitisation impact on Total 
Regulatory Capital Ratio, Loan Ratio, Risk and Bank Stability. The chapter splits the 
analysis and the results into two parts. The first section focuses on the relationship 
between securitisation of mortgage loans and regulatory capital arbitrage. The second 
section examines the relation between securitisation of mortgage loans and bank stability.  
 
Section 4.1 Securitisation of mortgage loans and regulatory capital arbitrage. 
 
This section presents the results pertaining to the acceptance or rejection of the first 
hypothesis formulated in chapter one. The null hypothesis tested stipulated that South 
African (SA) banks do not securitise mortgage loans for regulatory arbitrage. This was 
done through the following steps: descriptive statistics, correlation matrix, models 
specification, model estimation and results analysis, diagnostic and stability tests, 
robustness check and conclusion.  
 
4.1.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
 
Graphs of all the variables 
The year 2008 and 2013 marked the dates where Basel II and Basel III regulations 
respectively were implemented in South Africa. Our data starts in 2008 and ends in 2015. 
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They capture the impact of both regulations. 2008 specifically corresponds to the pick of 
the securitisation of mortgages activities in South Africa. It also coincides with the period 
where the financial crisis started, caused among other reasons by the careless use of 
securitisation. So, the graphs (in Appendix – Figure 4.1) provide a glimpse of how four of 
the main SA banks responded as the crisis was hitting and after. For example, it can be 
noticed that the volume of mortgage securitisation has continued decreasing since 2008, 
as well as total loans after a spike in 2009. The ratios of profitability have decreased 
similarly while expenses have increased.    
Other descriptive statistics and correlation matrix are equally attached in Appendix 
(Tables 4.1 and 4.2). 
 
Model specification 
 
The purpose of this section is to answer the question of whether SA banks securitise for 
regulatory arbitrage or alternatively for funding reasons. In the literature, RCA (regulatory 
capital arbitrage) is clearly mentioned as one of the reasons why banks securitise their 
mortgage loans. The hypothesis tested here is that [H0], as risk averse agents36, SA banks 
do not securitise mortgage loans for RCA purpose. Consequently, Mortgage loans 
securitization is expected to not negatively affect SA banks’ risk-based capital ratio [CAR], 
nor positively influence the level of risk [RWA_TA], nor positively affect their loan ratio 
                                                          
36 consideration derived from the agency theory (AT) presented in the theoretical framework in chapter 2.  
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[Loans]. Instead[H1], as risk averse agents, it is assumed that SA banks securitise 
mortgage loans mostly for funding purpose. Thus, Mortgage loans securitisation is 
expected to positively affect South African banks’ liquidity ratios [DST_TA; TL_DST].   
We proceed the statistical analysis starting with the OLS (ordinary least squares) 
regression, then adjusted the results with the Generalized linear technique. The variables 
are defined in Chapter 3.  
 
Our models specified in Chapter 3 as it follows:   
 
lnCARit  =  Φ0 + Φ1lnSEC_TAit +  Φ2lnDST_TAit + Φ3lnTL_DSTit +
Φ4lnBKSIZEit+ Dum2013 + δit              (1)                                                                                                                                                             
, where δit is the error term and i =1,...n and t=1,…,T 
 
lnRWA_TAit  =  φ0 + φ1lnSEC_TAit +
                                φ2lnROEit + φ3lnTL_TAit+ φ4lnDST_TAit+ φ5lnTL_DSTit +
                                 φ6lnBKSIZEit+ Dum2013 + υit                                                                          
            (2)                                                                                          
, where υit is the error term.  
 
lnTL_TAit  =  ω0 + ω1lnSEC_TAit +
                        ω1lnROEit + ω2lnInterbrateit+ ω3lnIE_DSTit(−1) +  ω4lnROAit +
                        ω5lnDST_TAit   + ω6lnTL_DSTit + ω7lnBKSIZEit+ Dum2013 + εit                                    
            (3)                                                                          
, where εit is the error term.  
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Model (I) specification is close to Uzun and Webb’s study where the regulatory arbitrage 
theory of securitisation was tested (Uzun & Webb, 2007). Just as these authors, we 
included the following variables: Capital ratio (here as the dependent variable), and as 
independent variables, securitisation ratio and bank size. Because the purpose here is to 
test our null hypothesis (Ho) that SA banks do not securitise for capital arbitrage motive, 
we accordingly expected the signs to be respectively [+] and [+]. Unlike Uzun and Webb, 
we added two liquidity measures in our model specification. We used Deposits and other 
short-term funds to Total Assets ratio, and Total Loans to Deposits and other short-term 
funds. The expected signs for both measures are respectively [+] and [-].    
Model (II) is similar to (Dionne & Harchaoui, 2008). The purpose here is to complement 
(I) with a clear answer to the second aspect of RCA definition in the literature which states 
that RCA reduces the regulatory capital while increasing risks. These authors as well as 
(Acharya et al., 2013) approximated this risk with the ratio Risk-weighted assets to Total 
Assets. The idea here was to see how securitisation affects this ratio. In the same way as 
argued by these authors, a positive relationship would imply higher risks taken by SA banks 
through securitisation and would go against the hypothesis from the agency theory that 
they are risk averse. So, we expect a negative sign [-] based on this hypothesis. As for the 
covariates, the cost of fund would be positive [+] as an increase create incentives to take 
more risk to compensate, Total Loans to Total assets [+] because an increase would push 
overall risk level upward, Deposits and other short-term funds to Total assets [+/-] will 
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all depend on how much is utilised, and Total loans to Deposits and other short-term funds 
[+] as a rise in this ratio can only be indicative of increased risk.  
Model (III) is meant to evidence whether securitisers in SA expand their loans level via 
securitisation of mortgage loans. (P. Calem & Rob, 1999) demonstrated in their study that 
well-capitalised banks take even more risk when the regulatory capital required increases. 
(Jokipii & Milne, 2008) while considering the determinants of bank capital, interpreted 
total loans to total assets ratio as an indicator of a riskier profile. Total loans to assets ratio 
is the dependent variable. It is joined by SEC_TA and other covariates that potentially can 
have an influence such as the cost of fund (ROE, Interest Expenses(IE_DST)), liquidity 
measures (LA_DST, TL_DST, DST_TA), the cost of short-term interbank fund 
(Interbank interest rate). Again, because of the assumption from the agency theory that 
these banks are risk averse, we expect the signs to be respectively [-] for securitisation, 
then [-] for the cost of funds as an increase would reverberate on loan pricing and slow 
down loans extension by discouraging potential borrowers, and [+] for all liquidity 
measures as used to fund loans.     
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4.1.2 RCA models estimation 
 
Table 4.5 Estimated results RCA 
Dependent variables       
Independent 
Variables 
CAR 
(I) 
RWA_TA 
(II) 
TL_TA 
(III) 
SEC_TA -1.011 (0.168) * 0.867 (0.050) * 0.475 (0.203) ** 
ROA   -0.502 (0.214) ** 
TL_TA   -0.680(0.031) *  
ROE  -0.411(0.010) * 0.158(0.147) 
IE_DST   -0.004(0.005) 
Interbrate   -0.020 (0.012) 
TL_DST 0.972 (0.536) *** 0.128(0.069) *** 0.315(0.344) 
DST_TA 0.820 (0.283) * 1.177(0.038) *   1.537(0.540) ** 
BKSIZE -1.177(0.204) *       1.410(0.063) * 0.964(0.431) ** 
Dum2013 -0.006(0.004)  -0.001 (0.001)                  0.003(0.003)  
Constant -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001)                 -0.001 (0.001)  
Standard error 
regression 
0.006 0.001 0.006 
N 30 30 30 
(*) significance at 1% level. (**) significance at 5% level. (***) significance at 10% level 
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Because TL_TA appears as an independent variable in the RWA_TA equation, II and III were also estimated as simultaneous 
equations with the two stage least squares method (results - in Appendix Table 6 - and do not show major differences). 
CAR, RWA_TA and TL_TA are analysed with the OLS technique and then adjusted with the generalized least squares model 
(specifically the white heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance). RWA_TA and TL_TA are also analysed 
with the two stages least square because TL_TA as endogenous variable appears in both equations (results are in Appendix).  
SEC_TA: ratio outstanding volume mortgages securitized to total assets; CAR: capital adequacy ratio (Tier1 + Tier2/RWA); 
ROE: return on equity; ROA: return on assets; Interbkrate: interbank short-term interest rate; RWA_TA: ratio Risk-weighted 
assets to Total Assets. TL_TA: ratio total loans to total assets; IE_DST: ratio Interest expenses to deposits and other short-term 
funds; TL_DST: ratio total loans to deposits and other short-term funds; DST_TA: ratio deposits and other short-term funds to 
total assets; BKSIZE is aggregate total assets; Dum2008: dummy accounting for 2008 global financial crisis.    
  
Models performance: all the models performed well with an R-squared correspondingly 
92%, 99%, and 88% for (I), (II) and (III) when we used OLS regression method. This 
means that the models were properly specified and moreover that the variance of the 
regulatory capital (CAR), RWA_TA and Total Loans (TL_TA) are between 88% to 99% 
explained by all our regressors.  
Looking at the overall model’s significance, the F-statistic test is one of the measures. The 
null hypothesis here is that the regressors included in this model are not effective. The P-
value of the F-statistic is significant at 1% level for the three models, meaning that the Ho 
hypothesis is rejected. Indeed, the explanatory variables performed well, making the 
overall models statistically significant.  
 
4.1.3 Results analysis 
In (I), SEC_TA is the ratio of the outstanding volume of mortgage securitised to total 
assets. This variable depicts the level of SA banks involvement in the securitisation 
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transactions. The coefficient is negative and significant at 1% level. This reflects an 
inverse relationship between securitisation activities and regulatory capital. This suggests 
that securitisation has a negative impact on the level of regulatory capital. This result falls 
in line with (Dionne & Harchaoui, 2008) where they found that the securitisation of 
Assets-Backed securities, including Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS) by Canadian 
banks reduces their regulatory capital. Similarly, (Uzun & Webb, 2007) found, with the 
USA data, that there is also an inverse relationship between regulatory capital and the 
securitisation of other ABS(credit cards) but a positive statistical significance relation with 
the RMBS. While at this stage, Dionne and Harchaoui were cautious in drawing any 
conclusion about regulatory arbitrage because they intended to evidence the risk-taking 
aspect, Uzun and Webb suggested based on their analysis that the result with the 
ABS(credit cards) already implies a practice of regulatory arbitrage. (Ambrose et al., 2005) 
found with USA data that RMBS were also used as regulatory capital arbitrage medium 
based on the evidence that higher risk loans were retained and lower risk portion 
securitised and not via capital adequacy ratios. (Martín-Oliver & Saurina, 2007) in Spain 
reached a different conclusion according to which RMBS were securitised only to meet 
liquidity needs. (Cardone-Riportella et al., 2010)  in another study in Spain did not find 
any evidence of RCA either by Spanish banks with all type of assets, including RMBS. Both 
studies in Spain used the CAR ratio. (Agostino & Mazzuca, 2011) findings in Italy support 
our results that RMBS minimise CAR and would mean RCA.  
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Model (II) highlights in a more straightforward way the relation between securitisation 
and risk, approximated by RWA_TA. Let’s recall that RCA reduces the CAR with no or 
little curve of risks (Jones, 2000). This model is close to the one used by (Dionne & 
Harchaoui, 2008) and (Salah & Fedhila, 2012). The key point here is that the coefficient 
of the relation between RWA_TA and SEC_TA is positive and significant at 1% level. This 
infers that  securitisation increases risks and thus confirms the outcome found by (Dionne 
& Harchaoui, 2008) and (Salah & Fedhila, 2012). Furthermore, having the same interest 
as (Acharya et al., 2013), we reverse the dependent variable ratio and replace RWA_TA 
by TA_RWA and found a negative and highly significant coefficient (results in Appendix). 
As securitisation volume grows, the ratio of TA to RWA decreases.  
Model (III) looked at the impact of SEC_TA on the expansion of total loans (TL_TA). 
SEC_TA has a positive and significant coefficient. 1% increase in securitisation of 
mortgages leads to 47% change in total loans. This might indicate that SA banks use 
securitisation to expand their loans portfolio. It possibly also implies that, if SA banks are 
not risk-adverse as the previous outcome seems to indicate, then as argued by (Blum, 
1999) expecting more equity tomorrow would mean taking higher risks today, if SA banks, 
like banks in general, perceive regulatory requirements as equity-costly, via cost-benefit 
analysis (Jones, 2000). This result, as far as the researcher is aware of, is a novelty. Previous 
studies evolved around model (I) and (II). Apart from (Uzun & Webb, 2007), (Cardone-
Riportella et al., 2010), this variable (TL_TA) was also used by (Dionne & Harchaoui, 
2008), however only as an independent variable.   
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Other costs of fund and two out of three liquidity variables have expected signs. Costs of 
fund have negative coefficient and not significant.  As for the two liquidity variables, the 
coefficients are positive and one is significant at 5%, demonstrating perhaps how 
decidedly they contributed in loans growth.  
 
BKSIZE in the three models (I, II, III) is measured by total assets. This variable has a 
negative coefficient and is significant at 1% level in (I). This shows a negative relationship 
between bank size and regulatory capital. It means that when total assets increase, the level 
of regulatory capital diminishes probably due to securitisation. However, in (II) and (III) 
the coefficient is positive when it comes to bank size and risk-weighted assets ratio to total 
assets on one hand, and total loans on the other hand. Our overall view is that for SA banks, 
the extent of securitisation depends more on the level of loans than total assets. Moreover, 
the increase of assets is accompanied by an increase of the level of risk.     
The dummy variable accounting for the year 2013 implementation of Basel III with 1 that 
year and 0 otherwise is not significant in the three models.    
In summary, regarding our null hypothesis (Ho), the direction of the key relationships 
among the related variables is contrary to the anticipated signs. All Three models 
corroborated the definition of RCA. Capital ratio and securitisation have inverse 
relationships while there is a positive relation between securitisation and risk 
approximated by risk-weighted assets to total assets. Moreover, there is a positive and 
significant association as well between loan ratio and securitisation. These results are thus 
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highly suggestive that SA banks do securitise motivated by capital arbitrage. Consequently, 
this means that our null hypothesis against capital arbitrage is rejected. 
4.1.4 Diagnostic and stability tests 
We started the analysis employing the OLS technique. There are three common diagnostic 
tests for the OLS method for a good model. They include the fact that the errors terms 
must be normally distributed, there must be no serial correlations among the independent 
variables and no heteroscedasticity. Eviews software offers the Jarque-Bera test for the 
first diagnostic test. The null hypothesis is that the error terms are normally distributed. 
Model I, II and III exhibited probability values of respectively 28%, 28% and 14 %, which 
are all more than 5% level of significance. This means that the null hypothesis of normality 
of residuals is accepted. Consequently, it can be concluded that our model’s predictions 
are not biased.  
The second test for serial correlation employed the Breug-Godfrey serial correlation test. 
The null hypothesis is no serial correlation. Tests for the three models showed that the 
Obs*R-squared of the tests had probability values of 20%, 16% and 96%. These outcomes 
accept the null hypothesis that there no serial correlation in our model’s specifications. 
The third test looks at whether there is heteroscedasticity (no constancy) in the variance 
of the error terms. The Breug-Pagan-Godfrey heteroscedasticity test’s null hypothesis is 
that there is homoscedasticity. Our three models generated a probability values which 
were significant at 1% level, thus rejecting the homoscedasticity hypothesis. To solve this 
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problem, (Asteriou & Hall, 2011) suggest using the generalised linear method. This 
method encompasses different procedures including the White’s heteroscedasticity-
consistent estimation method. The latter is appropriate when it is difficult to identify the 
variable causing the problem. We thus followed the steps as described by these authors 
and believe that we have obtained, as they predict, the estimates that are consistent and 
the estimators that are efficient.  
The stability tests were carried out with the CUSUM test. The graph shows that all the 
three models are stable. 
 
4.1.5 Robustness check 
Model (I) robustness check was inspired by the work of (Acharya et al., 2013) where they 
evidenced how Assets Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) conduits were used by banks 
before the GFC for regulatory arbitrage purpose and how the setting up of these structures 
negatively affected their balance sheets during the GFC. In their study, ABCP exposures 
are the dependent variable. This is also analogous to (Dionne & Harchaoui, 2008)’s paper 
where securitisation is the dependent variable. Here then, we have reversed the position 
of the two main variables by employing SEC_TA as the dependant variable as well. Unlike 
model (I), we supplemented this new specification with the ratio liquid assets to deposits 
and other short-term funds as needed to improve its goodness. This ratio shows the level 
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of liquid assets available. The target was the relationship between CAR and SEC_TA.  
Leaning on the assumption that SA is risk-averse agents (AT), the expected sign is [+].   
The outcomes (reported in Appendix – Table 7) showed an inverse relationship between 
CAR and SEC_TA where the coefficient is significant at 1% level. This confirms the 
statistical result in model (I). Similar results were reached by (Acharya et al., 2013) when 
studying ABCP conduits. In the same interpretive manner as Acharya et al in the same 
study on ABCP, we look at the trend of the ratio total assets to risk-weighted assets, 
assuming that if the securitisation of mortgage loans has decreased during the period 
studied as it indeed has, then we will see this ratio decreasing also. What we observed is 
that in 2008 this ratio was 2 and has remained roughly the same throughout the period 
until 2015 at 1.9. Which leads us to the conclusion that securitisation with RCA motive 
reduces the level of regulatory capital with no or little reduction of risk as argued by Jones 
(2000). 
Furthermore, surprisingly an increase in total assets as a measure of bank size had an 
inverse and strong relation with securitisation. This suggests that the increase in the level 
of securitisation was more determined by the level of loans issued than total assets.  
TL_TA’s coefficient was positive but not significant. Significance would have been 
interpreted as total loans increasing together with securitisation activities.  
LA_DST is the ratio of liquidity to deposits and other short-term funding, in the same way 
as in (Cardone-Riportella et al., 2010), (Agostino & Mazzuca, 2011). The coefficient is 
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also positive but not significant. Significance would have indicated that liquidity fosters 
securitisation possibly as a source of securitisation costs funding.   
TL_DST is another measure of liquidity used in this model, from (Martín-Oliver & 
Saurina, 2007). The statistical results confirms the previous liquidity measure’s above in 
exhibiting a positive coefficient with no statistical significance.  
Further robustness check was done by conducting similar regression analyses with natural 
data. The results confirm our first findings (see Table 4.10 in Appendix).  
 
Section 4.2 Securitisation of mortgage loans and bank stability 
 
In this section, the point of focus is whether securitisation of mortgage loans affects 
negatively or positively SA banks’ stability. The hypothesis tested here is originated from 
the agency theory and formulated as follows: If SA banks do not engage in regulatory 
arbitrage (because they are risk-averse) and random effects (i.e. macroeconomics factors) 
are favorable, then mortgage loans securitisation do not negatively affect SA banks 
‘stability(Ho). In other words, the hypothesis tested stipulates that in good time, 
securitisation of mortgage loans positively affects SA banks stability and in a bad time, it 
does the reverse, if there no RCA. This task was done through the following steps: 
descriptive statistics, correlation matrix, models specification, model estimation and 
results analysis, diagnostic and stability tests, robustness check and conclusion. Here we 
utilised two measures of bank stability named CAMELS and Z-score. 
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4.2.1 Securitisation and CAMELS 
 
CAMELS stands for Capital, Asset quality, Management efficiency, Earnings or 
Profitability, Liquidity and Sensitivity to market risk, specifically in this study, sensitivity 
to interest risk. 
 
4.2.1.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
Details of descriptive statistics and correlation matrix can be found in the appendix (Table 
4.3).  
 
Model specification (seen in Chapter 3) 
Securitisation and CAMELS relation is analysed with the two stage least square method. 
All the variables were defined and their inclusion in the regressions justified in Chapter 3. 
Our model’s specifications are as follows:  
Securitisation and capital 
lnTE_TAit               
=  α0 + α1lnSEC_TAit
+  α2lnTL_TAit+ α3lnLA_DSTit + α4lnTL_DSTit + α5lnROEit + α6lnOE_OIit+ α7lnBKSIZE(−1)it 
                +  α8lnHP(−1)it+Dum2013 + μit                                                                            (4) 
, where μit is the error term.  
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Instruments for the endogenous regressors LA_DST and OE_OI are respectively Z-
SCORE and GDP. The latter are determinants but not included in the specification. 
 
Securitisation and asset quality 
lnOBS_RWAit
=  ε0 + ε1lnSEC_TAit
+       𝜀2lnCARit+ ε3lnTL_DSTit + ε4lnROEit+ ε5lnInterbkrateit+ ε6lnROAit+ ε7lnBKSIZEit(−1)  
 +  ε8lnHPit(−1) + ε9lnGDPit +  Dum2013 + πit                                                      (5) 
, where πit is the error term.  
Instrumental variable for the endogenous regressor ROA is TL_TA. The latter is a 
determinant of ROA but not included in the specification. 
 
Securitisation and management efficiency 
lnOE_OIit  
=  β0 + β1lnSEC_TAit
+  β2lnTL_TAit+ β3lnIE_DSTit + β4lnOBS_RWAit+ β5lnTL_DSTit+ β6lnROEit+ β7lnBKSIZE(−1)it 
             + β8lnHP(−1)it+ Dum2013 + Ωit                       (6) 
, where Ωit is the error term.  
Instrumental variable for the endogenous regressor OBS_RWA is BKCON. The latter is a 
determinant of OBS_RWA but not included in the specification. 
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Securitisation and profitability 
  lnROAit   =  φ0 + φ1lnSEC_TAit +
            φ2lnOE_OIit+ φ3lnTL_TAit + φ4lnTE_TAit+ φ5lnOBS_RWAit+ φ6lnTL_DSTit+ φ7lnROEit +
             φ8lnBKSIZE(−1)it +  φ9lnHP(−1)it+ Dum2013 + ψit                                         (7                                                      
, where ψit is the error term.  
Instrumental variables for the endogenous regressors OE_OI, TE_TA and OBS_RWA are 
respectively IE_DST, DST_TA and GDP. These instruments are also the determinants 
but not included in the specification. 
 
Securitisation and liquidity 
 
                  lnLA_DSTit  =  Φ0 + Φ1lnSEC_TAit +
                     Φ2lnTL_DSTit + Φ3lnInterbkrateit+ Φ4lnOBS_RWAit + Φ5lnZ − SCOREit +
                     Φ6lnROAit+ Φ7lnBKSIZEit(−1) + Φ8lnHPit(−1) +   Dum2013 + δit     (8)                                                                     
, where δit is the error term.  
Instrumental variables for the endogenous regressors OBS_RWA and ROA are 
respectively GDP and ROE. The latter are the determinants as well but not included in 
the specification. 
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Securitisation and sensitivity to market risk (interest risk) 
 
             lnNII_TAit   
            =  λ0 + λ1lnSEC_TAit +  λ2lnTE_TAit + λ3lnInterbkrateit+ λ4lnTL_DSTit +
            + λ5lnDST_TA(−1)it + λ6lnBKSIZE(−1)it + λ7lnHP(−1)it +
                λ8lnGDP(−1)it+ Dum2013 + ռit             (9) 
              
, where ռit is the error term.  
Instrumental variable for the endogenous regressor TE_TA is BKCON. The latter is a 
determinant but not included in the specification.  BKCON is the level of concentration 
of SA banks measured by the HHI (Herfindahl–Hirschman index).  
 
Instrument variables for all specifications37: lnsec_ta;  lntl_ta; lnz-score; lntl_dst lnroe 
lnCAR; lnie_dst; lnie_dst(-1); lndst_ta(-1); lndst_ta; lnbcon; dlnbksize(-1); lninterbkrate 
lnhp; lnhp(-1); lngdp1; lngdp(-1);  Dum2013  
 
For each specification, one or two lags were added to the exogenous variables of that 
equation to improve the overall relevance and exogeneity of the instruments of the 
specification. For example, specification number one (dlnte_ta) had the following 
instruments: dlnsec_ta(-2) dlntl_ta(-2) dlnz-score dlntl_dst(-1) dlnroe(-2) dlnCAR 
                                                          
37 This list includes instruments for robustness check specifications.  
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dlnie_dst dlnie_dst(-1) dlndst_ta dlndst_ta(-1) dlnbcon(-1) dlnbksize(-2) dlninterbkrate 
dlnhp(-2) dlngdp(-1) dlngdp(-2) Dum2013 
  
4.2.1.2 Models estimation 
Table 4.8 presents the summary of the results for both measures of bank stability 
employed in this study (CAMELS and Z-score).  
 
Table 4.8 Estimated results securitisation and bank stability 
                                                                                                                           
   CAMELS    Z-SCORES  
Dependent    
variables 
Independent 
variables 
Capital Asset  
Quality 
Management 
Efficiency 
Earnings Liquidity Sensitivity 
to market 
risk 
Z-score (1) Z-score (2) 
SEC_TA -0.277 
(0.005) * 
0.148 
(0.075) *** 
2.022 
(0.250) * 
0.023 
(0.004) * 
0.684 
(0.014) * 
0.328 
(0.051) * 
-1.195 
(0.135) * 
-0.243 
(0.077) * 
CAR  3.078 
(0.339) * 
      
TE_TA    0.819 
(0.007) * 
 0.273 
(0.036) * 
1.146 
(0.048) * 
 
TL_TA  -0.018  -15.27 -1.229     
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(0.014)  (1.936) * (0.044) *  
RWA_TA       1.231 
(0.159) * 
0.499 
(0.100) * 
NII_TA        0.790 
(0.150) * 
LA_DST 0.530 
(0.002) * 
       
TL_DST 0.293 
(0.056) * 
-8.916 
(1.429) * 
-4662 
(0.823) * 
0.349 
(0.063) * 
-1.037 
(0.171) * 
-6.786 
(0.611) * 
-1.016 
(0224) * 
-0.086 
(0.167) 
LA_TA       -0.394 
(0.063) * 
 
ROE -0.282 
(0.003) * 
1.256 
(0.223) * 
-0.878 
(0.087) * 
0.839 
(0.004) * 
  0.736 
(0.067) * 
 
ROA  -1.335 
(0.223) * 
  0.092 
(0.008) * 
 
 
  
SBL_SEC  
 
      0.035 
(0.012) * 
OE_OI -0.230 
(0.007) * 
  -0.217 
(0.008) * 
    
IE_DST   0.647 
(0.101) * 
     
Interbkrate  -0.010   0.001 0.029 -0.009 -0.017 
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(0.038) (0.004) (0.016) *** (0.004) (0.013) 
Z-SCORE     1.876 
(0.018) * 
  
 
 
OBS_RWA   3.061 
(0.400) * 
0.179 
(0.008) * 
0.060 
(0.008) * 
   
DST_TA      0.513 
(0.136) * 
  
BCON        0.216 
(0.425) 
BKSIZE -0.006 
(0.003) 
(-1) 
0.223 
(0.119) 
(-1) 
0.107 
(0.059) 
(-1) 
-0.008 
(0.004) 
(-1) 
0.022 
(0.014) 
(-1) 
0.238 
(0.056) * 
(-1) 
-2.108 
(0246) * 
-0.316 
(0.105) 
 
HP -0.024 
(0.006) * 
(-1) 
0.697 
(0.195) * 
(-1) 
0.375 
(0.108) * 
(-1) 
-0.028 
(0.008) * 
(-1) 
0.084 
(0.022) * 
(-1) 
0.530 
(0.080) * 
(-1) 
0.100 
(0.028) * 
(-1) 
0.021 
(0.047) 
(-1) 
GDP  -0.054 
(0.006) * 
   -0.005 
(0.002) ** 
(-1) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
(-1) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
(-1) 
Dum2013 -0.001 
(0.000) 
0.012 
(0.008) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
 0.000 
(0.001) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
Constant -0.000 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
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F. Stat 11602 52.53 28.22 25640 3015 31.06 276 83.70 
Standard Error 
regression 
0.000 0.014 0.007 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.004 
N (after 
software 
adjustments) 
29 29 29 29 29 29 30 29 
(*) significance at 1% level. (**) significance at 5% level. (***) significance at 10% level 
CAMELS is analysed with the Two stage least squares instrumental variable method. Z-scores are analysed with the OLS technique 
and then adjusted with the generalized least squares method (the heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors).   SEC_TA: ratio 
outstanding volume mortgages securitized to total assets; CAR: capital adequacy ratio (Tier1 + Tier2/RWA); TE_TA: ratio 
equity to total assets; TL_TA: ratio total loans to total assets; LA_DST: ratio liquid assets to deposits and other short-term funds; 
TL_DST: ratio total loans to deposits and other short-term funds; ROE: ratio return on equity; ROA: ratio return on assets; 
SBL_SEC: ratio subordinated loans provided to SPVs to outstanding securitized mortgages; OE_OI: cost-to-income ratio: 
operating expenses to operating income; Z-score: ratio return on average assets + (ratio equity to total assets) to standard deviation 
return on average assets. IE_DST: ratio interest expenses to deposits and other short-term funds; Interbkrate is interbank interest 
rate; RWA_TA: ratio risk-weighted assets to total assets; NII_TA: ratio net interest income to total assets; OBS_RWA: ratio off-
balance sheet activities to risk-weighted assets; DST_TA: ratio deposits and other short-term funds to total assets; BKSIZE is 
aggregate total assets; HP is house price index; GDP is gross domestic product; Dum2008: dummy accounting for 2008 global 
financial crisis.  
 
Models performance: all the models performed well. CAMELS’s R-squared are 
respectively 99%, 96%, 94%, 99%, 99% and 94%. The two Z-scores’ are at 99% and 98%. 
This means that the models were properly specified and moreover that the variance of the 
different regressants is adequately explained by all our regressors.  
Looking at the overall model's significance, the F-statistic test is one of the measures. The 
null hypothesis here is that the regressors included in this model are not effective. The P-
values of the F-statistic is significant at 1% level for all the models, meaning that the Ho 
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hypothesis is rejected. Indeed, the explanatory variables performed well, making the 
overall models statistically significant.  
 
4.1.2.3 Results analysis 
Securitisation and Capital  
With regards to the dependent variable Capital, securitisation has a negative and 
significant coefficient. This suggests that an increase of the level of securitisation erodes 
the level of equity ratio. This result is consistent with the outcome of the first part of this 
study that was focused on testing the regulatory arbitrage hypothesis. It is worth noticing 
that the elasticity of the securitisation influence seems more pronounced when capital is 
defined according to the Basel Accord risk-weighted-based measure. For a percentage 
change of securitisation, capital change is more than 90% with the capital adequacy ratio 
against 27% for the simple equity to assets ratio. A strong capital level is one that can 
preserve the stability of banks’ balance sheets should they be subjected to shocks. This 
subsequently means that a downward movement at the capital level could be an indicator 
of a growth of the financial institution’ risk exposure (Evans et al., 2000). Let’s remember 
that under Basel II as implemented in South Africa in 2008, mortgage loans securitised are 
assigned 35% risk-weight (and more, depending on the risk) for the determination of the 
risk-weighted assets. According to the Bank Supervision Department 2014 report, the 
lessening of SA banks’ capital adequacy in 2013 is partly the result of the surge in the credit 
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risk-weighted exposures (South African Reserve Bank, 2014). This clearly indicates an 
increased risk taking. Because there an inverse relationship between securitisation and 
equity capital, we can suggest that SA banks securitise for RCA motive. This outcome 
confirms of our early results in Section I. 
Securitisation and Asset quality 
On the assets quality front, securitisation has a positive relationship with the ratio OBS to 
risk-weighted assets as a measure of assets quality, and the coefficient is significant at 10% 
level. We expected the sign to be positive because when a securitisation transaction takes 
place, assets securitised are moved from the balance sheet to securitised off-balance sheet 
debt. In the regulatory arbitrage framework, banks cherry-pick good assets, thus sending 
a signal to investors that their investment will be safe. Although off-balance sheet 
operations are still risky, in this case, the credit risk part will be significantly reduced. If 
securitised assets are mortgages granted with lax in the screening process, then off-balance 
sheet credit risk is important because additionally, banks would have to support the 
operations with more credit enhancements facilities given the prospect of a higher 
probability of default. Accordingly, as part of OBS activities, SEC and OBS move in the 
same direction. When we looked at the trends depicted by the graphs of these two variables 
earlier, there was a downward swing of the volume mortgage securitised since 2008 and 
an upward swing of OBS activities from that same time. We do not see causality between 
these two observations but attribute the connection between the two variables, as said 
earlier, to the fact that securitisation is part of the OBS activities. There are two other 
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plausible explanations for the inverse trends: a) one is the impact of the GFC where the 
misuses of mortgage securitisation are pointed in the literature as the main cause. South 
African banks, just as most countries that were engaged in the MBS, have pushed back 
their involvement in the MBS transactions since the crisis. B) Second, the upward trend 
of OBS is not a compensatory measure undertaken by SA banks to offset the decrease of 
SEC_TA, but instead the result of the enforcement in April 2010 of a new regulatory 
reporting requirement requesting that SA banks should incorporate “revocable facilities” 
in the off-balance sheets portfolio, which have since become the biggest portion of the 
OBSs, followed by undrawn facilities and guarantees (South African Reserve Bank, 2011).       
Not seeing the way to use Non-Performing Loans as another measure of assets quality, we 
alternatively conducted a robustness check by looking at the impact of securitisation on 
non-interest income as a percentage of net operating revenue. The non-interest income 
encapsulates fees service from securitised mortgages (Stiroh, 2004) and fees from all other 
OBS transactions. The coefficient was equally positive and significant at 1% level (see 
Table 8 in Appendix). A percentage change in securitisation translates into 20% change 
in the ratio. This implies that securitisation of mortgage loans generate substantial fees for 
SA banks. The result corroborates with the positive relation between OBS_RWA and 
SEC_TA found earlier.  
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Securitisation and Management Efficiency 
When it comes to the cost-to-income ratio as the measure of management efficiency or 
even bank performance, securitisation has a positive and significant coefficient. This 
would indicate that securitisation increases the level of cost relative to income. According 
to (Evans et al., 2000), if this ratio rises instead, the reason is likely to be the fact that the 
institution lack efficiency in the way it operates. This result contrast with the findings in 
the studies of (Hänsel & Bannier, 2008), (Cardone-Riportella et al., 2010) were 
securitisation enhances bank performance when approximated by cost-to-income ratio. 
For example, Hänsel and Bannier found that even though the cost of setting up a 
securitisation programme can be dissuasive, large banks, as well as small banks in the 
Europe, could overcome this barrier and engage in securitisation activities. So, SA banks 
probably need to review their operating costs as they engage in securitisation activities. 
Saayman and Styger interviewed South Africans financial operators about the difficulties 
hindering the development of securitisation in SA. Among the issues mentioned, was the 
fact that setting up securitisation program in SA is lengthy (about a year) and highly costly 
(Saayman & Styger, 2000) even though there was a hope that the trend will change 
overtime as the actors get fully skilled.     
 
Securitisation and Earning 
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Concerning the return on assets as a measure of bank profitability, securitisation has a 
positive and significant coefficient. This outcome may indicate that securitisation 
enhances SA banks’ profitability. It is worth noticing however that the percentage change 
in ROA is small (2%).This seems to be a logical consequence of the increase in the cost-
to-income ratio observed earlier. When there is a rise of this ratio, a negative impact can 
be equally expected on profitability (Evans et al., 2000). The positive results is consistent 
with the outcomes found in the studies carried by (Cerrato et al., 2012), (Jiangli & Pritsker, 
2008), (Salah & Fedhila, 2012), (Cardone-Riportella et al., 2010) and (Hänsel & Bannier, 
2008), securitisation is a profitable enterprise. An uncommon case of a negative outcome 
was evidenced by (Michalak & Uhde, 2011) and they suggested that the cause may come 
from the accounting practice.   
Another explanatory factor of the tightened impact could be the decrease in the ratio of 
equity to total assets, the solvency ratio, due to securitisation. It might have been 
negatively perceived as a signal of increasing risks (Evans et al., 2000) and trigger a 
swelling funding cost mechanism. Another explanation may come from the taxation aspect 
in South Africa (Saayman & Styger, 2000).  
When we conducted a robustness check by replacing the return on assets with the return 
on equity (ROE) which is another measure of profitability, securitisation positively and 
significantly influences the ROE (see Table 8 in Appendix). The statistical impact is much 
larger here at 13.6%. Our understanding is that, as securitisation has reduced the equity 
ratio in point 1, the decrease might have gone lower enough to keep a positive return. 
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There are different ways of extracting profits from securitisation transactions. These 
include transaction fees, swaps, avoiding double taxation by distributing the beneficial 
receivables to the originator and SPV, and dividends paid to the originator (Deacon, 
2004).  SA banks’ main method of extracting profits from securitisation is to directly hold 
preference shares in the capital of their SPV (Boshohh & Krisch, 2016) and transaction 
fees (as shown in the SPVs annual reports). From the securitisation programmes reports, 
we could notice that indeed servicers’ profits are recorded as preference dividends (from 
time to time) and servicers’ transaction fees. This means, over the period studied, 
originators received transactions fees and eventually some dividends. In brief, the profits 
may not yet be fully channeled in South African banks’ balance sheets but ROA loses a bit 
because of the increase of the operating expenses and ROE gains from the decrease of the 
equity ratio or inversely from the increases of the equity multiplier. ROE is the product of 
ROA and the Equity multiplier which is Total Assets/Equity (MacDonald & Koch, 2006). 
Lastly, the positive relationship between SEC and ROE can also be explained by the 
renowned risk/return positive relationship.  
 
Securitisation and liquidity 
Looking at the relationship between securitisation and the ratio liquid assets to deposits 
and other short-term funds, where this ratio is one measure of bank liquidity, the 
securitisation coefficient is positive and significant. This appears to indicate that 
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securitisation improves the level of liquidity. Which might also mean that SA banks 
securitise mortgage loans for funding purpose. A higher liquidity level can only be a 
positive indicator of the readiness of (SA) banks to face a crisis such as sudden runs (Evans 
et al., 2000). This outcome is consistent with several other related studies. In particular, 
(Agostino & Mazzuca, 2011) found that Italians banks securitise residential mortgages for 
funding purposes. In others cases, the same results were reached but for different types of 
assets: covered bonds and assets backed securities by Spanish banks (Martín-Oliver & 
Saurina, 2007), assets and liabilities of Spanish banks (Cardone-Riportella et al., 2010), 
CLO by European banks (Hänsel & Bannier, 2008) and ABS by UK banks (Cerrato et al., 
2012).  When we conducted a robust check by replacing LA/DST by LA/TA, the ratio 
liquid assets to total assets, we obtained similar results. The coefficient of the relation 
between SEC and LA/TA is positive and significant at 1% level (see Table 8 in Appendix).   
 
Securitisation and market sensitivity (interest rate risk) 
With regards to the net interest income (NII) as a measure of bank sensitivity to market 
risk, specifically interest risk, securitisation has a positive and significant coefficient. This 
would reflect the fact that securitisation has a positive impact on the net interest income 
to assets ratio. NII is the difference between interest income and interest expenses. 
Knowing that mortgage loans (long term maturity) are financed by deposits (short-term 
maturity), if interest rate declines, mortgages with fixed-interest rate will not be impacted, 
only the deposits. This causes a greater spread between the interest rate on deposits and 
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the interest rate on mortgages loans with the expansion of the NII subsequently 
(MacDonald & Koch, 2006).   Furthermore, evidence has demonstrated that the drop in 
short-term interest rate results in a lax on the lending standards of mortgage loans in 
relation to securitisation and supervisory requirements (Maddaloni & Peydró, 2011). The 
fact is South African short-term interest rate has sharply lowered between 2008 and 2015, 
going gradually from 10.17% in 2008 to 4.67% in 2015. Moreover, when we looked at the 
ratings of the RMBS programmes involved in this study, the major portion is rated AAA, 
then from A to BB in conformity with Basel II regulation. Only a negligible part is 
indicated as unrated. This suggests that SA banks hold the riskiest share of mortgage loans 
securitised on their balance sheets. Therefore, the statistical inference above might imply 
that because of lower interest rate during the period studied, more liabilities (deposits) 
were repriced at a lower rate than assets (retained part of mortgages securitised), interest 
income had then contracted but at a smaller magnitude than interest expenses, leading to 
a higher net interest income (MacDonald & Koch, 2006).   
Dum2013: regarding the dummy entered in the specification to account for the 
implementation of Basel III in South Africa, this variable is globally not statistically 
significant.  
In conclusion, CAMELS is a valid instrument of bank vulnerability measure as evidenced 
by (Cole & White, 2012) on the year 2009, a period covering the latest financial crisis. We 
agree with these authors that lower capital, worse asset quality, lower earnings, worse 
liquidity increase the probability of failure (Cole & White, 2012). 
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4.2.1.4 Diagnostic and stability tests 
The two stage least square is basically the OLS technique in two steps, with the 
introduction of instrument variables. Again, there are three common diagnostic tests for 
the OLS method for a good model and they include the fact that the errors terms must be 
normally distributed, there must be no serial correlations among the independent variables 
and no heteroscedasticity. Eviews software offers the Jarque-Bera test for the first 
diagnostic test. The null hypothesis is that the error terms are normally distributed. 
CAMELS specifications exhibited probability values of respectively 20%, 41%, 50.6%, 
51%, 48% and 41%. These probability values are all at more than 5% level of significance. 
This means that the null hypothesis of normality of residuals is accepted. Consequently, it 
can be concluded that our model’s predictions are not biased.  
The second test for serial correlation employed the Breug-Godfrey serial correlation test. 
The null hypothesis is no serial correlation. Tests for the CAMELS models showed that 
the Obs*R-squared have probability values of respectively 42%, 15%, 50.7%, 28%, 38% 
and 17%. These outcomes accept the null hypothesis that there no serial correlation in our 
model’s specifications. 
The third test looked at whether there is heteroscedasticity (no constancy) in the variance 
of the error terms. The Breug-Pagan-Godfrey heteroscedasticity test’s null hypothesis is 
that there is homoscedasticity. Our CAMELS models generated probability values of 
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respectively 14%, 13%, 25%, 24%, 22% and 26%. These outcomes thus accept the 
homoscedasticity hypothesis.  
  
4.2.1.5 Instruments tests 
Weak instrument tests: As pointed out by (Kennedy, 2008), weak instruments lead to 
meaningless results. F-statistics provided an indication of the strength of our instruments. 
(Staiger & Stock, 1997) posited that an F-statistics of more than 10 from the first-stage 
regression when there is only one endogenous regressor on the right side of the equation 
implies the instruments are strong. In the CAMELS system, the specifications of Asset 
quality (OBS_RWA), Management(OE_OI) and Sensitivity to market risk(NII_TA) have 
one endogenous variable each which are respectively ROA, OBS_RWA and TE_TA. When 
we regressed the instruments chosen to substitute the latter on the total instruments in 
each equation as explained by (Kennedy, 2008), we obtained F-statistics of respectively, 
34.7, 21.4 and 66.8. This suggests that our instruments are strong.  
As for Capital (TE_TA), Earnings(ROA) and Liquidity(LA_DST), they have more than 
one endogenous variable in their right-hand equations, which are respectively [LA_DST, 
OE_OI]; [OE_OI, TE_TA, OBS_RWA] and [OBS_RWA, ROA]. To test the strength of 
the instruments for multiple endogenous variables, (Stock & Yogo, 2005) provided critical 
values. 
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The validity of instruments: an instrument is valid if its relevance and exogeneity 
conditions are met (Stock & Watson, 2003).  An instrument that is correlated with the 
dependent variable but not correlated with the error term is relevant and exogenous. The 
statistical test for the latest is the J-statistic. The null hypothesis is exogenous variable.  
(Kennedy, 2008) recognized the difficulty to have both conditions met. For each equation 
of the CAMELS, we have ensured that each instrument is a determinant, thus correlated 
to the dependent variable, and was not previously included in the equation, thus ensuring 
its exogeneity. The P-values of the J-statistics of all the specifications are 15.7%. These 
outcomes thus implied that our instruments were relevant and accepted the null 
hypothesis of exogeneity.  
 
4.2.2 Securitisation and Z-score 
 
This section conducts the analysis of the relation between securitisation and bank stability 
using the second measure which is the Z-score. Z-score 1 includes the data of four banks 
while Z-score 2, only three banks for the reasons explained later in this section. 
 
4.2.2.1 Descriptive statistics: Z-score (1) and Z-score (2) 
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix are counted in Appendix (Table 4.3) 
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Model specification (as seen in Chapter 3) 
Z-score (I) 
 
lnZ − score(1)it  =  α0 + α1lnSEC_TAit +  α2lnRWA_TAit + α3lnTE_TAit +
                                 α4lnLA_TAit+ α5lnTL_DSTit + α6lnROEit +
                                α7lnInterbkrate it(−2) + α8lnBKSIZEit + α9lnHPit(−1) +
 α10lnGDPit(−1) +  Dum2013 + μit                                                                                    (10) 
 
 where μit is the error term.  
 
Z-score (II) 
 
lnZ − score(2)it  =  ψ0 + ψ1lnSBL_SECit +  ψ2lnSEC_TAit+ ψ3lnInterbkrate(−2)it +
                                 + ψ4lnTL_DSTit + ψ5lnRWA_TAit+  ψ6lnNII_TAit +
                                 ψ7lnBKSIZEit + ψ8lnBKCONit(−1) + ψ9lnHP(−1)it+ ψ10lnGDP(−1)it +
                                 Dum2013 + πit                                                                                                         (11) 
 
, where πit is the error term.  
 
4.2.2.2  Models estimation 
The estimations are all summarised in Table 4.8 above. 
 
4.2.2.3 Results analysis 
 
Z-score (I) 
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Z-score has become a common measure of bank stability.  It is composed of the average 
return on assets, the equity to assets ratio and standard deviation of the average return on 
assets. As indicated in Chapter 3, the higher the score, the greater the distance from 
default. 
We have undertaken the analysis of the relation between securitisation of mortgage loans 
and Z-score utilising the OLS regression. The results indicate a negative and significant 
coefficient at 1% level. This means securitisation of mortgage loans increases the 
probability of default or insolvency risk of SA banks. This outcome is consistent with those 
found by (Michalak & Uhde, 2011) in the European Union and Switzerland from 1997 to 
2007, (López-Andión et al., 2015) from 1998 to 2006 in Spain,  where they attributed the 
negative impact to regulatory arbitrage. Because we have previously seen that 
securitisation of RMBS undermined SA banks’ capital ratio due to RCA, we would adopt 
the same conclusion. By contrast, other studies found that RMBS contribute in 
strengthening banks stability’. We saw that in (López-Andión et al., 2015) from 2007 to 
2012 in Spain, (Salah & Fedhila, 2012) from 2001 to 2008 in the USA for RMBS but not 
for non-RMBS.  What is noticeable is that, RCA seems to have occurred in the former 
countries when only Basel I was implemented. Let’s recall that RCA is precisely one of the 
key reason why Basel I have since been replaced by Basel II, implemented in 2007 and the 
latter by Basel III following the GFC. This study covers the period 2008 to 2015 where 
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banks were subjected to new regulations and yet RCA, apparently, is still likely to occur as 
shown by SA results and mentioned in the theoretical literature.   
 
 
Z-score (2) 
 
The analysis with Z-score (2) looked at how credit enhancements, which most of the time 
accompany securitisation, affect banks’ stability. This point was originally meant to be an 
integral part of Z-score (1). The entire study is based on the data of the four majors SA 
banks. Because of the unavailability of data on retained interest for one of the 4 banks, we 
had 3 banks left and decided to conduct the analysis separately. The credit enhancement 
in question here is the subordinated debt granted to SPVs by SA banks when they 
securitise mortgage loans. This variable was added in the Z-score regression for the 3 
banks. The results demonstrated interestingly that the coefficient of subordinated debt is 
positive and significant at 1% level, indicating that this type of retained interest does not 
affect bank stability. This is contrary to our expectation because, in effect, in (Acharya et 
al., 2013)’s study on “securitisation without risk transfer”, the authors evidenced how 
setting up ABCP conduits and supporting these structures with liquidity guarantees did 
not really transfer risk to investors as it should normally be the case. Subsequently, banks 
involved suffered major losses during the GFC. However, our result is not singular but 
accords with (Sarkisyan & Casu, 2013) on “retained interest in securitisations and 
implications for bank solvency” where they found that subordinated debts reduce the risk 
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for small scale securitisers. It is also worth noticing that securitisation of mortgage loans 
as control variable maintained a negative and significant coefficient at 5% as seen with Z-
score (1). It thus seems that securitisation, even supported by subordinated debt, still has 
a negative impact on bank stability. 
 
4.2.2.4 Diagnostic and stability tests 
We started the analysis employing the OLS technique. There are three common diagnostic 
tests for the OLS method for a good model and they include the fact that the errors terms 
must be normally distributed, there must be no serial correlations among the independent 
variables and no heteroscedasticity. Eviews software offers the Jarque-Bera test for the 
first diagnostic test. The null hypothesis is that the error terms are normally distributed. 
Z-score I and Z-score II exhibited probability values of respectively 11% and 61 %, which 
are all more than 5% level of significance. This means that the null hypothesis of normality 
of residuals is accepted. Consequently, it can be concluded that our model’s predictions 
are not biased.  
The second test for serial correlation employed the Breug-Godfrey serial correlation test. 
The null hypothesis is no serial correlation. Tests for the three models showed that the 
Obs*R-squared of the tests had probability values of 98% and 94%, which is far more than 
5%. These outcomes accept the null hypothesis that there no serial correlation in our 
model’s specifications. 
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The third test looked at whether there is heteroscedasticity (no constancy) in the variance 
of the error terms. The Breug-Pagan-Godfrey heteroscedasticity test’s null hypothesis is 
that there is homoscedasticity. Z-score (1) model generated a probability values of 33%, 
thus accepting the homoscedasticity hypothesis, while Z-score (2)’s was significant at 1% 
level, thus rejecting the homoscedasticity hypothesis. To solve this problem, (Asteriou & 
Hall, 2011) suggest using the generalised linear method. This method encompasses 
different procedures including the White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent estimation 
method. The latter is appropriate when it is difficult to identify the variable causing the 
problem. We thus followed the steps as described by these authors and believe that we 
have obtained, as they predict, the estimates that are consistent and the estimators that 
are efficient for Z-score (2).  
The stability tests were carried out with the CUSUM test. The graphs showed that both 
models are stable:  
Z-score1(stability test) 
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4.3 Conclusion 
The conclusion of this section answers the second null hypothesis of this study drawn from 
agency theory which states that, if there is no RCA and random effects are favourable, then 
mortgage loans securitisation does not negatively affect banks’ stability. The results have 
exhibited an inverse relationship between Capital and Securitisation of mortgage loans, 
inferring RCA. Moreover, we have observed that during the period studied, GDP in SA 
went from a 3.7% growth in 2008 to 1.3% in 2015. Interest rate decreased from 10% in 
2008 to 4.75% in 2015 and house price index had increased from 356.3 in 2008 to 498.2 
in 2015. These macroeconomics indicators illustrate the erosion of the SA economic 
conditions.  Under these circumstances, we have seen that our analysis generated more 
negative than positive inferences for bank stability. Therefore, our second null hypothesis 
can be accepted. However, this conclusion must be qualified. The analysis with the 
CAMELS measure for bank stability revealed that in the short run, securitisation of 
mortgage loans improves the liquidity, net interest income and earnings of SA banks. The 
implication is that liquidity (DST_TA in model (1) of the first section and LA_DST in     
CAMELS) is positively and significantly related to SA banks’ capital ratios. With regards 
to earnings, it is assumed that part of it has been put back as retained earnings in the 
balance sheets. Overall, from the CAMELS analysis, it can be said that securitisation of 
mortgage loans has reduced SA banks’ capital but has generated liquidity and earnings 
reinvested to strengthen that capital. Now the question is, has there been a perfect trade-
off.  Bank stability measured with Z-score, which is composed of the equity ratio and the 
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return on average assets (divided by its standard deviation), answers negatively even when 
securitisation of mortgage loans is supported by retained interests (specifically 
subordinated debts). Further robustness check was done by conducting similar regression 
analyses with natural data. The results confirm our first findings except for securitisation 
and assets quality (see Tables 4.10 and 4.11 in Appendix).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 162 
  
Chapter 5 
Conclusion and policy implications 
“Regulatory arbitrage as a business model is a dangerous undertaking” (Acharya & Schnabl, 2009) 
 
This chapter recalls what this research was all about, summarises the research results and 
theoretical interpretation. It also suggests some policy implications and formulates some 
recommendations using a framework (Figure 5.1). Lastly, it provides direction for future 
research.   
 
Section 5.1. Research Summary 
 
SA banks are featured by the SARB as safe, sound and well-capitalised because their capital 
adequacy ratio is above the minimum required by the Basel Accords, as seen in Chapter 2. 
The problem with well-capitalised banks that are involved in the securitisation 
transactions is that their true level of insolvency probability can be masked if securitisation 
is carried out for regulatory arbitrage purpose. The amount of capital published may well 
be above the regulatory minimum required but in reality, remains below the level needed 
to cover the overall risks taken. This thesis has thus investigated whether the major well-
capitalised SA banks securitise mortgage loans for regulatory arbitrage reasons, in which 
case their well-capitalised standing would be undermined. The thesis has furthermore 
considered the impact of this type of securitisation and motives on these SA banks’ 
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insolvency probability, in other words, on their stability. Finally, the theoretical aspect has 
shed important light on the contributing factors that lead to securitisation.  
 
The six hypotheses, formulated in light of the agency and institutional theories’ 
perspectives, where SA banks are considered as acting on the behalf of the regulators and 
in constant quest of legitimacy for their survival, stipulate that: If SA banks are risk-averse 
agents, then they do not securitise mortgage loans for regulatory arbitrage motives (Ho). 
Alternatively, they securitise mortgage loans to meet their liquidity needs (H1).  
 
The third and fourth hypotheses assume that, from the Agency Theory lens, the 
implications of the securitisation of mortgage loans for SA banks’ stability, no matter the 
motive, would be uncertain (outcome uncertainty) because even though they depend on 
banks’ behaviour, they also rely on unpredictable factors such as the economic conditions. 
Therefore, the researcher assumes that, if SA banks do not engage in regulatory arbitrage, 
because they are risk-averse, and random effects such as economic conditions are 
favourable, then mortgage loans securitisation will positively affect SA banks’ stability 
(Ho). If, by contrast, SA banks engage in regulatory arbitrage and random effects are 
unfavourable, then mortgage loans securitisation will negatively impact SA banks’ stability 
(H1).  
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The last hypothesis, from Institutional Theory (IT), leans on the concept of legitimacy.  It 
is articulated around the idea that SA banks are keen to preserve their well-capitalised 
reputation, which confers legitimacy. Legitimacy coming from complying with legal 
requirements per IT, the researcher hypothesizes that if SA banks want to preserve their 
legitimacy, thus their well-capitalised position, then they will not securitise mortgage loans 
driven by regulatory arbitrage (Ho). Alternatively, if regulatory arbitrage is one of their 
guiding aims, then it will wear down their legitimacy (H1).  
 
Section 5.2. Key research findings 
 
Recapping that this study’s focus was exploring the correlation between the main variables 
and thus, did not test their directional influences (causality), the main outcomes are as 
follows:  
 
5.2.1. Securitisation of mortgage loans and regulatory capital arbitrage 
 
According to several authors, regulatory capital arbitrage will be manifested in that 
securitising mortgage loans will cause the reduction of regulatory capital level with little 
or no reduction of risks. Banks would securitise the less risky portion of their portfolio, 
retain the riskier part, extend their loans portfolio with lax criteria and the average level of 
risk of the loans portfolio will hence increase.  The researcher looked at the relationship 
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between the volume of securitisation and regulatory capital as defined by the Basel 
Accords, the relationship between the volume of securitisation and total risk and the 
relationship between the volume of securitisation and total loans.  
 
The empirical results, recapitulated in a framework further down, are:  
 
A1(a).38 The relationship between the outstanding volume of mortgage loans 
securitized and the regulatory capital is negative. So, securitized mortgage loans 
reduce the level of regulatory capital. This result suggests that SA banks securitise 
mortgage loans for regulatory capital arbitrage. They might have found the 
regulatory capital required higher, and thus costlier, than the economic capital they 
deemed sufficient to hold for the portion of loans securitised, and resolved it is more 
profitably to remove these assets from their balance sheets.   
 
A2.  The relationship between the outstanding volume of mortgage loans 
securitized and the measure of risks is positive. This result indicates that 
securitising mortgage loans increases the overall level of SA banks’ risk. As 
explained in the literature, banks usually retain the junior tranches, namely the 
riskiest share of loans securitised. The purpose is saving their reputation vis-a-vis 
the investors, but more importantly, freeing more capital as they can be strategically 
                                                          
38 References of the framework in Figure 5.1 
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included in the portfolio with the knowledge that the required regulatory capital for 
the level of risk these tranches carry is ultimately less than the appropriate 
economiccapital.  
A3.  The relationship between the outstanding volume of mortgage loans 
securitized and the volume of the loans portfolio is equally positive. This implies 
that SA banks use the proceed of mortgage loans securitization to expand their 
loans portfolio. This would have been perceived as the normal step forward after 
securitization if the increasing risk suggested by the previous results did not occur. 
The researcher interprets this outcome as a signal that confirms the assumption 
that most banks that securitise their loans get more lax in their credits valuations 
and in so doing, accumulate more risk.  
 
5.2.2 Securitisation and Bank Stability 
 
The second part of the study focused on the impact of the securitisation of mortgage loans 
on SA banks’ stability. The results on bank stability measured by CAMELS are as follows: 
 
A1(b). Capital (the economic capital, not the regulatory capital): The relationship 
between the outstanding volume of mortgage loans securitized and capital, proxied 
with the simple leverage ratio, is negative. We observe that the effect of mortgage 
loans securitisation is identical on the regulatory capital and the economic capital. 
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This also confirms our previous suggestion that regulatory capital arbitrage is one 
of the potential reason why SA banks use these innovative activities.   
 
A4. Asset quality: The relationship between the outstanding volume of mortgage 
loans securitized and asset quality, proxied by the volume of off-balance sheets 
activities and risk weighted assets ratio is positive, indicating a deterioration of asset 
quality via an increase of risks. 
 
A5. Management efficiency: The relationship between the outstanding volume of 
mortgage loans securitized and management efficiency, proxied by cost-to-income 
ratio is positive, showing that these mortgage loans securitisation transactions 
increase the cost level of SA banks involved. 
 
A9. Earnings: The relationship between the outstanding volume of mortgage loans 
securitized and bank profitability, proxied by the return on asset ratio is positive. 
These results suggest that despite an increase in costs, securitisation of mortgage 
loans remains profitable for SA banks. 
 
A8. Liquidity: The relationship between the outstanding volume of mortgage loans 
securitized and the liquidity measure is positive as well. This prompts the comment 
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that SA banks securitise mortgage loans not only for regulatory capital arbitrage, 
but also for funding purposes. 
 
A10. Sensitivity to market risk: The relationship between the outstanding volume of 
mortgage loans securitized and SA banks’ sensitivity to market interest risk is 
positive. The net interest income to total assets ratio remains positively related to 
the securitisation of mortgage loans.  This indicates that even when interest rate 
varied the securitisation of mortgage loans was used productively perhaps by 
charging upfront higher interest rate to riskier loans.   
 
Impact of economic variables on CAMELS: results suggest that House prices (B2) 
increase over the period studied had a negative effect on SA banks’ capital, it has 
contributed in the deterioration of assets quality, pushed upward SA banks 
operating costs relative to operating income, had a tightening effect on banks’ 
earnings. However, it has improved SA banks’ liquidity and net interest income 
relative to total assets.    
 
B1 - With regards to GDP, results have established an inverse relationship with 
asset quality where Off-balance sheet activities relative to risk weighted assets has 
increased with a declining SA GDP. A negative relationship was also found between 
GDP and net interest income to total assets ratio implying that under a liquidity 
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constrained environment due to slow economy, SA banks might have increased 
their intermediation costs to preserve their margin.  
 
In brief, the CAMELS measure of bank stability reveals that securitising mortgage loans 
may be a good thing in the short term but it harms SA banks’ resilience capacity should 
they be faced with serious economic conditions.   
 
The results with bank stability when measured by Z-score are: 
 
A6.  The relationship between the outstanding volume of mortgage loans 
securitized and Z-score is negative. This result shows and confirms that for SA 
banks, an increase of mortgage loans securitisation might represent a threat for 
their stability. It reduces their distance to insolvability.  
 
A7.  The relationship between the volume of mortgage loans securitized and Z-
score when the researcher includes part of the retained interest in the form of 
subordinated loans in the baseline model, is equally negative. However, the 
relationship between subordinated debt and Z-score is positive. The finding is 
contrary to what transpired from the GFC but could be explained by the fact that 
the size of subordinated loans provided by SA banks to special purpose vehicles 
(SPVs) remains inconsequential.  
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A8. Bank size in previous studies favors large banks with regards to the decision to 
securitise. Large size also facilitates portfolio diversification to reduce risk. 
However, large size creates the too-big-to-fail belief that exacerbate the risk taking 
behaviour. In this study, bank size is significant in explaining the contraction of SA 
banks’ capital ratio, the increase of risk and loans, and the reduction of the distance 
of insolvability.  
 
B2. Impact of economic variables on Z-score: House price exhibited a positive 
relationship with Z-score, meaning that the increase of house prices during the 
period studied might have enhanced SA banks’ stability. However, B1. GDP did 
not have any statistical significance in explaining the changes of the Z-score.   
 
Section 5.3. Theoretical Interpretation of the Results 
 
The theoretical lenses through which the results are explained are Agency Theory (AT) 
and Institutional theory (IT).  
 
5.3.1 Agency Theory 
 
The researcher uses some of the key concepts developed in the AT and IT to tentatively 
enlighten why SA banks securitise mortgage loans and the effect on their stability. In other 
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words, here the researcher tries to clarify whether SA banks’ managers securitised 
mortgage loans with the interests of the regulators in mind and the repercussions of their 
decisions. The main concepts from AT to do so are goal conflict, approximated by the 
regulatory capital arbitrage indicators; asymmetry of information, proxied by 
securitisation volume; risk, proxied by the ratios total loans and risk weighted assets to 
total assets; and outcome uncertainty,  proxied by the measures of bank stability. The 
concepts are employed under the AT assumptions that banks are self-interested  but risk-
averse  and regulators are self-interested  but risk-neutral. From IT, we focus on the 
concept of legitimacy, approximated by effective compliance to regulation,  meaning no 
RCA.  
 
In Chapter 2, regulatory capital arbitrage, in the context of this study, and its consequences 
are presented as originating from the friction in the relationship between regulators and 
banks due to conflicting goals. This goal conflict is reflected in the difference between the 
regulatory capital required by the regulator and the economic capital, which is the banks’ 
internal desired level of capital. We have found the features of that relationship consistent 
with the characteristics of the implicit administered contracts, which has provided us with 
a bridge to AT.  
 
The core of AT’s simple model is a metaphoric contractual relationship between a 
principal and an agent where the agent acts on behalf of the principal. However, this 
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relationship has problems of asymmetry of information, because the agent hides its 
behaviour from the principal, and risk sharing, because the principal is assumed risk-
neutral and the agent risk-averse. In the end, conflicting goals and conflicting risk 
preferences arise together with monitoring costs. In the literature, the researcher has 
located a rare interesting instance where banks as “regulatee”-agents would act in place of 
the regulator (the principal), because they have been given the latitude to choose among 
the provisions of a regulation, and the options that best match the features of their 
activities. One would expect banks to simply comply with the regulations as subordinates 
and not as substitutes of the regulators. This uncommon case permitted the researcher to 
reflect the assumptions of AT on the relationship between the SA Reserve Bank (the 
regulator implementing the Basel Accords) and SA banks, and to formulate the 
hypotheses. In the AT framework, banks are assumed risk averse while regulators are 
assumed risk neutral, which causes conflicting risk preferences. To solve the agency 
problems, AT’s simple model suggests a behaviour-oriented or an outcome-oriented 
contract, which are however respectively subject to outcome uncertainty due to random 
effects and transfer of risk to the agent. 
 
In the context of this study, regulators’ goals are to preserve the safety, the soundness and 
the stability of the whole banking system from potential systemic crisis. However, banks 
are in pursuit of profits. Competition has narrowed their margins and innovative but risky 
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products, such as securitisation, provide them with extra revenues. Opacity surrounding 
these products create asymmetry of information between banks and regulators.  
Regulations are thus inadequately tailored to reach the regulators’ goals. Banks then use 
the loopholes in these regulations to not comply or to partially comply, which is called 
regulatory arbitrage. Regulators with the Basel Accords have thus given banks the latitude 
to choose, within the dispositions provided, those that align with the goals of securing the 
banking system better. Unfortunately, this has only opened a free way for more 
delinquencies even though the control systems via tightened provisions have improved.    
 
From the assumptions of AT then, we recall the hypotheses and then interpret the results 
as follows:  
 
Null hypothesis (1) stated that, if SA banks are risk-averse agents (AT), then they do not 
securitise mortgage loans for regulatory capital arbitrage (RCA) because it is risky, it 
increases the insolvency probability of banks and do not align with the regulators’ (the 
principal’s) aims to safeguard the banking system. In other words, statistically, Mortgage 
loans securitization does not negatively affect Total risk-based capital ratio of securitising 
SA banks, nor positively affect their risk and loan ratios.The results have suggested 
otherwise. They seem to indicate instead that RCA has taken place during the period 
studied and thus reject the null hypothesis. These results tell us that banks’ managers are 
indeed rational self-interested agents as predicted by the AT theory because their decision 
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to securitise mortgage loans to uphold less capital, ignores the regulators’ purpose. 
However, engaging in RCA contradicts the risk-averse profile these banks are supposed to 
have, according to the simple model of the AT.  However, from a more progressive aspect 
of AT,  where the risk-averse assumption is relaxed, agents are less risk-averse and the 
risk-reward trade-offs substitute to the pejorative way to interpret risk (Eisenhardt, 1988). 
 
An alternatively Hypothesis (1) expected that if SA banks are risk-averse agents (AT), 
then they would securitise mortgage loans for funding purposes or simply securitise to 
transfer risk to the investors. Consequently, mortgage loans securitisation would positively 
affect South African banks’ liquidity ratios.  
Remarkably, the results from the CAMELS analysis accept this hypothesis and has shown 
that in addition to regulatory capital arbitrage, SA banks also securitise mortgage loans for 
liquidity needs.  From the AT perspective, if we consider the relax assumption where banks 
are less risk-averse, this would mean once again that SA banks are positioned in the 
risk/reward type of decision making process when it comes to securitisation.   
 
Null Hypothesis (2) is related to the concept of outcome uncertainty (SA banks’ stability), 
which depends on SA banks’ behaviour as well as the economic conditions (random 
effects). If SA banks do not engage in regulatory arbitrage because they are risk-averse 
and random effects are favorable, then mortgage loans’ securitisation do not negatively 
affect SA banks’ stability (Ho). 
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This hypothesis is rejected by the empirical results and the alternative hypothesis that 
stipulated that the contrary is accepted. This implies that SA banks have shown themselves 
less risk-averse (here, consistent with the relax of the simple model’s assumptions) and 
regulatory capital arbitrage together with SA’s slow economy, led to a negative effect of 
securitization of mortgage loans on SA banks’ stability. A less risk averse agent engaging 
in RCA and good economic conditions may yield the same results but with less concern as 
with some increased profits from securitisation, banks would eventually retain more 
earnings to strengthen their capital.  
 
5.3.2.  Institutional Theory  
 
According to the IT, legitimacy derives from complying with the legal or quasi-legal 
requirements. The researcher hypothesizes that if SA banks want to preserve their well-
capitalised reputation, which confers legitimacy, then they will not securitise mortgage 
loans for regulatory arbitrage (Ho). Alternatively, regulatory arbitrage will erode their 
legitimacy (H1).The results are interpreted in accordance with this definition of 
legitimacy. Using securitisation of mortgage loans as a source of funding by SA banks will 
be construed as conforming to legal requirements and RCA as non-conformity.   
Therefore, results reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative.   
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Section 5.4. Policy Implications and Recommendations 
 
Over the period studied (2008-2015), where Basel II and Basel III were enforced, the 
researcher observes that the regulators searched for more transparency in the way banks 
report their activities in their balance sheets. For example, they require that banks  disclose 
details of their capital components and if these components are presented in the form of 
ratios, the calculation method used must be clearly indicated. Drawing the parallel with 
Agency Theory, higher level of capital and more robust information systems seem to have 
been found by the regulator as the optimal way to curb the agency problem. However, the 
results from this study are suggesting that setting up an information system to control the 
banks’ behaviour is not enough. The recommendations are as follows: 
 
The researcher agrees with the advocates of simplicity (C1) in the formulation of 
regulations and suggest (C3) tighter regulation on activities that have higher likelihood to 
propagate systemic risk and lax regulation, or not all, on others, or even forward-looking 
loan loss provisioning. This would render banks more responsible for their individual fate 
and reduce moral hazard.   
 
AT also assumes that the principal (the regulators) is self-interested. The literature 
mentions cases of revolving-door goals and regulations being purposefully complexified 
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(Krueger & Duncan, 1994; Heyes, 2000). We recommend regulators to be genuinely risk-
averse (C2) as the extended simple model of AT assumes they are, and less self-interested.  
 
Through training, regulators should be more knowledgeable (C2) about banks’ activities 
and processes. This would reduce asymmetry of information and thus loopholes in the 
regulations.   
 
The introduction of incentives (C4) such as compensation and rewards such as rebates on 
costs, discount on interest rate among others, if compliance is proved effective and 
efficient. These incentives are justified as it will always be a challenge for the regulators to 
know exactly what banks are doing, given the pace at which banks’ activities evolve. This 
will also reduce the perception that the regulation requirements are costly.  
 
(C5). A combination of behavior-based (behavior control: information system) and 
outcome based contract (outcome required: bank stability) between banks and regulators 
where proper behavior occurs, should lead to adequate compliance. 
 
A positive impact of securitisation on banks’ stability is viewed in the literature as the result 
of a closed monitoring of securitised assets (C6). The same policy is recommended for SA 
banks.  
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See Figure 5.1. below for a framework on securitisation of mortgage loans’ influence on 
banks’ capital, risk, stability and recommendations.
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Figure 5.1. Framework on Securitisation of Mortgage Loans’ Influence on Banks’ Capital, 
Risk, Stability and Recommendations. 
 
 
Section 5.5 Suggestions for Future Research 
 
5.5.1. So far, this study focused on the banks’ side of the agency relationship. Further 
studies could look at the regulators’ side by examining how their profile impact the 
efficiency of regulations.  
 
5.5.2. Others could research the effect of securitisation under the Basel III securitisation 
framework effective from 2018 on banks’ capital adequacy ratio and on other bank stability 
measures such as non-performing loans and Expected Default Frequency. 
 
5.5.3. Looking at whether the determinants including credit risk transfer, reputation, 
performance and specialisation justify securitisation transactions in South Africa may 
equally yield interesting outcomes. 
 
5.5.4.  Further study may also examine the impact of other assets securitised than mortgage 
loans, such as credit cards receivables, auto loans and commercial mortgages on the 
banking and shadow banking’s stability.  
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Appendices 
A) Appendix of Chapter 2 
Table 2.1: Survey of the studies related to this thesis 
Study Model Period Country Key variables Findings 
RCA and securitisation (in chronological order) 
[1] (Calomiris & Mason, 
2004) 
OLS 
Probit 
Tobit 
1996 USA Tier 1 + Tier 2/on-
balance sheet Assets 
Tier 1 + Tier 2/managed 
Assets 
Cash + Government 
securities/ on-balance 
sheet Assets 
Insured deposit/Total 
deposits 
Managed credit cards 
portfolio securitised 
Min 90 days past due 
loans/Total loans 
Min 90 days past due 
loans/Total assets 
Efficient 
contracting RCA 
(+) Credit Cards 
 
Safety net abuse 
RCA (-) Credit 
Cards 
[2] (Ambrose et al., 
2005) 
Model 
prepayment – 
default 
probabilities 
OLS 
Logit 
 
1995 -1997 USA Loan-to-value ratio 
Effective yield-10 years 
Treasury rate 
Credit score borrower 
RCA (+) RMBS 
Reputation (+) 
[3] (Martín-Oliver & 
Saurina, 2007) 
Probit 
Tobit 
1999–2006 Spain Solvency ratio 
(Capital/RWA) 
Liquidity ratio 
RCA (-) / 
Liquidity (+) for 
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(loan/deposit) 
Risk profile (Non-
performing loans ratio) 
Funding cost 
Covered bonds 
and ABS 
Transfer of risk (-) 
RCA (+) for SMEs 
loans 
[4] (Uzun & Webb, 
2007) 
Matched sample 
approach 
 
Fixed-effects 
Logit 
2001 – 2005 USA Tier 1 leverage ratio 
Tier 1 capital ratio 
Total risk-based capital 
ratio 
Loan ratio 
RCA (+) (Credit 
Cards) 
RCA (-) RMBS 
and other assets 
[5] (Dionne & 
Harchaoui, 2008) 
Instrumental 
variable model 
1988 – 1998 Canada Tier 1 leverage ratio 
Total risk based capital 
ratio 
Loan ratio 
ROE-ROA 
Cost of capital 
Securitisation ratio 
RCA (+) 
Risk taking (+) 
 
[6] (Hänsel & Bannier, 
2008) 
Logit 1997-2004 EU  Tier 1 ratio 
Equity share 
Credit risk provision/net 
interest income 
ROE 
Cost/ income ratio 
Credit default 
probability 
Rating downgrades to 
upgrades ratio 
S.T & L.T interest rates  
Yield diversified stock 
index 
RCA (+/-) CLO 
Credit risk transfer 
(+) CLO 
Funding (+) CLO 
Access to capital 
market based 
businesses + fee 
income (+) 
(performance) 
“Reverse” RCA 
(+) 
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[7] (Cardone-Riportella 
et al., 2010) 
Logit 2000 – 2007 Spain Total risk-based capital 
ratio 
Equity/Total Assets 
Interbank loans ratio 
Liquid assets/Deposits + 
S.T funding 
NPL/Gross loans 
ROE - ROA 
Credit Risk 
Transfer (-) 
RCA (-) 
Liquidity (+) 
Performance (+) 
[8] (Agostino & 
Mazzuca, 2011) 
Probit 1999 – 2006 Italy Tier 1 ratio 
Loans to assets ratio 
Interbank ratio 
Liquidity ratio 
Historical cost 
Leverage 
Market funding ratio 
ROA- Interest ratio 
RCA and Funding 
(+) (RMBS) 
Funding and 
Specialisation (+) 
(NPL) 
[9] (Cerrato et al., 
2012) 
Logit / Probit 
 
Bank fixed-effect 
model 
2000 – 2010 UK Tier 1 ratio 
Total risk-based capital 
ratio 
Capital funds and Equity 
ratios 
Interbank ratio 
Other liquidity ratios 
NPL/gross loans 
RROA (rate of return on 
operating assets) 
 
Funding (+) 
globally 
RCA and credit 
risk transfer (+) 
(ABS) 
RCA and Funding 
(+) (CDO) 
OTD (+) for 
ABS/CDOs’ high 
default rate 
Profitability (+) 
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[10] (Jiangli & Pritsker, 
2008) 
Semi-parametric 
Instrumental 
variable analysis 
OLS 
2001 – 2007 USA Time deposits premium 
Leverage ratio 
ROE 
Cost of funding 
Share of loans/Assets 
Nonaccrual + charge off 
/ Loans 
Insolvency risk (-) 
(MBS) 
Profitability (+) 
(MBS) 
Leverage ratios 
(+) (MBS) 
[11](Michalak & Uhde, 
2011) 
Instrumental 
variable 
1997 – 2007 EU / 
Switzerlan
d 
Securitisation/total 
assets 
Securitisation/net loans 
Z-Score (accounting 
based: (ROAA+Equity 
capital/Total 
Assets)/SdROAA) + Z-
Score (market based: 
Distance to Default, 
Expected default 
Frequency, Banks’ stock 
return volatility) 
Tier 1 
Financial 
Soundness (-) due 
to RCA 
 
Profitability (-) 
capital 
environment (-) 
Return’s volatility 
(+) 
[12] (Salah & Fedhila, 
2012) 
 
Generalized Least 
Square Method 
2001 – 2008 USA Mortgage Securitised 
/Total Assets 
Non-mortgage 
securitised Assets/Total 
Assets 
RWA/Total Assets 
Z-Score (ROAA+Equity 
capital/Total 
Assets)/SdROAA) 
Total capital/Total 
Assets 
ROE 
 
Degradation 
portfolio (+) 
Credit risk (+) 
Profitability (+) 
Stability (+) 
(MBS) 
Stability (-) (non-
MBS) 
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Liquid Assets/Total 
Assets 
Real Interest Rate 
[13] (López-Andión et 
al., 2015) 
Dynamic panel 
data model 
Forward 
orthogonal 
deviations 
generalized 
method of 
moment model 
(GMM) 
1998 – 2012 Spain Total securitisation 
Cost-income ratio 
Impaired loans to gross 
loans 
Net interest margin 
S.T interest rates 
Liquid assets to Total 
assets 
Z-score 
Stability (-) (MBS 
+ ABS) from 1998 
to 2006 due to 
RCA 
Stability (+) from 
2007 – 2012 
 
Stability (no 
effect) (covered 
bonds – liabilities 
securitisations) 
 
 
B) Appendix of Chapter 4  
Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics of all the variables used in this study (quarterly detailed) 
 
 LNSEC_TA LNTL_TA LNLA_DST LNTL_DST LNROE LNOE_OI 
 Mean -4.723117 -0.327375 -2.080014 -0.009208 -1.933409 -0.618855 
 Median -4.725696 -0.326815 -1.977650 -0.012952 -1.965310 -0.591830 
 Maximum -4.342951 -0.288430 -1.878611  0.040357 -1.620448 -0.556925 
 Minimum -5.233914 -0.354749 -2.435612 -0.041880 -2.066802 -0.735134 
 Std. Dev.  0.298332  0.019260  0.200797  0.026156  0.128737  0.061710 
 Skewness -0.236711  0.616639 -0.719676  0.536606  1.686794 -0.923327 
 Kurtosis  1.938608  2.870005  1.906133  2.269361  4.838571  2.307136 
       
 Jarque-Bera  1.800909  2.050495  4.357707  2.247491  19.68191  5.186925 
 Probability  0.406385  0.358708  0.113171  0.325060  0.000053(*)  0.074761 
       
 Sum -151.1398 -10.47599 -66.56045 -0.294660 -61.86908 -19.80335 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  2.759057  0.011500  1.249902  0.021209  0.513773  0.118052 
       
 Observations  32  32  32  32  32  32 
 
(*) annual probability 0.08 
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 LNCAR LNINTERBKRATE LNROA LNIE_DST LNOBS_RWA LNTE_TA 
 Mean -1.911440  1.586649 -4.624895 -2.859638 -1.359665 -2.685003 
 Median -1.905429  1.446919 -4.615272 -3.029315 -1.382425 -2.677174 
 Maximum -1.849055  2.319442 -4.491842 -2.302585 -1.198896 -2.598160 
 Minimum -2.022774  1.252763 -4.767689 -3.130407 -1.641768 -2.870427 
 Std. Dev.  0.049462  0.347383  0.080109  0.301083  0.142057  0.084261 
 Skewness -1.146524  1.125516 -0.257533  0.954818 -0.582503 -1.098289 
 Kurtosis  3.830930  2.956491  2.556876  2.227153  2.589482  3.449446 
       
 Jarque-Bera  7.931355  6.758719  0.615536  5.658668  2.034350  6.702611 
 Probability  0.018955(*)  0.034069(**)  0.735086  0.059052  0.361615  0.035039(***) 
       
 Sum -61.16608  50.77278 -147.9966 -91.50841 -43.50929 -85.92010 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  0.075842  3.740924  0.198940  2.810184  0.625590  0.220098 
       
 Observations  32  32  32  32  32  32 
 
(*), (**) and (***) are significant at 1% level, others are at 5% level. (*) annual probability 0.37; (**) annual probability non-log 
0.003; (***) annual probability 0.43 
 
 
 LNZSCORE LNDST_TA LNNII_TA LNNII_NOR LNLA_TA LNRWA_TA 
 Mean  3.992617 -0.319456 -3.625408 -0.840614 -2.403644 -0.660903 
 Median  4.007145 -0.316128 -3.634391 -0.846034 -2.282782 -0.655881 
 Maximum  4.063198 -0.293030 -3.571986 -0.811404 -2.171557 -0.623621 
 Minimum  3.872450 -0.371064 -3.665163 -0.867303 -2.813411 -0.733969 
 Std. Dev.  0.066476  0.024273  0.030141  0.017304  0.225087  0.031222 
 Skewness -0.547984 -0.951991  0.538637  0.307269 -0.752148 -1.402431 
 Kurtosis  1.998968  3.048313  2.064392  2.131388  1.998459  4.296161 
       
 Jarque-Bera  2.937615  4.836638  2.714507  1.509524  4.354652  12.72971 
 Probability  0.230200  0.089071  0.257367  0.470122  0.113344  0.001721(*) 
       
 Sum  127.7638 -10.22259 -116.0131 -26.89965 -76.91661 -21.14891 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  0.136990  0.018264  0.028162  0.009282  1.570586  0.030219 
       
 Observations  32  32  32  32  32  32 
 
(*) annual probability 0.20 
 
 
 LNTA_RWA LNSBL_SEC LNBKSIZE LNBCON LNHP LNGDP 
 Mean  0.660144 -3.403126  14.76796 -1.683476  6.005711  0.663155 
 Median  0.655157 -2.995652  14.75174 -1.679328  5.964474  0.852374 
 Maximum  0.732849 -2.680922  15.03210 -1.666008  6.211002  1.308333 
 Minimum  0.621651 -4.615221  14.58448 -1.709258  5.872118 -0.693147 
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 Std. Dev.  0.031273  0.721624  0.143515  0.015943  0.118462  0.629543 
 Skewness  1.351195 -0.590935  0.492706 -0.436781  0.550766 -1.061382 
 Kurtosis  4.225223  1.635308  2.155672  1.708152  1.937979  3.170301 
       
 Jarque-Bera  11.73877  4.345599  2.245237  3.242644  3.121679  6.046844 
 Probability  0.002825(*)  0.113858  0.325427  0.197637  0.209960  0.048635(**) 
       
 Sum  21.12460 -108.9000  472.5746 -53.87125  192.1827  21.22095 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  0.030319  16.14299  0.638490  0.007880  0.435032  12.28604 
       
 Observations  32  32  32  32  32  32 
 
(*) Annual probability 0.23; (**) is significant at 1% level and annual probability was 0.46 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Graphs of all the variables 
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Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix Securitisation and regulatory 
arbitrage  
Table 4.3a Descriptive statistics  
 
      
      Variable Name Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs    
       
       LNCAR -1.91 0.04 -2.02 -1.84 32  
LNSEC_TA -4.72 0.29 -5.23 -4.34 32  
LNTL_TA -0.32 0.01 -0.35 -0.29 32  
LNROE                 -1.93 0.12 -2.06 -1.62 32  
LNROA -4.62 0.08 -4.76 -4.49 32  
LNINTERATE 1.58 0.34 1.25 2.31 32  
LNIE_DST  -2.85 0.30 -3.13 -2.30 32  
LNTL_DST -0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.04 32  
LNDST_TA -0.31 0.02 -0.37 -0.29 32  
LNBSIZE 14.76 0.14 14.58 15.03 32  
LNRWA_TA -0.66 0.03 -0.73 -0.62 32  
       
           
All variables are normally distributed except CAR, ROE, INTERBKRATE, RWA_TA. 
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Table 4.3b:  Correlation Matrix 
 
 LNCAR LNSEC_TA LNDST_TA LNTL_DST LNROE LNROA LNTL_TA LNINTBKRATE LNIE_DST LNBKSIZE LNRWA_TA 
LNCAR  1.00              
LNSEC_TA -0.41  1.00              
LNDST_TA  0.89 -0.58  1.00           
LNTL_DST -0.53  0.58 -0.68  1.00           
LNROE -0.85  0.34 -0.71  0.16  1.00        
LNROA -0.38 -0.08 -0.16 -0.42  0.78  1.00        
LNTL_TA  0.32  0.11  0.24  0.53 -0.59 -0.73  1.00      
LNINTBKRATE -0.88  0.68 -0.90  0.72  0.69  0.15 -0.07  1.00     
LNIE_DST -0.81  0.80 -0.87  0.81  0.62  0.06  0.07  0.94  1.00   
LNBKSIZE  0.25 -0.98  0.45 -0.52 -0.18  0.20 -0.17 -0.56 -0.69  1.00  
LNRWA_TA 0.91 -0.47 0.87 -0.48 -0.89 -0.47 0.35 -0.83 -0.77 0.32 1.00 
 
 
 LNRWA_TA LNSEC_TA LNROE LNTL_TA LNDST_TA LNTL_DST LNBKSIZE   
LNRWA_TA  1.00           
LNSEC_TA -0.47  1.00           
LNROE -0.89  0.34  1.00        
LNTL_TA  0.35  0.11 -0.59  1.00       
LNDST_TA  0.87 -0.58 -0.71  0.24  1.00     
LNTL_DST -0.48  0.58  0.16  0.53 -0.68  1.00    
LNBKSIZE  0.32 -0.98 -0.18 -0.17  0.45 -0.52  1.00   
        
  
 
 
 
 
 LNTL_TA LNSEC_TA LNROE LNINTERBKRATE LNIE_DST LNROA LNDST_TA LNTL_DST LNBKSIZE 
LNTL_TA  1.00            
LNSEC_TA  0.11  1.00         
LNROE -0.59  0.34  1.00        
LNINTERBKRATE -0.07  0.68  0.69  1.00       
LNIE_DST  0.07  0.80  0.62  0.94  1.00     
LNROA -0.73 -0.08  0.78  0.15  0.06  1.00    
LNDST_TA  0.24 -0.58 -0.71 -0.90 -0.87 -0.16  1.00   
LNTL_DST  0.53  0.58  0.16  0.72  0.81 -0.42 -0.68  1.00  
LNBKSIZE -0.17 -0.98 -0.18 -0.56 -0.69  0.20  0.45 -0.52 1.00 
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Table 4.3 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix Securitisation and bank stability 
  
 
Securitisation and Capital 
Table 4.4a Descriptive statistics  
 
      
      Variable Name Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs    
       
       LNTE_TA -2.68 0.08 -2.87 -2.59 32  
LNSEC_TA -4.72 0.29 -5.23 -4.34 32  
LNTL_TA -0.32 0.01 -0.35 -0.29 32  
LNLA_DST  -2.08 0.20 -2.43 -1.87 32  
LNTL_DST -0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.04 32  
LNROE                 -1.93 0.12 -2.06 -1.62 32  
LNOE_OI                  -0.61 0.06 -0.73 -0.55 32  
LNBKSIZE                 14.76 0.14 14.58 15.03 32  
LNHP 6.00 0.11 5.87 6.21 32  
       
       The composition of our variables is essentially made of ratios. As such, the mean is more appropriate as the measure of central tendency, 
unlike of the mode or the median (Gay, Mills, & Airasian, 2006). Except perhaps the variable LNOE_OI, all the other variables 
pertaining to the determination of the relationship between LNSEC_TA and LNTE_TA are huddled around their respective mean and 
quite close together. Likewise, their respective standard deviations, which is the measure of variance, are all less that one. This is an 
indication that our data are less spread out, meaning that they are not too far from the mean.  
Table 4.4b Correlation matrix 
 LNTE_TA LNSEC_TA LNTL_TA LNLA_DST LNTL_DST LNROE LNOE_OI LNBKSIZE LNHP   
LNTE_TA  1.00              
LNSEC_TA -0.63  1.00          
LNTL_TA  0.23  0.11  1.00          
LNLA_DST  0.87 -0.87 -0.09  1.00          
LNTL_DST -0.65  0.58  0.53 -0.81  1.00       
LNROE -0.79  0.34 -0.59 -0.53  0.16  1.00      
LNOE_OI  0.75 -0.79  0.04  0.85 -0.57 -0.69  1.00      
LNBKSIZE  0.50 -0.98 -0.17  0.78 -0.52 -0.18  0.68  1.00     
LNHP  0.54 -0.97 -0.01  0.78 -0.43 -0.32  0.78  0.96  1.00   
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Securitisation and Asset quality 
Table 4.4c Descriptive statistics  
 
      
      Variable Name Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs    
       
       LNOBS_RWA -1.35 0.14 -1.64 -1.19 32  
LNSEC_TA -4.72 0.29 -5.23 -4.34 32  
LNCAR -1.91 0.04 -2.02 -1.84 32  
LNTL_DST -0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.04 32  
LNROE                 -1.93 0.12 -2.06 -1.62 32  
LNROA                 -4.62 0.08 -4.76 -4.49 32  
LNINTERBRATE                  1.58 0.34 1.25 2.31 32  
LNBKSIZE                 14.76 0.14 14.58 15.03 32  
LNHP 6.00 0.11 5.87 6.21 32  
LNGDP 0.66 0.62 -0.69 1.30 32  
       
       All variables are throng together around the mean. 
 
Table 4.4d Correlation matrix 
 
 LNOBS/RWA LNSEC_TA LNCAR LNTL_DST LNTL_TA 
LNINTB
KRATE LNROE LNROA LNBKSIZE LNHP LNGDP 
LNOBS_RWA  1.00             
LNSEC_TA -0.79  1.00               
LNCAR  0.67 -0.41  1.00          
LNTL_DST -0.30  0.58 -0.53  1.00           
LNTL_TA  0.47  0.11  0.32  0.53  1.00       
LNINTERBKRATE -0.74  0.68 -0.88  0.72 -0.07  1.00        
LNROE -0.69  0.34 -0.85  0.16 -0.59  0.69  1.00      
LNROA -0.32 -0.08 -0.38 -0.42 -0.73  0.15  0.78  1.00      
LNBKSIZE  0.72 -0.98  0.25 -0.52 -0.17 -0.56 -0.18  0.20  1.00   
LNHP  0.81 -0.97  0.30 -0.43 -0.00 -0.58 -0.32  0.00  0.96  1.00  
LNGDP -0.44  0.05 -0.07 -0.54 -0.84 -0.05  0.32  0.45 -0.05 -0.13  1.00 
All independent variables are suitably correlated except LNSEC/LNHP; LNSEC/LNBKSIZE and LNBKSIZE/LNHP. We have 
employed them with one period lag.  
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Securitisation and Management efficiency 
 
Table 4.4e Descriptive statistics  
 
      
      Variable Name Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs    
       
       LNOE_OI -0.61 0.06 -0.73 -0.55 32  
LNSEC_TA -4.72 0.29 -5.23 -4.34 32  
LNTL_TA -0.32 0.01 -0.35 -0.28 32  
LNIE_DST  -2.85 0.30 -3.13 -2.30 32  
LNOBS_RWA -1.35 0.14 -1.64 -1.19 32  
LNTL_DST                 -0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.04 32  
LNROE                  -1.93 0.12 -2.06 -1.62 32  
LNBKSIZE                 14.76 0.14 14.58 15.03 32  
LNHP 6.00 0.11 5.87 6.21 32  
       
       All variables are clustered around the mean. 
 
Table 4.4f Correlation matrix 
 
 LNOE_OI LNSEC_TA LNTL_TA LNIE_DST LNOBS_RWA LNTL_DST LNROE LNBKSIZE LNHP 
LNOE_OI  1.00            
LNSEC_TA -0.79  1.00            
LNTL_TA  0.04  0.11  1.00           
LNIE_DST -0.89  0.80  0.07  1.00         
LNOBS_RWA  0.75 -0.79  0.47 -0.74  1.00      
LNTL_DST -0.57  0.58  0.53  0.81 -0.30  1.00      
LNROE -0.69  0.34 -0.59  0.62 -0.69  0.16  1.00    
LNBKSIZE  0.68 -0.98 -0.17 -0.69  0.72 -0.52 -0.18  1.00  
LNHP 0.78 -0.97 -0.01 -0.70 0.81  -0.43  -0.32 0.96  1.00 
Except LNBKSIZE, all independent variables are reasonably correlated.  
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Securitisation and Profitability 
 
Table 4.4g Descriptive statistics  
 
      
      Variable Name Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs    
       
       LNROA -4.62 0.08 -4.76 -4.49 32  
LNSEC_TA -4.72 0.29 -5.23 -4.34 32  
LNTL_TA -0.32 0.01 -0.35 -0.28 32  
LNOE_OI -0.61 0.06 -0.73 -0.55 32  
LNTE_TA -2.68 0.08 -2.87 -2.59 32  
LNOBS_RWA -1.35 0.14 -1.64 -1.19 32  
LNTL_DST                 -0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.04 32  
LNROE                  -1.93 0.12 -2.06 -1.62 32  
LNBKSIZE                 14.76 0.14 14.58 15.03 32  
LNHP                 6.00 0.11 5.87 6.21 32  
       
       Here also, all the variables are grouped around the mean.  
 
Table 4.4h Correlation matrix 
 
 LNSEC_TA LNOE_OI LNTL_TA LNTE_TA LNOBS_RWA LNTL_DST LNROE LNBKSIZE LNHP LNROA 
LNSEC_TA  1.00             
LNOE_OI -0.79  1.00             
LNTL_TA  0.11  0.04  1.00           
LNTE_TA -0.63  0.75  0.23  1.00         
LNOBS_RWA -0.79  0.75  0.47  0.79  1.00       
LNTL_DST  0.58 -0.57  0.53 -0.65 -0.30  1.00      
LNROE  0.34 -0.69 -0.59 -0.79 -0.69  0.16  1.00    
LNBKSIZE -0.98  0.68 -0.17  0.50  0.72 -0.52 -0.18  1.00    
LNHP -0.97  0.78 -0.01  0.54  0.81 -0.43 -0.32  0.96  1.00   
LNROA -0.08 -0.34 -0.73 -0.24 -0.32 -0.42  0.78  0.20  0.01 1.00 
All the variables are properly correlated except LNSEC/LNHP; LNSEC/LNBKSIZE and LNBKSIZE/LNHP. We included them with 
one period lag also. 
  
 LNROA LNSEC_TA LNOE_OI LNTL_TA LNTE_TA LNOBS_RWA LNTL_DST LNROE LNBKSIZE LNHP1 
LNROA  1.00            
LNSEC_TA -0.08  1.00           
LNOE_OI -0.34 -0.79  1.00           
LNTL_TA -0.73  0.11  0.04  1.00          
LNTE_TA -0.24 -0.63  0.75  0.23  1.00         
LNOBS_RWA -0.32 -0.79  0.75  0.47  0.79  1.00      
LNTL_DST -0.42  0.58 -0.57  0.53 -0.65 -0.30  1.00     
LNROE  0.78  0.34 -0.69 -0.59 -0.79 -0.69  0.16  1.00   
LNBKSIZE  0.20 -0.98  0.68 -0.17  0.50  0.72 -0.52 -0.18  1.00  
LNHP  0.01 -0.97  0.78 -0.01  0.54  0.81 -0.43 -0.32  0.96  1.00 
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All the variables are properly correlated except LNSEC/LNHP; LNSEC/LNBKSIZE and LNBKSIZE/LNHP. We included them with 
one period lag also. 
 
Securitisation and Liquidity 
 
Table 4.4i Descriptive statistics  
 
      
      Variable Name Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs    
       
       LNLA_DST -2.08 0.20 -2.43 -1.87 32  
LNSEC_TA -4.72 0.29 -5.23 -4.34 32  
LNTL_DST                 -0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.04 32  
LNOBS_RWA -1.35 0.14 -1.64 -1.19 32  
LNZSCORE 3.99 0.06 3.87 4.06 32  
LNROA -4.62 0.08 -4.76 -4.49 32  
LNINTERATE 1.58 0.34 1.25 2.31 32  
LNBSIZE                 14.76 0.14 14.58 15.03 32  
LNHP                 6.00 0.11 5.87 6.21 32  
       
       All variables are normally distributed except Lninterbankrate 
 
Table 4.4j Correlation matrix 
 
 LNLA_DST LNSEC_TA LNTL_DST LNZSCORE LNINTBKRATE LNOBS_RWA LNROA LNBKSIZE LNHP 
LNLA_DST 1.00         
LNSEC_TA -0.87 1.00        
LNTL_DST -0.81 0.58 1.00       
LNZSCORE 0.93 -0.73 -0.81 1.00      
LNINTBKRATE -0.90 0.68 0.72 -0.93 1.00     
LNOBS_RWA 0.76 -0.79 -0.30 0.75 -0.74 1.00    
LNROA 0.02 -0.08 -0.42 0.01 0.15 -0.32 1.00   
LNBKSIZE 0.78 -0.98 -0.52 0.63 -0.56 0.72 0.20 1.00  
LNHP 0.78 -0.97 -0.43 0.62 -0.58 0.81 0.01 0.96 1.00 
All independent variables are appropriately correlated except LNINTBKRATE/LNZSCORE and LNBKSIZE/LNHP. The latter were 
included with one period lag as well.  
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Securitisation and Sensitivity to market risk 
 
Table 4.4k Descriptive statistics  
 
      
      Variable Name Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs    
       
       LNNIM_TA -3.62 0.03 -3.66 -3.57 32  
LNSEC_TA -4.72 0.29 -5.23 -4.34 32  
LNTE_TA -2.68 0.08 -2.87 -2.59 32  
LNDST_TA -0.31 0.02 -0.37 -0.29 32  
LNINTERATE 1.58 0.34 1.25 2.31 32  
LNTL_DST                 -0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.04 32  
LNBKSIZE                 14.76 0.14 14.58 15.03 32  
LNHP                 6.00 0.11 5.87 6.21 32  
LNGDP                 0.66 0.62 -0.69 1.30 32  
       
       Variables here, are also closed to their mean. All variables are normally distributed except LNTE_TA, LNINTERBKRATE and 
LNGDP.  
 
Table 4.4l Correlation matrix 
 
 LNNIM_TA LNSEC_TA LNTE_TA LNDST_TA LNINTBKRATE LNTL_DST LNBKSIZE LNHP LNGDP 
LNNIM_TA  1.00           
LNSEC_TA -0.24  1.00          
LNTE_TA  0.45 -0.63  1.00          
LNDST_TA  0.49 -0.58  0.96  1.00       
LNINTBKRATE -0.27  0.68 -0.93 -0.90  1.00      
LNTL_DST -0.01  0.58 -0.65 -0.68  0.72  1.00    
LNBKSIZE  0.22 -0.98  0.50  0.45 -0.56 -0.52  1.00   
LNHP  0.34 -0.97  0.54  0.50 -0.58 -0.43  0.96  1.00  
LNGDP -0.43  0.05 -0.10 -0.10 -0.05 -0.54 -0.05 -0.13  1.00 
All the variables are suitably correlated except LNSEC/LNHP; LNSEC/LNBKSIZE; LNTE_TA/LNINTERBKRATE and 
LNBKSIZE/LNHP. Likewise, they were used with one period lag to correct perfect multicollinearity.  
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Securitisation and Z-score (1) 
 
Table 4.4m Descriptive statistics  
 
      
      Variable Name Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs    
       
       LNZSCORE       
LNTE_TA -2.68 0.08 -2.87 -2.59 32  
LNSEC_TA -4.72 0.29 -5.23 -4.34 32  
LNLA_TA -2.40 0.22 -2.81 -2.17 32  
LNRWA_TA -0.66 0.03 -0.73 -0.62 32  
LNTL_DST -0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.04 32  
LNROE                 -1.93 0.12 -2.06 -1.62 32  
LNINTERBRATE                  1.58 0.34 1.25 2.31 32  
LNBKSIZE                 14.76 0.14 14.58 15.03 32  
LNHP 6.00 0.11 5.87 6.21 32  
LNGDP                 0.66 0.62 -0.69 1.30 32  
       
        
Table 4.4n Correlation matrix 
 
 
 LNZSCORE LNSEC_TA LNRWA_TA LNTE_TA LNLA_TA LNTL_DST LNROE LNINTBKRATE LNBKSIZE LNHP LNGDP 
LNZSCORE  1.00               
LNSEC_TA -0.73  1.00           
LNRWA_TA  0.82 -0.47  1.00          
LNTE_TA  0.96 -0.63  0.93  1.00          
LNLA_TA  0.94 -0.85  0.75  0.89  1.00        
LNTL_DST -0.81  0.58 -0.48 -0.65 -0.81  1.00      
LNROE -0.60  0.34 -0.89 -0.79 -0.55  0.16  1.00     
LNINTBKRATE -0.93  0.68 -0.83 -0.93 -0.91  0.72  0.69  1.00    
LNBKSIZE  0.63 -0.98  0.32  0.50  0.76 -0.52 -0.18 -0.56  1.00   
LNHP  0.62 -0.97  0.39  0.54  0.76 -0.43 -0.32 -0.58  0.96  1.00  
LNGDP  0.05  0.05 -0.20 -0.10  0.05 -0.54  0.32 -0.05 -0.05 -0.13  1.00 
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Securitisation and Z-score (2) 
 
Table 4.4o Descriptive statistics  
 
  
 
      
      Variable Name Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs    
       
       LNZ-SCORE 4.18 0.08 4.03 4.29 32  
LNSEC_TA -4.56 0.34 -5.09 -4.09 32  
LNSBL_SEC -3.40 0.72 -4.61 -2.68 32  
LNINTERBKRATE 1.58 0.34 1.25 2.31 32  
LNTL_DST -0.07 0.02 -0.10 -0.04 32  
LNRWA_TA -0.66 0.04 -0.74 -0.59 32  
LNNII_TA -3.68 0.03 -3.72 -3.64 32  
LNBKSIZE 14.42 0.16 14.21 14.70 32  
LNHP 6.00 0.11 5.87 6.21 32  
LNGDP 0.66 0.62 -0.69 1.30 32  
LNBCON -1.68 0.01 -1.70 -1.66 32  
       
        
  
 
 
Table 4.4p Correlation matrix 
 
 LNZSCORE2 LNSEC_TA LNSBL_SEC LNINTERBKRATE LNTL_DST LNRWA_TA LNNIM_TA LNBKSIZE LNBCON LNHP LNGDP 
LNZ-SCORE2  1.00               
LNSEC_TA -0.84  1.00          
LNSBL_SEC  0.95 -0.87  1.00           
LNINTERBKRATE -0.88  0.75 -0.91  1.00        
LNTL_DST  0.57 -0.64  0.45 -0.35  1.00        
LNRWA_TA  0.87 -0.59  0.84 -0.83  0.27  1.00        
LNNII_TA  0.36 -0.12  0.14 -0.02  0.61  0.19  1.00      
LNBKSIZE  0.76 -0.96  0.76 -0.58  0.71  0.45  0.23  1.00     
LNBKCON -0.79  0.96 -0.76  0.61 -0.77 -0.46 -0.31 -0.98  1.00   
LNHP  0.73 -0.95  0.71 -0.58  0.77  0.39  0.24  0.97 -0.99  1.00  
LNGDP -0.10 -0.01  0.06 -0.05 -0.61 -0.07 -0.63 -0.05  0.14 -0.13 1.00 
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 Table 4.4 Unit root tests of all the variables 
  Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (*) Phillips-Perron test (*)   
     
  T-values (lags) /P-values T-values(bandwidth) /P-values   
  Model specification 5% significance 5% significance Conclusion 
  Intercept -0,416(4) / 0,89 0,658(13) / 0,98   
LnBKCON Trend and Intercept -2,265(4) / 0,43 -3,266(30) / 0,09 Non-stationary 
  None 1,880(4) / 0,98 3,510(14) / 0,99   
  Intercept 0,544(4) / 0,98 1,677(30) / 0,99   
LnBKSIZE  Trend and Intercept -2,265(4) / 0,43 -3,595(26) / 0,04 Non-stationary 
  None  2,360(4) / 0,99 2,470(14) / 0,99   
  Intercept -2,381(0) / 0,15 -2,470(1) / 0,13   
LnGDP  Trend and Intercept -3,502(3) / 0,05 -2,428(1) / 0,35 Non-stationary 
  None -1,879(0) / 0,05 -1,90(1) / 0,055   
  Intercept 0,109(0) / 0,96 1,344(30) / 0,99   
LnHP Trend and Intercept -2,537(0) / 0,31 -2,442(8) / 0,352 Non-stationary 
  None 1,868(4) / 0,98 4,519(30) / 0,99   
  Intercept -1,641(0) / 0,45 -2,264(20) / 0,18   
LnLA-DST Trend and Intercept -1,319(0) / 0,86 -1,088(7) / 0,91 Non-stationary 
  None -1,912(0) / 0,05 -2,348(11) / 0,02   
  Intercept -1,624(0) / 0,45 -1,730(2) / 0,40   
LnNII-NOR Trend and Intercept -1,869(0) / 0,64 -1,909(1) / 0,62 Non-stationary 
  None 0,022(0) / 0,68 0,02(0) / 0,68   
  Intercept -1,877(0) / 0,33 -1,843(4) / 0,35   
LnOBS-RWA Trend and Intercept -2,572(0) / 0,29 -2,560(3) / 0,29 Non-stationary 
  None -1,467(0) / 0,13 -1,709(4) / 0,08   
  Intercept -1,747(0) / 0,39 -1,719(4) / 0,41   
LnOE-OI Trend and Intercept -15,12(7) / 0,00 -2,024(2) / 0,56 Non-stationary 
  None -1,479(0) / 0,12 -1,637(4) / 0,09   
  Intercept -2,540(0) / 0,11 -2,562(2) / 0,11   
LnROAA Trend and Intercept -11,85(7) / 0,00 -2,244(7) / 0,44 Non-stationary 
  None 0,318(0) / 0,77 0,318(0) / 0,77   
  Intercept 0,530(4) / 0,98 1,165(14) / 0,99   
LnSEC-TA  Trend and Intercept -2,475(4) / 0,33 -5,039(30) / 0,00 Non-stationary 
  None 2,193(4) / 0,99 5,65(14) / 0,99   
  Intercept -2,374(0) / 0,15 -2,755(15) / 0,07   
LnTE-TA Trend and Intercept -1,283(0) / 0,87 -0,148(30) / 0,99 Non-stationary 
  None -1,165(0) / 0,21 -1,249(3) / 0,18   
  Intercept -2,515(0) / 0,12 -2,515(0) / 0,12   
LnTL-LA Trend and Intercept -2,469(0) / 0,33 -2,521(1) / 0,31 Non-stationary 
  None -0,415(0) / 0,52 -0,415(0) / 0,52   
  Intercept -2,412(0) / 0,14 -2,452(7) / 0,13   
LnCAR Trend and Intercept -1,562(0) / 0,78 -1,073(23) / 0,91 Non-stationary 
  None -0,832(0) / 0,34 -0,840(1) / 0,34   
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 (*) Ho: the variable has unit root
 
 
  Intercept -1,460(0) / 0,54 -1,497(1) / 0,52   
LnZSCORE Trend and Intercept -2,262(0) / 0,29 -2,673(1) / 0,25 Non-stationary 
  None 0,648(0) / 0,85 0,653(1) / 0,85   
 Intercept -2,263(0) / 0,18 -2,311(5) / 0,17   
LnDST-TA Trend and Intercept -1,274(0) / 0,87 -0,673(7) / 0,96 Non-stationary 
 None -0,937(0) / 0,30 -0,947(1) / 0,29   
 Intercept -1,441(0) /0,54 -1,469(1) / 0,53   
LnTL-DST Trend and Intercept -1,354(0) / 0,85 -1,470(2) / 0,81 Non-stationary 
 None -1,287(0) / 0,17 -1,315(1) / 0,17   
 Intercept -9,208(7) / 0,00 -3,222(9) / 0,02   
LnROE Trend and Intercept -9,371(7) / 0,00 -2,306(10) / 0,41 Non-stationary 
 None -0,616(0) / 0,84   0,623(1) / 0,84   
 Intercept -2,828(1) /0,06 -2,048(3) / 0,26   
LnInterbkrate Trend and Intercept -1,733(4) / 0,70  0,229(10) / 0,99 Non-stationary 
 None -1,520(1) / 0,11 -1,973(0) / 0,04   
 Intercept -2,484(4) / 0,13 -2,533(21) /0,11   
LnIE-DST Trend and Intercept -0,292(3) / 0,98 0.033(22) / 0,99 Non-stationary 
 None 0,090(4) / 0,70 1,376(4) / 0,95   
 Intercept -2,352(0) / 0,16 -2,352(0) /0.16   
LnROA Trend and Intercept -5,109(7) / 0,00 -2,345(2) /0,39 Non-stationary 
 None 0.440(0) / 0,80 0,440(0) / 0.80   
 Intercept -2,587(0) / 0,10 -2,829(7) /0,06   
LnRWA-TA Trend and Intercept -1,960(0) / 0,59 -1,559(8) / 0,78 Non-stationary 
 None -0,899(0) / 0,31 -0,909(1) / 0,31   
 Intercept -1,869(0) / 0,34 -1,988(2) /0,29   
LnNII-TA Trend and Intercept -6,100(7) / 0,00 -1,837(2) /0,66 Non-stationary 
 None -0,049(0) / 0,65 -0,049(0) / 0,65   
 Intercept -1,765(0) / 0,39 -2,447(20) / 0,13   
LnLA-TA Trend and Intercept -1,219(0) / 0,88 -0,888(8) / 0,94 Non-stationary 
 None -1,837(0) / 0,06 -2,108(9) / 0,03   
 Intercept -1.590(0) / 0,47 -1.620(9) / 0,46   
LnSBL-SEC Trend and Intercept -1,080(0) / 0,91 -1.005(5) / 0,92 Non-stationary 
 None -1.854(0) / 0,06 -2.030(7) / 0,04   
 Intercept -2,573(0) / 0,10 -2,803(7) / 0,06   
LnTA-RWA Trend and Intercept -1,960(0) / 0,59 -1,573(7) / 0,78 Non-stationary 
 None -0,891(0) / 0,32 -0.900(1) / 0,31   
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Table 4.6 RCA - Estimated results with the Two Stage Least Squares method 
 
 Dependent 
variables 
Independent 
variables 
RWA_TA 
 
TL_TA 
 
 SEC_TA 0.897(0.044) * 0.483(0.204) ** 
 ROA  -0.520(0.222) ** 
 TL_TA -0.755(0.050) *  
 ROE -0.425(0.010) * 0.169(0.153) 
 IE_DST  -0.004(0.005) 
 Interbrate  -0.019 (0.012) 
 TL_DST 0.100(0.063) 0.342(0.329) 
 DST_TA 1.221(0.059) *     1.573(0.557) ** 
 BKSIZE       1.456(0.071) * 0.987(0.435) ** 
 Dum2008 0.001 (0.001) *** 0.001(0.001)  
 Constant -0.001 (0.001) ***  -0.001 (0.001)  
 N 30 30 
(*) significance at 1% level. (**) significance at 5% level. (***) significance at 10% level 
Instruments variables: lnsec_ta1 lnroe1 lnie_dst1(-1) lninterbkrate lnroa1 lndst_ta1 lntl_dst1 lnbksize1 Dum2008 
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Table 4.7 Securitisation and RCA - Robustness check - Estimated results 
 
 Dependent 
variables 
Independent 
variables 
 
SEC_TA 
 
 
TA_RWA 
 
 CAR -0.929 (0.171) *  
 SEC_TA  -0.867(0.05) * 
 TL_TA 0.655(0.618)  -0.680(0.031) * 
 LA_DST 0.481(0.345)  
 ROE  -0.411(0.010) * 
 TL_DST 0.721 (0.426) -0.128(0.069) *** 
 DST_TA -1.433(1.562) -1.177(0.03) * 
 BKSIZE -1.157(0.143) *       -1.410(0.063) * 
 Dum2013 -0.002(0.003)   -0.008 (0.001)  
 Constant -0.001 (0.001) *** 0.000 (0.000) *** 
 Std error 
regression 
0.005 0.001 
 N 30 30 
         (*) significance at 1% level. (**) significance at 5% level. (***) significance at 10% level 
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Table 4.9 Securitisation and Bank stability - Robustness check - Estimated results 
 
 Dependent 
variables 
Independent 
variables 
 
ROE 
 
NII_NOR 
 
LA_TA 
 SEC_TA 0.136(0.021) * 0.206(0.05) * 0.917(0.026) * 
 TL_TA 0.261(0.113) ** -4.069(0.44) *  
 IE_DST -0.000(0.004) 
(-1) 
  
 TE_TA -0.996(0.015) *   
 OBS_RWA -0.004(0.025) 0.516(0.060) * 0.135(0.015) * 
 TL_DST -1.131(1.187) * 1.822(0.373) * -1.928(0.319) * 
 ROA 1.051(0.001) *  0.126(0.015) * 
 DST_TA  -0.074(0.061) 
(-1) 
 
 Interbkrate   0.001(0.008) 
 Z-SCORE   2.265(0.03) * 
 ROE  -0.095(0.018) *  
 BKSIZE 0.025(0.014) *** 
(-1) 
 0.042(0.026) 
(-1) 
 HP 0.091(0.026) * 
(-1) 
-0.192(0.047) * 
(-1) 
0.157(0.041) * 
 GDP  -0.055(0.004) *  
 Dum2013 0.001(0.001) 0.001 (0.002) 0.001(0.001) 
 Constant 0.00(0.00) -0.001 (0.001) 0.001(0.001) 
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 Std error 
regression 
0.001 0.003 0.003 
 N 29 29 29 
                        (*) significance at 1% level. (**) significance at 5% level. (***) significance at 10% level 
 
 
  
Table 4.10 Estimated results RCA with original data 
Dependent variables       
Independent 
Variables 
CAR 
(I) 
RWA_TA 
(II) 
TL_TA 
(III) 
SEC_TA -5.042 (1.767) * 21.19 (1.74) * 19.02 (2.16) * 
                        (*) significance at 1% level – Other control variables are intentionally not reported 
Table 4.11 Estimated results Securitisation and Bank stability with original data                                                                                                                    
   CAMELS    Z-SCORES  
Dependent    
variables 
Independent 
variables 
Capital Asset  
Quality 
Management 
Efficiency 
Earnings Liquidity Sensitivity 
to market 
risk 
Z-score (1) Z-score (2) 
SEC_TA -2.37 
(0.061) * 
-9.20 
(2.41) * 
43.19 
(17.92) * * 
0.461 
(0.001) * 
9.47 
(1.10) * 
0.383 
(0.159) * * 
-667 
(6.17) * 
-1262 
(23.58) * 
SBL_SEC        53.77 
(2.02) * 
(*) significance at 1% level. (**) significance at 5% level - Other control variables are intentionally not reported 
